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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
CLAUDIA J, COX, 
Claimant, 
vs. 
UTAH POWER AND LIGHT/ENERGY 
MUTUAL INSURANCE, EMPLOYERS 
REINSURANCE FUND, and THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 930342-CA 
Priority No. 7 
Industrial Commission 
No. 9200255 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ENERGY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
IN RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR 
REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ORDER 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
a) Whether there is sufficient evidence to show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, a causal relationship between 
applicant's industrial injury of, August 15, 1988 and her claimed 
permanent and total disability. 
b) Whether the applicant is entitled to an award for being 
permanently and totally disabled under the odd lot doctrine. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appeal filed herein is to seek a review of the Industrial 
Commission's Order denying Applicant's request for a permanent 
total disability award. The Industrial Commission denied 
Applicant's request for a permanent total disability award on the 
basis that Applicant had not proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence that her total disability was caused by the industrial 
accident of August 15, 1988, and further held that the odd lot 
doctrine did not apply in this case because there was no proven 
medical causation between the accident of August 15, 1988 and 
Petitioner's alleged permanent total disability. 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the Industrial 
Commission's Order, dated April 28, 1993, which upheld the 
Administrative Law Judge's determination that Petitioner was not 
entitled to a permanent total disability award because Petitioner 
had failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that her 
permanent total disability was caused by the industrial incident 
of August 15, 1988. 
Thereafter, on May 27, 1993, Applicant filed a timely Petition 
for Writ of Review. 
The Appeals Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2) (1988); 35-
1-86 (1988); 63-46(b)16(4)(1988); 78-2a-3(2) (1988); and Rule 14 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues presented for consideration in this appeal are: 
a) Whether there is sufficient evidence to prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, a causal relationship between 
applicant's industrial injury of August 15, 1988 and her claimed 
permanent and total disability. 
Standard of Review: 
Is the "substantial evidence" standard because the issue of 
medical causation is a question of fact and "the Commission's 
findings of fact will be affirmed if they are supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record." 
Willardson v. Industrial Commission, 216 U.A.R. 12 (Utah App. June 
28, 1993); Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 
1992); and Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46(b)-16 (4) (1988); 
and 
b) Whether Petitioner is entitled to an award for being 
permanently and totally disabled under the odd lot doctrine. 
Standard of Review: 
Is the "correction of error," standard since the issue above 
presented involves questions of law, and no deference to the 
agency's view of the law is necessary or required. Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-
46(b)-16(4) (1988), Willardson v. Industrial Commission, 216 U.A.R. 
3 
12 (Utah App. June 28, 1993), King v. Industrial Commission, 850 
P2d 1281, 1286 (Utah App, 1993), Luckau v. Board of Review, 840 P2d 
811 (Utah App. 1992), and Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing 
Division, 814 P2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINING STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-45 and 35-1-67 (1988) are 
the applicable and determinative statutory provisions. See 
Appendix "A." 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
On February 4, 1993, Petitioner's claim for a permanent 
disability award was denied by the Administrative Law Judge on the 
basis that Petitioner had failed to show, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the industrial incident of August 15, 1988 was the 
cause of Petitioner's total disability. 
On March 5, 1993, Petitioner made a Motion for Review before 
the Industrial Commission. 
On April 28, 1993, the Industrial Commission upheld the 
Administrative Law Judge's Order and denied Petitioner's Motion for 
Review. 
On May 27, 1993, Petitioner filed her appeal with the above 
entitled Court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For purposes of this appeal, Respondent accepts the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law as determined by the Administrative 
Law Judge and the Industrial Commission. The relevant facts which 
should be considered in determining this appeal are as follows: 
1. Petitioner had back pain as early as 1959 (R-68, 
Appendix B at 2)• 
2. From 1972 forward, Petitioner suffered from 
fatigue/anemia/depression and, in 1973, Petitioner was seen for 
allergic rhinitis (R-66, Appendix Bat 3). 
3. In 1977, Petitioner began working for Utah Power & Light 
in a clerical/accounting position (R-66, Appendix B at 3). 
4. In 1978, Petitioner began seeing a chiropractor for 
treatment of a non work related traumatic lumbar-sacral strain 
(R-66, Appendix B at 3) . 
5. Thereafter, Petitioner sought chiropractic treatments two 
times a week in September and October, 1978; once or twice a week 
in July 1979; almost daily in August 1979; almost daily in late 
August 1980; almost daily in late 1981, tapering off in October and 
November 1981; two to four times a month from April through October 
1982; two to four times a month in February, June, July and 
December of 1983; three times a week from mid May through mid June 
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1984; almost daily in late August 1986, tapering off in September 
1986 (R-67, Appendix B at 4) . 
6. On October 4, 1986, Petitioner was injured in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico while on vacation at the hot air balloon 
festival (R-67, Appendix B at 4) . 
7. In 1986, Petitioner was treated for depression on a 
weekly basis for at least six (6) months at a mental health clinic 
(R-68, Appendix B at 5). 
8. In December, 1986, Dr. L. Gaufin diagnosed Petitioner as 
suffering from acute and chronic lumbar radiculopathy secondary to 
centrally herniated L4-5 disc, a mild bulge at L3-4, cervical 
radiculopathy secondary to encroachment upon the nerve roots C4-
5 and C5-6 bilaterally (R-68, Appendix B at 5). 
9. On January 5, 1987, Dr. L. Gaufin performed a semi-hemi 
laminotomy foraminotomy and nerve root decompression at L4-5 on 
Petitioner (R-68, Appendix B at 5). 
10. On March 10, 1987, Dr. Gaufin did a second surgery on 
Petitioner and performed an anterior cervical diskectomy with nerve 
root decompression and interbody fusion C4-5 and C5-6 (R-69, 
Appendix B at 6). 
11. On August 5, 1987, Petitioner was released by Dr. Gaufin 
to return to work (R-68, Appendix B at 5). 
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12. In December, 1987, Petitioner, while at work, sat down 
on her chair, and as she sat down, the chair rolled back and away 
from her so that Petitioner slid off the end of the seat and fell 
to the floor on her buttocks (R-69, Appendix B at 6). 
13. While the above incident resulted in back pain and right 
leg pain with muscle spasms, Petitioner did not visit a doctor or 
miss any work time. Petitioner did, however, get a refill of soma 
on December 29, 1987 (R-69-70, Appendix B at 6-7). 
14. On August 15, 1988, Petitioner suffered a second accident 
at work. Petitioner attempted to open the bottom drawer of one of 
her co-worker's file drawers. Said file drawer, unknown to 
Petitioner, was filled with papers and books. When Petitioner 
tried to open the drawer, it stuck, injuring Petitioner's neck and 
back (R-70, Appendix B at 7). 
15. There were no immediate doctor visits resulting from the 
August 15, 1988 injury; but Petitioner did mention on September 29, 
1988, when she saw her doctor for a mammogram, that she had 
reinjured her neck "the other day" and needed a soma refill (R-
70, Appendix B at 7) . 
16. After the August 15, 1988 incident, Petitioner continued 
to have pain in her neck, shoulders, and arms, and numbness in the 
first, second and third digits of both hands. However, medical 
tests performed by Dr. Gaufin and others showed a stable fusion at 
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C4-5 and C5-6, but degenerative disc disease at C6-7, producing a 
bar-type defect obliterating the thecal sac and impinging the nerve 
roots bilaterally, right greater than left; with no evidence of 
recurrent disc injury in the lumbar areas; and normal nerve tests 
(R-71, Appendix B at 8). 
17. Petitioner worked overtime from January 1990 through 
April 1990 (R-72, Appendix B at 9). 
18. On July 9, 1990, Petitioner was seated at her desk and 
merely turned her head with resultant neck spasm and symptoms down 
her spine (R-73, Appendix B at 10). 
19. As a result of the July 9, 1990 incident, Petitioner was 
reduced to even less activity than she performed after the August 
15, 1988 accident, and was, as a result of the July 9, 1990 
incident, "Totally down" (R-77, Appendix B at 10). 
20. After the July 9, 1990 incident, Petitioner was unable 
to continue working because of her pain (R-73, Appendix B at 10) . 
21. On February 11, 1992, Petitioner filed her Application 
for Hearing asking for unpaid medical expenses, temporary total 
compensation, permanent partial compensation, permanent total 
compensations and interest (R-l). 
22. On November 3, 1992, Petitioner was referred to a Medical 
Panel which issued its report on November 27, 1992 (R-39-49, 
Appendix C at 1-11). Said Medical Panel Report was adopted by the 
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Administrative Law Judge to resolve the issues of causation and 
impairment (R-80, Appendix B at 17). 
23. The medical panel rated Petitioner's cervical spine 
lumbar spine and her hypothyroidism and based upon those factors, 
found Petitioner to have a 36% whole person partial permanent 
impairment (R-78, Appendix B at 15). 
24. Of said 36%, the medical panel found 1.27% attributable 
to the December 12, 1987 injury and 2.87% attributable to the 
August 15, 1988 accident (R-78, Appendix B at 15). 
25. The remainder of the 36% impairment the medical panel 
found attributable to non-industrial causes (R-78, Appendix B at 
15). 
26. The medical panel found that Petitioner suffered from 
depression with pre-existing personality disorder. The medical 
panel held these problems were the result of multiple non-
industrial factors, but did not rate said factors (R-78, Appendix 
B at 15). 
27. On December 21, 1992, Petitioner was found to be disabled 
by the Social Security Administration (R-51-57, 65, Social 
Security Decision, Appendix D at 1-6). 
28. The Social Security Decision lists ten (10) separate 
problems that contribute to Petitioner's disability which include 
a lumbar disc surgery in January, 1987, cervical disc surgery in 
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March 1987, post traumatic right, greater than left, hand numbness 
with decreased grip and intermittent hand pain, fibromyalgia 
syndrome, inflammatory polyarthritis, polypharmacy, hypothyroidism, 
degenerative joint disease, degenerative disc disease, depression 
and passive dependent personality disorder. Nowhere in said 
determination was the incident of August 15, 1988 mentioned or 
considered as a reason or cause of Petitioner's disability (R-
54, Appendix D at 2). 
29. The Administrative Law Judge noted that although six (6) 
of the problems listed in the Social Security Disability Award 
possibly may have been affected by Petitioner's industrial 
injuries, there was no evidence of that fact in this case (R-83, 
Appendix B at 20). 
30. On March 31, 1992, a functional capacity evaluation was 
performed at Carbon Emery Physical Therapy/Alta Health Services 
which found that Petitioner could do light/sedentary work (R-76, 
Appendix B at 13) . 
31• On June 15, 1992, a Career Guidance Center report 
concluded there are jobs available for which the applicant is 
trained, but that she may have difficulty finding an employer 
willing to make the accommodations that are necessary in order for 
her to tolerate the workplace (R-77, Appendix B at 14). 
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32. The Administrative Law Judge found that Petitioner was 
probably totally disabled due to multiple factors as noted in the 
Social Security decision (R-85, Appendix B at 22). 
33. Based on all of the above, the Administrative Law Judge 
denied Petitioner's claim for permanent total disability benefits 
associated with the August 15, 1988 and July, 1990 incidents and 
dismissed Petitioner's claim with prejudice (R-85, Appendix B at 
22) . 
34. The Administrative Law Judge made no separate finding 
with respect to Petitioner's ability to work (R-85, Appendix B at 
22) . 
35. The Industrial Commission affirmed the Administrative Law 
Judge's decision on the grounds that the relatively small 
proportion of the applicant's impairment that related to the August 
15, 1988 industrial accident was insufficient to support a finding 
that applicant's permanent total disability was caused by the 
August 15, 1988 accident (R-122, Appendix E at 7). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. For Petitioner to succeed in obtaining permanent total 
disability benefits, Petitioner must prove her disability is 
medically the result of an exertion or injury that occurred during 
a work-related activity. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P2d 
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15, 27 (Utah 1986). In this case, no evidence has been presented 
by Petitioner that her August 15, 1988 work related incident caused 
her to become totally disabled. There is evidence that the 
Petitioner has an impairment of 2.85% as a result of the August 15, 
1988 accident and that thereafter she suffered some additional 
pain; but no medical evidence that said pain resulted in 
Petitioner's becoming totally disabled. 
2. The odd lot doctrine cannot be applied to Petitioner's 
claim for benefits because no causal relationship between the 
August 15, 1988 accident and Petitioner's total disability has been 
established. Zupon v. Industrial Commission, 221 U.A.R. 37 (Utah 
App. Sept. 14, 1993); and even if such a connection were 
established, the Administrative Law Judge made no finding as to 
Petitioner's ability to work (R-85, Appendix B at 22), nor was 
there the required showing by Petitioner that the Division of 
Vocational Rehabilitation had determined that Petitioner could not 
be rehabilitated as set forth in Zimmerman v. Industrial 
Commission. 785 P2d 1131 (Utah App. 1989). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE AND THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
PROPERLY FOUND THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO SHOW MEDICAL 
CAUSATION BETWEEN THE AUGUST 15, 1988 INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT AND 
APPLICANT'S ALLEGED PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY. 
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Petitioner argues that the Workers' Compensation Act "should 
be liberally construed and applied to provide coverage and any 
doubts should be resolved in favor of the applicant." 
Luckau v. Board of Review. 840 P2d 811, 815 (Utah App. 1992). 
Petitioner then argues that "The ALJ and the Industrial 
Commission did not give the applicant the benefit of the doubt in 
any regard and thus have defeated the purpose of this act, leaving 
Ms. Cox without remedy" (Appellant's brief, p.10). 
Petitioner misreads and has misinterpreted the law. While it 
is true that the Workers' Compensation Act should be liberally 
construed to provide coverage, that does not mean that Petitioner 
is entitled to the "benefit of the doubt" in proving that the 
August 15, 1988 accident was the cause of her disability. It is 
the statutes that are to be read broadly to provide coverage rather 
than the facts of the case as is suggested by Petitioner. The 
appropriate standard to be applied in this matter, and the standard 
which was applied is the "preponderance of the evidence" standard. 
Large v. Industrial Commission. 758 P2d, 954 (Utah App. 1988). 
In order to prove medical causation, Petitioner must prove, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that her disability is 
medically the result of an exertion or injury that occurred during 
a work-related activity." Willardson v. Industrial Commission, 216 
U.A.R. 12, (Utah App. June 28, 1993) (quoting Allen v. Industrial 
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Commission, 729 P2d 15 (Utah 1986) (Emphasis added). 
In this case, Petitioner failed to meet that burden of proof. 
Petitioner had a history of back pain dating back to 1959 
(R-68, Appendix B at 5). Petitioner injured her neck and back in 
a non-industrial accident on October 4, 1986 (R-67, Appendix B at 
4). As a result of the above referred to accident, Petitioner 
underwent a semi-hemi laminotomy, foraminotomy and nerve roct 
decompression at C4-5 on January 5, 1987, and an anterior cervical 
diskectomy with nerve root decompression and interbody fusion C4-
5 and C5-6 (R-69, Appendix B at 6). 
After recovering from these surgeries, Petitioner returned to 
work. Petitioner then injured herself in December, 1987 (R-69, 
appendix B at 6), on August 15, 1988 (R-71, Appendix B at 8), and 
on July 9, 1990 (R-73f Appendix B at 10). Petitioner testified 
that after the August 15, 1988 incident, she had to reduce her 
activities and suffered an increase in pain (R-71, Appendix B at 
8) ; but she continued to work and in fact worked overtime from 
January, 1990 through April, 1990 (R-72, Appendix B at 9) . On 
July 9, 1990, Petitioner, while at work, turned her head and 
suffered neck spasms and symptoms down her spine (R-73, Appendix 
B at 10). Thereafter, Petitioner's activities were reduced even 
more than they had been after the August 15, 198 8 incident and 
Petitioner described her then level of activity as "totally down" 
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(R-77, Appendix B at 14). After the July 9, 1990 incident, 
Petitioner never returned to work. 
In reviewing Petitioner's medical history, the medical panel 
found that the August 15, 1988 incident contributed 2.83% of the 
36% permanent partial impairment they granted Petitioner based on 
her reported back, neck and hypothyroidism problems (R-78, 
Appendix B at 15). However, the medical panel did not state that 
Petitioner's 2.83% impairment was in any way related to 
Petitioner's claimed permanent total disability. In Zupon, this 
Court found that a finding of medical causation issue between an 
industrial accident and permanent total disability is: 
"... a different question from, and not controlled in any way 
by the determination that ...[an] . . . industrial accident 
caused a permanent partial disability. Zupon v. Industrial 
Commission. 221 U.A.R. 37, 38 (Utah App., September 14, 1993). 
Based upon Zupon, the medical panel report fails to establish 
medical causation between the August 15, 1988 incident and 
Petitioner's alleged permanent total disability. 
Additionally, the Social Security Administration's Disability 
Award listed ten (10) items that caused Petitioner's disability, 
none of which included the December, 1987, the August 15, 1988, or 
the July 9, 1980 accidents (R-53-55, Appendix D at 1-3). In fact, 
the Administrative Law Judge found there was no evidence to show 
that the problems listed in the Jocial Security Award were in 
any way affected by the industrial accident of August 15, 1988 
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(R-83, Appendix B at 30). 
The Administrative Law Judge noted in her findings that the 
only evidence that the August 15, 1988 accident caused Petitioner's 
permanent total disability and was the "straw that broke the 
camel's back" was applicant's testimony; and that Petitioner's 
testimony alone was insufficient to sustain that theory (R-83, 
Appendix B at 20). 
Based upon all of the above factors, the* Administrative Law 
Judge and the Industrial Commission were well justified in finding 
that Petitioner had failed, by a preponderance of the evidence, to 
establish medical causation between the August 15, 1988 incident 
and Petitioner's alleged permanent total disability. 
In this matter, the Standard of Review which should be 
employed in determining whether to affirm or demy the Industrial 
Commission's ruling concerning medical causation is the substantial 
evidence standard. In Zupon, this court held: 
Medical causation is an issue of fact and we review the 
determination of the Industrial Commission under the 
substantial evidence standard. Zupon, Id. p.38. 
Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 
Willardson v. Industrial Commission, 216 U.A.R. 12, 13 (Utah App. 
16 
June 28, 1993), (quoting Stewart v. Board of Review, 831 P2d 134, 
137 (Utah App. 1992)• 
The lack of medical evidence establishing a causal relation 
between the August 15, 1988 accident and Petitioner's alleged 
permanent total disability, based upon the medical panel's failure 
to comment on the connection between the industrial accident and 
Petitioner's permanent total disability, the fact that said injury 
did not result in loss of work, any temporary total disability or 
the immediate need of medical care (R-82, Appendix B at 19), the 
Social Security Administration's decision, which did not attribute 
any portion of Petitioner's total disability to work related 
injuries and Petitioner's extensive history of pre-existing 
injuries, all amount to substantial undisputed evidence which 
supports the Industrial Commission's ruling that "Applicant has not 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence that her disability was 
caused by her industrial accident of August 15, 1988 (R-122, 
Appendix E at 7). 
POINT II 
THE ODD LOT DOCTRINE IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE. 
Petitioner argues that she is entitled to benefits under the 
odd lot doctrine, because permanent total disability benefits 
should be granted when "a relatively small percentage of impairment 
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caused by an industrial accident is combined with other factors to 
render claimant unable to obtain employment." Zimmerman v. 
Industrial Commission 785, P2d, 1127, 1131 (Utah App. 1989). 
However before the odd lot doctrine can apply, 
The Commission must first determine there is medical causation 
between the petitioner's... industrial accident and his now 
claimed permanent total disability. Zupon, 221 U.A.R. 37, 38 
(Utah App., September 14, 1993). 
In this case, if the Court affirms the Industrial Commission's 
ruling that Petitioner did not show by a preponderance of the 
evidence medical causation between the August 15, 1988 accident and 
her alleged permanent total disability, then such ci finding would 
preclude application of the odd lot doctrine "no matter how 
compelling the other factors". Zupon, Id. p.38. 
In addition, Petitioner would have to: 
Prove that he or she can no longer perform the duties required 
in his or her occupation . . . [and] . . . through cooperation with 
the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, must establish that 
he or she cannot be rehabilitated. Zupon. Id. p. 38. 
Petitioner has not presented any evidence that the Division 
of Vocation Rehabilitation has determined that she cannot be 
rehabilitated and in fact the evidence is that Petitioner can do 
light/sedentary work (R-76, Appendix B at 13). 
For the above stated reasons, application in this case of the 
odd lot doctrine would not be appropriate. 
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CONCLUSION 
The ruling of the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial 
Commission that Petitioner "has not proved by a preponderance of 
the evidence that her disability was caused by her industrial 
accident of August 15, 1988," and that "Applicant's claim for 
permanent total disability benefits under the odd lot doctrine 
likewise fails due to the lack of causal connection between the 
industrial accident and her permanent total disability" should be 
upheld. (R-122, Appendix E at 7). 
There is substantial evidence to support the commission's 
findings to deny benefits to Petitioner. Said ruling should be 
affirmed based upon the substantial evidence standard of review 
that mandates which the Industrial Commission's findings should be 
upheld if supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light 
of the whole record. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the decision of the 
Industrial Commission should be affirmed. 
DATED this % rJ^ day of November, 1993. 
FAIRBOURN & PESHELL 
Rinehart L. Peshell 
Attorney for Respondent 
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Statutes 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-45 
Injury arising out of or in course of em-
ployment 
"Act of God" is not by implication excluded 
in Subdivision (5) of this section. State Rd. 
Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 56 Utah 252, 
190 P. 544 (1920). 
Where mine superintendent was killed by 
holdup bandits as he entered store to purchase 
cigar for his own use, his death was not com-
pensable as "accidental" injury within this sec-
tion since in order to recover for accidental in-
jury there must be some causal connection or 
relation between act causing injury and em-
ployment or duties of injured employee. 
Westerdahl v. State Ins. Fund, 60 Utah 325, 
208 P. 494 (1922). 
Where state road employee while working on 
road sought shelter from storm and was struck 
by lightning, the accident arose out of and in 
course of employment State Rd Comm'n v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 56 Utah 252, 190 P. 544 
(1920). 
Under Subdivision (5) although an employee 
is employed on the day of an accident, it cannot 
be said he is in the course of his employment 
where he steps aside to engage in an alterca-
tion with some third person concerning a per-
sonal grievance wholly unrelated to matters 
connected with his employment. Wilkerson v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 71 Utah 355, 266 P. 270 
(1928). 
Wife of deceased drugstore employee was not 
entitled to compensation where she did not sus-
tain burden of proving that typhoid fever was 
result of injury received in course of his em-
ployment Chase v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 
Utah 141, 17 P-2d 205 (1932). 
Death of beer truck driver after being taken 
to the hospital when he had a severe pain in 
his chest after making his second morning de-
livery, did not result from an accident arising 
out of or in the course of his employment, 
where substance of opinions of medical panel 
was that death from coronary thrombosis with 
myocardial infarction was not caused from the 
exertion of deceased's work on that morning. 
Burton v. Industrial Comm'n, 13 Utah 2d 353, 
S74 P.2d 439 (1962). 
Regular course of employment 
Bricklayer killed in automobile accident 
while returning home from work was not killed 
in an accident arising out of or in the course of 
employment despite fact that decedent's hourly 
wage had been increased due to location of con-
struction site, increased hourly wage did not 
constitute pay for travel time. Barney v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 29 Utah 2d 179, 506 P-2d 1271 
(1973). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C-J.S. — 99 CJS, Workmen's Compensa-
tion I 1. 
AJLR. — Suicide as compensable under 
Workmen's Compensation Act, 15 AXJLSd 
616 
Workmen's compensation: injury or death 
due to storms, 42 ALJLSd 885. 
Workmen's compensation: injury sustained 
while attending employer-sponsored social af-
fair as arising out of and in the course of em-
ployment, 47 AXILSd 566. 
Master and servant: employer's liability for 
injury caused by food or drink purchased by 
employee in plant facilities, 50 AXJt 3d 505. 
Workers' compensation law as precluding 
employee's suit against employer for third per-
son's criminal attack, 49 A U U t h 926 
Workers' compensation: sexual assaults as 
compensable, 52 AI*H4th 731. 
Key Numbers, — Workers' Compensation 
• • 4 7 . 
35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid. 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured and the depen-
dents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the 
course of his employment, wherever such ixyury occurred, if the accident was 
not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on 
account of the injury or death, and such amoimt for medical, nurse, and hospi-
tal services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral 
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and 
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral 
expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the employer and its insur-
ance carrier and not on the employee. 
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-67 
35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of pay-
ments. 
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial accident, 
the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this section. Perma-
nent total disability for purposes of this chapter requires a finding by the 
commission of total disability, as measured by the substance of the sequential 
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20 
of the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. The commission shall adopt 
rules that conform to the substance of the sequential decision-making process 
of the Social Security Administration under 20 C.F.R. Subsections 404.1520 
(b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) (1) and (2), as revised. 
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-
week entitlement, compensation shall be 662/3% of the employee's average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited as follows: 
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury. 
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per 
week, plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child 
under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor 
children, but not exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (a) 
nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the 
injury. 
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation 
rate under Subsection (b) shall be 36% of the current state average 
weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar. 
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks 
of permanent total disability compensation except as outlined in Section 
35-1-69. The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay 
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in 
this section and Sections 354-65, 35-1-65.1, and 35-1-66, in excess of the 
amount of compensation payable over 312 weeks at the applicable permanent 
total disability compensation rate under Subsection (2) Any overpayment of 
this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier 
by the Employers* Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the Employers* 
Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee. 
(4) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its 
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of 
disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable perma-
nent total disability compensation rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation. Employers* 
Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer 
or its insurance carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Sec-
tion 35-1-69. Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection 
(2), the compensation payable by the Employers* Reinsurance Fund shall be 
reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of the 
Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same 
period. 
(5) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all 
cases be tentative and not final until all of the following proceedings have 
occurred: 
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35-1-67 LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
(a) Upon tentatively determining that an employee is permanently and 
totally disabled, the commission shall, unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties, refer the employee to the vocational rehabilitation agency under 
the State Board of Education for rehabilitation training. The commission 
shall order that an amount be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), for use in the rehabilitation 
and training of the employee. 
(b) If the vocational rehabilitation agency under the State Board of 
Education certifies to the commission in writing that the employee has 
fully cooperated with that agency in its efforts to rehabilitate the em-
ployee, and in the opinion of the agency, the employee is not able to be 
rehabilitated, the commission shall, after notice to the parties, hold a 
hearing to consider the agency's opinion as well as other Evidence regard-
ing rehabilitation. The parties may waive the right to a hearing. If a 
preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not 
possible, the commission shall order that the employee be paid weekly 
permanent total disability compensation benefits. The period of benefits 
commences on the date the employee became permanently totally dis-
abled, as determined by the commission based on the facts and evidence, 
and ends with the death of the employee or when the employee is capable 
of returning to regular, steady work. In any case where an employee has 
been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible, but where 
the employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for 
permanent partial disability. An employee is not entitled to compensa-
tion, unless the employee filly cooperates with any rehabilitation effort 
under this section. 
(6) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both 
arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body 
members, constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated ac-
cording to this section. No tentative finding of permanent total disability is 
required in any such instance. 
History: C. 1953, 85-1-67, enacted by L. ment substituted *$120M for "$ 110" in the first 
1988, cb. 116, $ 4. sentence of the second paragraph. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1988, Effective Dates. — Section 2 of Laws 1985, 
ch 116, § 4 repeals former § 35-1-67, as last ch 160 provided This act takes effect upon 
amended by Laws 1985, ch 160, § 1, relating approval by the governor, or the day following 
to permanent total disability, effective July 1, ***« constitutional time limit of Article VD, 
1988, and enacts the present section &*• 8 without the governor's signature, or in 
Amendment Notes. - The 1985 amend- * e C M L ° l f v ? ° ; * ? £ * o f v e U ) o v e m d e 
Approved March 18, 1985. 
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Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on August 
5, 1992 at 1:00 o'clock p.m. Said hearing was 
pursuant to Order and notice of the Coinmission. 
Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant was present and was represented by 
Edward B. Havas, Attorney, 
The defendants were represented 
Peshell, Attorney. 
by Rinehart 
The Employers Reinsurance Fund was represented by 
Erie Boorman, Attorney/Administrator. 
This case involves a claim for permanent total disability 
benefits in relation to 3 industrial incidents occurring while the 
applicant was employed by Utah Power and Light (one in December of 
1987, and two others that the applicant feels caused her permanent 
total disability, one on August 15, 1988 and one on July 9, 1990). 
No application for hearing was filed with resepct to the December 
1987 incident, but it has been dealt with through out the 
litigation in this matter. The carrier and the Employers 
Reinsurance Fund deny that the applicant is permanently totally 
disabled as a result of any of her work injuries. The carrier 
argues that the 1988 and 1990 incidents contributed little to the 
applicant's already impaired <~arvical and lumbar spine and the 
carrier argues that the 1990 incident may be non-compensable. In 
support of this argument, the carrier points out that the applicant 
had all her spinal surgeries prior to the 1988 industrial incident 
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and the carrier notes that the applicant continued to work until 
July 1990. The applicant counters that the 1988 accident did 
indeed significantly worsen her condition and that she continued to 
work thereafter only because she maintained herself on pain 
medication. Both the carrier and the Employers Reinsurance Fund 
also question whether the applicant is truly unable to work at any 
job. At the time of the hearing, the applicant was in the process 
of appealing a denial of Social Security Disability benefits and 
the Social Security Disability records and oth€>r vocational 
assessment included in the medical record exhibit at the time of 
the hearing suggested that the applicant could possibly still work. 
However, just after the medical panel submitted its report to the 
Commission, the applicant was awarded Social Security'Disability 
benefits pursuant to an order dated December 21, 1992. The order 
was presented to the ALJ on January 20, 1993. 
At hearing, a joint medical record exhibit was not ready for 
submission and instead a partial group of records were admitted 
into evidence after much argument as to what records were 
admissable. The ALJ gave the parties an extension of time post-
hearing to submit the rest of the joint exhibit, but confusion 
ensued when additional records were submitted by the applicant 
without an indication as to whether the records were duplicative of 
records already admitted and without an indication as to whether 
the additional submissions had been agreed to by the carrier and 
the Employers Reinsurance Fund. Finally, per a conference call in 
early October 1992, the parties confirmed that all records that the 
Commission had at that time were to be considered the joint exhibit 
and the ALJ was informed at that time that there might be 
duplicates in the records that had been submitted. Rather than 
return the records to the parties to prepare an acceptable exhibit 
without duplicates, the ALJ decided to weed out the duplicates 
herself and after doing so, the ALJ admitted the medical record 
exhibit and marked it as Exhibit A-l. The records reflected a 
medical controversy regarding what portion of the applicant's 
impairment was related to the industrial incidents. Therefore, the 
ALJ determined that the matter would be referred to a medical panel 
for additional input. 
The medical panel report was received at the Industrial 
Commission on December 16, 1992 and was distributed to the parties 
on December 17, 1992, with 15 days allowed for objections. Counsel 
for the applicant filed objections and/or argument regarding the 
report on January 4, 1993 and counsel for the defendant filed a 
response to this on January 8, 1993. Counsel for the applicant 
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filed a reply to the response and the Social Security Disability 
award information on January 20, 1993. The matter was considered 
ready for order on Jaunary 20, 1993. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Although the first relevant industrial event that is 
involved in this claim did not occur until December 1987, the 
applicant had a significant non-industrial injury to both her 
lumbar and cervical spine in October of 1986 and did have back 
treatment and possibly neck treatment by a chiropractor prior to 
1986. A good portion of the medical records submitted deal with 
the applicant's medical status prior to 1986 and the ALJ will 
briefly review this chronologically. 
The applicant began having unexplained right upper quadrant 
pain as early as 1963 and she was finally hospitalized for this and 
associated back pain in 1973. Through that time, it was thought to 
be related to gastro-intestinal or gall bladder problems, but the 
testing during the hospitalization failed to confirm any problem in 
the stomachf kidneys, gall bladder or intestines. From 1972 
forward, the applicant's regular family physician or physicians 
practiced at the Emery Medical Clinic in Castledale, Utah. The 
records from that clinic note that she was seen for 
fatigue/anemia/depression and allergic rhinitits in 1973. In 1974, 
she was seen for phlebitis and heart palpitations with chest pain. 
In 1975, ovarian cysts were diagnosed and in 1977 the applicant 
began to have excessive or unusual uterine bleeding. Additional 
assessment and testing in 1982 and 1983 confirmed bilateral ovarian 
cysts and continued prolonged bleeding. In 1977, the applicant 
began working for Utah Power and Light in a clerical/accounting 
position. In 1978, the applicant began to see a chiropractor at 
Castle Chiropractic Center in Castledale, Utah. The chiropractor's 
records note that the applicant first came in in September 1978 due 
to a traumatic lumbo-sacral strain. She was seen approximately 2 
times per week in September and October of 1978. She again sought 
out chiropractic care in July of 1979 (once or twice per week) and 
in late August of 1979 (almost daily). In October of 1979, the 
applicant was seen at the Emery Medical Clinic for 
anxiety/depression and she was prescribed limbitrol. 
The applicant was seen at Castle Chiropractic Center in late 
August 1980, almost daily, and again in late 1981 almost daily, 
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tapering off in October and November of 1981. in September of 
1981, the Emery Medical Center diagnosed acute otitis media with 
perforation and the applicant was seen by Dr. G. Lund for a patch 
on the perforation. From April of 1982 through October of 1982, 
the applicant went to the chiropractor 2 to 4 times per month. In 
1983, she was seen 2 to 4 times per month in February, June, July 
and December. In 1984, the applicant was seen by Dr. C. Null, a 
cardiologist, and he diagnosed a slight heart murmur. The 
applicant underwent breast reconstruction surgery in 1984. She saw 
the chiropractor from mid-May 1984 through mid-June 1984, 3 times 
per week, and then again in August of 1984, 2 times per week. In 
October of 1984, the applicant had a complete hysterectomy and 
oopherectomy at Holy Cross Hospital in Salt Lake City. At hearing, 
the applicant recalled that she did not see the* chiropractor for 
back pain after her hysterectomy, but the records do indicate that 
the applicant saw the chiropractor almost daily in late August of 
1986, tapering off in September in 1986. In October of 1986, she 
had her first significant cervical/lumbar injury. 
On October 4, 1986, the applicant was in Albuquerque, New 
Mexico on vacation at the hot air balloon festival. She was riding 
in the back of a pick-up truck, on a gravel road, chasing a hot air 
balloon when the truck hit a dip in the road. The applicant stated 
that the truck was not going very fast and she was seated with her 
legs straight out in front of her leaning on the the side of the 
truck bed. As the truck hit the dip in the road, the applicant was 
bounced up off the bed of the truck and she came down hard, still 
in a seated position* The applicant described the effect on her as 
a heavy impact and a very severe jolt. That afternoon or evening, 
the applicant called a local chiropractor in Albuquerque and he 
treated the applicant on an emergency basis, also providing her 
with a back brace and a heel lift. 
When the applicant returned to Utah, she went to see Dr. R. 
Sanders at the Castle Chiropractic Center on October 9, 1986. Dr. 
Sanders felt she had sustained multiple strains of the lumbar, 
thoracic and cervical spine. He began treating her with 
chiropractic treatments. The next doctor she saw for the 
Albuquerque injury was Dr. G. Momberger, a Salt Lake City 
orthopedist. She saw Dr. Momberger on October 28, 1986 and on an 
intake form it is noted that she had injured her neck, spine, low 
back, shoulders, Tcnee and elbow. Responding to the cause of the 
problem, the form indicates that the applicant was picking up a 
suitcase and was bumped on August 16, 1986 (this incident was not 
discussed at hearing), with the truck incident occurring 6 weeks 
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later. The intake form also notes that BEFORE 1976 a Dr. Kazarian 
had recommended surgery and Dr. Lamb had recommended exercise only. 
There are no records from Dr. Kazarian or Dr. Lamb in the medical 
record exhibit. The same form indicates that the applicant's low 
back pain had begun in 1959. Dr. Momberger's notes indicate mid-
thoracic pain and he referred the applicant to Dr. Ward at the 
University to determine if possibly she had a connective tissue 
disorder. 
The next physician visit was on November 6, 1986, when the 
applicant was seen at the Emery Medical Clinic for depression. It 
was noted that the applicant had been followed weekly ht a menta-1 
health clinic for the last 6 months for depression which was 
situational and related to various life set-backs. Desyrel was 
prescribed. The applicant continued with chiropractic treatments 
from Dr. Sanders through November 24, 1986# receiving an overall 
total of 14 treatments between October 9, 1986 and November 24, 
1986. Dr. Sanders's records indicate that he referred the 
applicant to Dr. L. Gaufin, at the Utah Neurological Clinc in 
Provo, Utah, on November 24, 1986 and that Dr. Gaufin had a CT scan 
done. This may be an error, because there is no record of a CT 
scan in Dr. Gaufin's records or in the Utah Valley Regional Medical 
Center records, the hospital at which Dr. Gaufin normally gets his 
films. Dr. Gaufin did admit the applicant to Utah Valley Regional 
Medical Center on December 2, 1986 for a myelogram and Dr. Sanders 
may be referring to this film when he states a CT scan was 
performed. After reviewing the myleogram results, Dr. Gaufin's 
final diagnoses were: 1) acute and chronic lumbar radiculopathy 
secondary to centrally herniated L4-5 disc, 2) mild disc bulge L3-
4, 3) cervical radiculopathy secondary to encroachment upon the 
nerve roots C4-5 and C5-6 bilaterally. Upon discharge, on Decmeber 
4, 1986, Dr. Gaufin prescribed tylenol #3. The applicant was seen 
at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center several days later for what 
Dr. Gaufin describes as a post-myelogram headache with neck pain. 
The applicant was given dalmane and tylenol #3. 
On January 5, 1987, Dr. L. Gaufin performed a semi-hemi 
laminotomy, formainotomy and nerve root decompression at L4-5 on 
the right at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center. In February of 
1986, Dr. Gaufin wrote Dr. Sanders that the applicant had improved 
symptoms as a result of the surgery, but that she was still 
protective and cautious about her back and used an L5 corset for 
traveling. He noted that he would consider operating on her 
herniated cervical disc as soon as she stabilized from the lumbar 
surgery. On March 4, 1987, Dr. Gaufin wrote State Farm Insurance, 
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indicating that the October 4, 1986 truck accident had produced an 
acute vertical load on the applicant's spine and subsequent 
pressure on the discs which was totally compatible with the 
symptoms she later suffered and the herniated lumbar and cervical 
discs. He states in the letter that he did not operate on the L3-4 
level because the applicant wanted to get as much wear out of that 
level as she could before proceeding with surgery. He noted that 
the applicant continued with neck, shoulder and arm symptoms and 
with headaches when she was in a vertical position. He noted that 
these symptoms were associated with the C4-5 and C5-6 discs and 
that he had scheduled her for neck surgery. The applicant was 
admitted to Utah Valley Regional Medical Center on March 9, 1987 
and on March 10, 1987, Dr. Gaufin performed an anterior cervical 
disectomy with nerve root decompression and interbody fusion C4-5 
and C5-6. 
The applicant recuperated from March of 1987 until August 
5, 1987 when Dr. Gaufin released her to return to work. During 
recuperation, Dr. Gaufin prescribed soma and tylenol /3 and the 
applicant went to the Emery Medical Clinic for estrogen supplements 
and allergy medications. The applicant testified that she had 
difficulty the first couple weeks back at work, but then got better 
and had no problems doing her work duties. Upon releasing the 
applicant to return to work, Dr. Gaufin recommended that she 
follow-up with her family physician for any medication refills she 
might need. There are almost no doctor visits except for those 
associated with medication refills at Emery Medical Clinic from the 
date of release (August 5, 1987) until December 14, 1987 when the 
applicant saw Dr. C. Null, a cardiologist, for lab tests. 
Apparently, the applicant was concerned with fatigue or low energy 
and Dr. Null confirmed with her that her test results were normal 
and that he believed her energy level was being effected by her 
recent surgeries and illnesses and that she should take vitamins. 
It was during this same month, December 1987, that the 
applicant had the first of her industrial injuries. The applicant 
stated that she was at work and that she was wearing a long skirt 
with a slippery slip underneath it. As she went to sit on her 
chair, that had rollers on the legs, she caught just the edge of 
the chair seat and then the chair rolled back and away from her as 
she slid off the end of the seat. She apparently fell to the floor 
on her bjuttocks and had resulting back pain and right leg pain with 
muscle spasms. However, she had no doctor visits associated with 
this incident. She did get a refill of soma on December 29, 1987 
at Emery Medical Center, but there are no actual examinations or 
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treatments for this injury. The applicant also missed no work time 
and there is no Employers First Report of Work Injury for this 
incident. 
The applicant continued to work and was able to return to 
most all activities after the 1987 surgeries. She stated that she 
did avoid very jarring type activities, like aerobics and 3-
wheelers per Dr. Gaufin's instructions. She did all her housework 
and she could drive, but she did avoid mowing the lawn per her 
testimony. She had only 4 or 5 visits or calls to Emery Medical 
Center from December of 1987 until August of 1988 and these were 
for prescription refills, only one of which was for soma. On 
August 15, 1988, the applicant had her second industrial incident. 
She was working quickly as she was filling in for several other 
workers that were off work at the time. She was doing Carma 
O'Brien's work for her and had to get into one of her file drawers. 
The relevant drawer was the bottom drawer of a file cabinet and was 
the largest drawer in the cabinet. The drawer was filled with 
paper and books, but the applicant did not know this. She was 
bending over and pulling on the drawer handle, which was about a 
foot off the floor, with her right hand, when the drawer partially 
opened and then stopped abruptly like it was stuck. The applicant 
stated that she felt something give in the middle of her back and 
her neck, shoulder and right arm felt wrenched. She also stated 
that she felt her neck pop or give way, but that she was more 
concerned at the time regarding her low back. She stated that 
there was no one at work to fill in for her, so she remained at 
work the remainder of the shift. She stated she continued to work 
in pain and discomfort after the incident and just tried to ignore 
••it." She testified that she took pain medications and muscle 
relaxers daily and would go straight to bed after getting off work. 
Once again, there are no immediate doctor visits associated 
with this injury. The applicant testified at hearing that she did 
not want to see a doctor because she was afraid to find out that 
she had made her condition worse once again. The nearest-in-time 
medical record is a refill of estrogen at Emery Medical Center on 
August 30, 1988. The next doctor visit, on September 29, 1988, 
relates to the need for mammography and the fact that the applicant 
wanted her cholesterol checked. The office note for this visit 
does mention that the applicant had reinjured her neck "+\e other 
day" and needed a soma refill. Fioricet was presjribed on 
September 30, 1988. The first mention in the records of the 
December 1987 injury and the August 15, 1988 injury is in Dr. 
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Gaufin's office note dated October 3, 1988. In that note, he 
refers to the sliding-off-the-chair incident (he indicates this was 
in October of 1987 as opposed to December 1987) and the August 15, 
1988 injury opening a heavy file drawer. The first incident he 
notes gradually resolved, but he noted that the applicant continued 
to have pain in the neck, shoulders and arms and numbness in the 
first, second and third digits of both hands (right greater than 
left) related to the August 15, 1988 incident* Some pain in the 
lumbar area was also noted. Dr. Gaufin wanted to rule out a 
recurrent disc herniation in the cervical spine, and carpal tunnel 
and thus he referred the applicant for an MRI and nerve conduction 
velocity tests and an EMG of the right upper extremity. On October 
7, 1988, that applicant had an MRI of both the cervical and lumbar 
spine. The cervical film was read to show a stable fusion at C4-5 
and C5-6, but degenerative disc disease at C6-7, producing a bar-
type defect obliterating the thecal sac and impinging the nerve 
roots bilaterally, right greater than left. The lumbar film was 
read to show no evidence of recurrent disc injury, with a mild 
bulge at L5-S1 which did not significantly impinge on the nerve 
root or thecal sac. The nerve tests done at Western Neurological 
Associates on October 7, 1988 were read as normal by Dr. J. 
Andrews. 
The applicant got refills of soma and tylenol #3 at Emery 
Medical Center on November 19, 1988. On November 23, 1988, Dr. 
Gaufin wrote Dr. Kotrady at Emery Medical Center indicating that he 
did not recommend surgery at that time for either the neck or back. 
He stated that he felt the applicant's 2 industrial injuries 
(December 1987 and August 15, 1988) had agrravated a pre-existing 
mild degenerative change at C6-7 and had created a mild bulge at 
L5-S1. He noted that the applicant might need surgery in the 
future, but for the time being he recommended anti-inflammatory 
medication, muscle relaxants and physical therapy as needed. In 
December of 1988, the applicant got refills of fioricet, tylenol #3 
"and lomatil. In January 1989, she was referred for physical 
therapy, which she attended 5 times between January 19, 1989 and 
February 9, 1989. In March of 1989, the applicant got refills of 
fioricet and seldane and there is an Emery Medical Center office 
note dated April 13, 1989 that indicates that the physical therapy 
had helped, but that the applicant wanted a soft cervical collar 
and a lumbar support. It was also noted that the physical 
therapist had recommended a TENS unit and the applicant was fitted 
for one in May of 1989. At hearing, the applicant testified that 
the physical therapy made her feel sicker. She indicated that the 
TENS unit helped sometimes. Although she continued to work, the 
applicant stated that she had her daughter do her housework for 
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her. She felt that she could not engage in her hobby of cake 
decorating and recalls needing to lay down in order to have her 
nails done, as this takes 2 hours. She stated that she tried to 
strengthen her back by walking while wearing her neck brace and 
that she tried to adjust her computer screen at work to make it 
more comfortable for her. She also indicated that she needed to 
lay down periodically at work. 
Beginning in mid-May 1989, the applicant began to see an 
acupuncturist, Kris Ahshi. Based on the brief handwritten notes of 
the acupuncturist, the visits were not primarily for the neck or 
back (these were mentioned in the notes for just one visit) , but 
rather were for a host of other non-industrial problems including 
fatigue, bloating/edema/water retention, sinus headaches, ear pain 
and constipation. She had 6 or 7 treatments per month from June 
1989 through September of 1989 (in July only one treatment) with 
almost double that number of visits in October of 1989. During 
that period, in addition to her acupuncture treatments, the 
applicant was seen for various things at the Emery Medical Center 
including assessment for hypothyroidism in June 1989 (unconfirmed), 
for refills of tylenol #3, fioricet and soma in July 1989, for 
fioricet and naprosyn in September 1989 and for fioricet in October 
1989, and for cholesterol lab tests in September 1989. In November 
of 1989, she was seen at Emery Medical Center for neck pain and 
right arm pain and it was noted that she had been using a neck 
brace for 2 months. It was recommended that she continue using the 
brace and going to acupuncture. The 4 visits to the acupuncturist 
in November 1989 are accompanied by notes indicating treatment for 
cervical pain, tingling and numbness. The applicant got refills of 
fioricet, naprosyn and soma on November 20, 1989 at Emery Medical 
Center. 
On Decmeber 1, 1989, the applicant was seen at the Salt Lake 
Clinic by some physician for 1) hot flashes, 2) headaches, 3) 
fatigue, 4) allergies and 5) left upper chest pain. The physician 
noted that he would take some tests and he recommended that the 
applicant cut her premarin intake in half and that she quit taking 
provera altogether. From December 1989 through June of 1990, the 
applicant went to the acupuncturist only twice (once in March 1990 
and once in June 1990) and apparently got prescription refills only 
at Emery Medical Center. Prescription refills included Zovirax, 
fioricet (6 times), tylenol #3, naldicon, estrogen, soma (2 times) 
naprosyn, amitriptyline and prozac. The applicant testified that 
she actually worked overtime from January of 1990 through April of 
1990 as another employee failed to return from maternity leave. 
00 J72 
ORDER 
RE: CLAUDIA COX 
PAGE 10 
She indicated that this extra effort caused her to take more 
medication and to use her neck brace again so that she could keep 
up with the work. In May of 1990, a visit to Emery Medical Center 
notes pain down the right arm with numbness in the right digits, 
constant headache, and pain in the right leg with parasthesias in 
the toes after walking. Her visit to the acupuncturist in June of 
1990 was for leg swelling and pain. On July 2, 1990, Dr. Kotrady 
of the Emery Medical Center wrote Dr. Gaufin, recommending that the 
applicant be reevaluated by Gaufin. In that letter, he notes that 
the applicant had persisting neck pain and that at one point she 
had become dependent on fioricet, soma and tylenol #3. He notes 
that she had been intolerant to prozac and amitriptyline and that 
he recommended a pain clinic if surgery was not recommended. He 
noted that he felt there was an emotional stress component that was 
blocking any successful treatment. 
On July 9, 1990, just one week after Dr. Kotrady sent his 
letter to Dr. Gaufin, the applicant had her final industrial 
incident. The applicant stated at hearing that she was seated at 
her desk and merely turned her head with resultant neck spasm and 
symptoms on down her spine. It is somewhat unclear what exactly 
happened at work after she turned her head. There are some 
references in the medical records regarding the applicant 
collapsing on this date, but it is unclear whether she did any more 
than just lay down. She did go to the Emery Medical Center on the 
same day and a cervical spine X-ray was done, which showed the 
prior fusion and the C6-7 degeneration. An acute strain was 
diagnosed and soma and lortab were prescribed. Several days later 
she was referred to physical therapy, but the applicant called to 
tell the therapist she was to wait with the physical therapy until 
she saw Dr. Gaufin per Gaufin's instructions. On August 6, 1990, 
the applicant went to see family practitioner, Dr. S. Potter, in 
Price, Utah for hot flushes and headaches. He recommended a trial 
of prozac and some lab tests. Apparently, she thereafter made Dr. 
Potter her family doctor, but through the end of 1990 she continued 
to get prescription refills at Emery Medical Center for both her 
spinal problems (fioricet, soma, naprosyn, tyleonl #3) and for 
other things like anti-depressants (prozac and provera). 
The applicant had a repeat cervical MRI done at Utah Valley 
Regional Medical Center on August 9, 1990 per Dr. Gaufin's 
referral. This was read to show no major changes since the one 
done on October 7, 1988. Dr. Gaufin saw her on August 15, 1990 and 
he noted that she continued to have chronic neck, shoulder and arm 
pain, with the pain being better when she was laying down and worse 
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when she was sitting at work. He noted that she continued to use 
the neck collar and his impression was acute chronic cervical 
radiculopathy secondary to spondylosis and protrusion of the disc 
at C6-7 bilaterally. He recommended surgery to decompress the 
nerve roots, but he noted that the applicant would need to be very 
careful in the future due to the propensity of deterioration of the 
discs caused by stress on the joints due to a 3-level fusion. His 
office note for October 7, 1988 indicates that the applicant would 
consider whether to have the additional surgery. Dr. Gaufin's 
letter to the carrier dated October 1, 1990 indicates that the 
applicant opted to avoid surgery and he therefore recommended: 1) 
avoiding jolting or jarring the neck, 2) use of a soft cervical 
collar, 3) cervical traction taught by a physical therapist and 4) 
anti-inflammatory medication and muscle relaxants with avoidance of 
narcotics. 
In December 1990, Dr. Taylor at the Emery Medical Center 
wrote Dr. Gaufin requesting that he Mdo a disabilty determination" 
on the applicant as he believed the applicant would not be a 
dependable future employee. In response to this, the applicant saw 
Dr. Gaufin again on January 9, 1991 and Dr. Gaufin wrote Dr. Taylor 
a letter indicating that the applicant was at that time in such 
intense pain that she could not tolerate sitting in a chair in 
front of a table or a desk with her head flexed for 8 hours. He 
noted that her care options were surgery or conservative care, but 
that nothing was going to totally Mget rid,f of the pain. He noted 
that there was a general reduced success rate for 3rd surgeries and 
that the applicant would experience a continued wearing out process 
with age. He states in the letter that there would be a point at 
which surgery would not help. He found that the applicant 
continued to be termporarily totally disabled and that she would 
continue to use traction and see if she got her better enough to 
return to work. In January.1991, Dr. Taylor again wrote Dr. 
Gaufin asking him to rate the applicant. The applicant applied for 
Social Security Disability on January 28, 1991 and got refills of 
prozac, tylenol #3, soma, fioricet and naprosyn at the Emery 
Medical Center on January 31, 1991. Dr. Gaufin saw the applicant 
for the last time on March 18, 1991 when he rated her as having a 
33% whole person impairment due to her industrial injuries, a 
combined rating of 20% lumbar and 16% cervical impairment. Not 
included in his rating was a 7% whole person rating for the neck 
and 8% for the lumbar spine due to the surgeries in 1987. 
On April 29, 1991, Dr. P. Harris performed an examination 
of the applicant at the request of the carrier. He noted that the 
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applicant's two major complaints were: 1) constant neck pain with 
numbness and tingling made worse by sitting, standing in one spot 
and walking and made better by laying down with pillows under the 
neck, pain medications and muscle relaxers and 2) constant back 
pain from the mid-back to the low back radiating down her leg to 
her toe, better when she was laying down, walking or taking 
medication and generally more tolerable than the neck pain. He 
found that the applicant was medically stable and that surgery was 
advisable only if muscle atrophy occurred, muscle we^ akness became 
progressive or a free fragment was discovered* He found surgery 
was not advisable if the applicant merely had progressive pain 
symptoms. He found that the applicant had a combined total 
impairment from both the lumbar and cervical spine of 34%. He 
breaks this rating down, but his breakdown is a little confusing. 
Nonetheless it does appear that he feels that the* vast majority of 
the rating was caused by the 1986 injury and ensuing 1987 
surgeries. 
In June and July 1991, the applicant saw Dr. S. Potter for 
depression and headaches and in July of 1991 th€> applicant returned 
to Dr. C. Null for increasing symptoms of precordial pressure, 
aching and tightness seeming to occur with activity. His diagnoses 
were: 1) mitral valve prolapse syndrome, 2) anginal syndrome, 3) 
intermittent episodes of arterial hypertension in the past, 4) 
prior spine injuries and 5) prior hysterectomy. Dr. Null noted 
that the applicant needed to get her cholesterol level down. The 
applicant saw Dr. J. Heiner in August 1991, apparently to get a 
second opinion regarding her neck and low back symptoms. His 
office note from this visit makes some observations, but there are 
no real conclusions stated in the note. He did take lumbar and 
cervical X-rays. Dr. Potter referred the applicant for acupuncture 
again in September of 1991 and the applicant had 5 treatments in a 
2-month period from mid-September 1991 through mid-November 1991. 
On October 25, 1991, Social Security issued its initial decision 
denying the applicant disability benefits. The order notes that it 
was determined that the applicant could work an 8-hour day with 
normal breaks. 
On November 7, 1991, the applicant saw Dr. S. Potter and he 
noted a new symptom. The applicant was having difficulty closing 
her hands. He referred the applicant for a rheumatoid factor lab 
test and his November 21, 1991 office note inddicates that this 
came back negative. He prescribed fioricet, physical therapy and 
a nerve conduction velocity test. The applicant had 10 acupuncture 
treatments from November 29, 1991 through December 27, 1991. On 
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December 20, 1991 Dr. J. Watkins, a nerurologist, wrote Dr. L. 
Gaufin indicating that he had seen the applicant for a tingling 
sensation in both hands and in the right arm along with 
intermittent loss of grip and tingling in front of her left ear 
which all began as of July 9, 1990. Numbness in the first 3 
digits of the hands was also reported along with occasional 
drooling from the right side of the mouth. Dr. Watkins recommended 
nerve conduction velocity tests, EMGs of both upper extremities and 
an MRI of the brain. He wrote Dr. Gaufin on January 22, 1992 that 
these tests came back normal. Dr. Potter refilled the applicant's 
fioricet, tylenol #3, feldene, prozac and soma in January of 1992. 
On February 6, 1992, Dr. Potter also prescribed desyrel for neck 
symptoms and emotional stress and he informed the applicant's 
attorney that the desyrel was related to her industrial injuries. 
On March 1, 1992, he wrote the applicant's attorney and notified 
him that the medications that he was refilling (prozac, feldene, 
tylenol #3, fioricet and naprosyn) were all necessary due -to the 
applicant's industrial injuries. 
On March 5, 1992, Dr. Watkins wrote Dr. Gaufin and noted 
that the applicant had also developed dizzy symptoms and that she 
had gone off all medications and was trying meclizine for the 
dizziness. On March 30, 1992, Delvin McFarlane, LCSW, wrote a 
letter to-whom-it-may concern noting that he had seen the applicant 
10 times in counseling and that the applicant had experienced some 
improvement as a result, but continued to grieve over the loss of 
her job and health. He concluded that it was difficult to 
accomplish much in therapy until the issue regarding her Social 
Security Disability was settled. He stated that he could see no 
way that she would be able to return to work and he recommended a 
speedy disability retirement. On March 31, 1992, a functional 
capacity evaluation was done through Carbon Emery Physical 
Therapy/Alta Health Services and this resulted in a classification 
for the applicant of light/sedentary work. It was noted that ±he 
applicant did not have good control of her pain and that she was 
limited by this and her fear of reinjury. 
On April 6, 1992, the applicant saw Dr. J. Matthews who 
diagnosed her as having fibromyalgia syndrome and inflammatory 
polyarthritis. He noted that he wanted to rule out multiple 
sclerosis, lyme disease and hypothryroidism. He referred the 
applicant for lab tests and he did X-rays of her hands. He gave he 
an injection of adlone and prescribed cyclobenzodrine. Dr. Potter 
saw the applicant again on May 19, 1992 and he noted hand pain and 
leg swelling and he noted a possible diagnosis of fibromyacitis and 
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fatigue. He prescribed amitriptylline. The appliccint was seen in 
the emergency room of Castleview Hospital on May 31, 1992 for neck 
and back pain and she was given an injection of demerol/phenergan 
and was sent home with percocet. Dr. Matthews's office note for 
June 1, 1992 adds two other diagnoses: hypothryroidism and chronic 
pain. He prescribed synthroid in addition to the cyclobenzodrine 
and indicated he would recheck her in 3 months. On June 29, 1992, 
the applicant requested a hearing with Social Security in order to 
reassess her entitlement to disability benefits. 
There is a Career Guidcance Center report dated June 15, 
1992 which concludes that there are jobs available for which the 
applicant is trained, but that she may have difficulty finding "an 
employer willing to make the accommodations that are necessary in 
order for her to tolerate the workplace. The applicant has been 
receiving long term disability benefits since shortly after the 
July 9, 1990 incident but it is unclear in what amount and how long 
the benefits will continue. As of October of 1992, the Social 
Security Disability litigation was still in progress with no final 
result made known to the ALJ. 
The applicant testified that since the July 9, 1990 
incident, she was reduced to even less activity than she performed 
after the August 15, 1988 accident. She characterized her activity 
level as "totally down." She stated that she had a hard time even 
walking and could do no housework. She stated that she wore her 
neck brace for traveling and when she was unable to lay down. She 
stated that she was unable to drive for one year as she could not 
turn her head. At the time of the hearing, the applicant stated 
that she had constant pain in her neck (she wore her cervical 
collar at the hearing) and that she had reduced range of motion in 
the neck due to pain when she tried to turn her head. She stated 
that she had to lay still in the morning for a couple of hours 
before she could move her head. She stated that she no longer 
walks to help her back pain because this jars her neck. She stated 
that she can sit or stand for only 30 minutes at a time before the 
pain gets bad and then she needs to lay back, put her legs up or 
use her neck brace. She stated that it is painful to have her neck 
bent over looking at her desk or keyboard. 
With respect to education ahd work experience, the applicant 
stated that she graduated from South Emery Highschool in Ferron, 
Utah and had only typing classes thereafter. She stated that she 
worked for 20 years, initially as a retail sales clerk in a women's 
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apparel store and later in several accounting/clerical positions. 
She feels that her limited ability to sit with her neck bent over 
a desk or keyboard prevents her from returning to 
clerical/accounting work and she feels that she can no longer do 
the bending, lifting, reaching and work on her feet that is 
required in a retail sales clerk position. 
The medical panel consisted of Chairman, Dr. Madison Thomas, 
a neurologist and panel member Dr. B. Holbrook, an orthopedist. 
Their report was received at the Commission on December 16, 1992. 
The panel report concludes that there is a causal connection 
between the applicant's symptoms and the three industrial injuries 
at issue as well as a connection between her symptoms and pre-
existing conditions or injuries. The panel is not specific about 
what symptoms it refers to, but the panel specifically talks about 
neck symptoms with radiation and problems in the right upper 
extremity and low back symptoms radiating into the right lower 
extremity. The panel found that the applicant's December 1987 work 
injury and the August 15, 1988 work injury did not result in any 
temporary total disability, with the July 9, 1990 work injury 
resulting in 3 or 4 weeks of temporary disability. With respect to 



































The panel concluded that the treatment that the applicant has had 
was attributable to the accidents in the proportion represented by 
the impairment percentages and that the applicant's psychological 
status (depression with pre-existing personality disorder) was the 
result of multiple non-industrial factors. 
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On January 4, 1993, the ALJ received objections/argument 
from counsel for the applicant. In that filing, counsel objects to 
the panel's finding that no temporary total disability was 
attributable to the 1988 accident and that only 3 weeks of 
temporary total disability was attibutable to the 1990 accident. 
Counsel cites the indications of inability to return to work made 
by Dr. Gaufin and Delvin McFarlane, LCSW, in 1991 and 1992 as 
support for this objection. Counsel also notes that the panel did 
attribute some impairment to the 1987 and 1988 injuries and 
suggests that temporary disability should be proportional to the 
impairment noted by the panel. Counsel also argues that the panel 
should have attributed at least some of the applicant's depression 
to the industrial injuries since the social disruption that is 
cited as part of the cause of the depression resulted due to the 
applicant's loss of her job. Counsel for the defendants filed a 
response to these objections on January 8, 1993 pointing out that 
the July 9, 1990 injury is non-compensable as a result of the Allen 
case and since the applicant discontinued work due to this non-
compensable incident, any depression resulting therefrom is also 
non-compensable. 
On January 20, 1993, counsel for the applicant filed a reply 
to the response filed by counsel for the defendants. That reply 
indicates that the applicant is no longer contending that the July 
9, 1990 injury is a separate compensable accident, but rather just 
the date when the applicant discontinued work as a result of 
injuries incurred in the 1987 and 19£8 accidents. Attahced to the 
reply of counsel for the applicant is the December 21, 1992 award 
of Social Security Disability benefits. The decision notes that 
the applicant was found to be first disabled as of July 9, 1990, 
when she discontinued her work with Utah% Power and Light. The 
findings of the ALJ who issued the decision cite the following 
impairments as the impairments that were relevant to the award of 
disability benefits: 
[A] history of lumbar disk surgery in January 1987, 
and cervical disk surgery in March 1987; post 
traumatic right, greater than left hand numbness 
with decreased grip and intermittent hand pain; 
fibromyalgia syndrome; inflammatory polyarthritis; 
polypharmacy; hypothyroidism; degenereitive joint 
disease; degenerative disc disease; depression; and 
passive dependent personality disorder. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Adoption of Medical Panel Report; 
The ALJ adopts the medical panel report to resolve the 
issues of causation and impairment in this matter* The panel alone 
has had access to all the applicant's medical records and thus the 
panel report is the only expert medical evidence in this case that 
is based on a complete medical history, as well as the applicant's 
hearing testimony. Although some of the applicant's medical care 
providers have pointed to the applicant's back and neck problelns 
and her loss of her job as causes of her current disability, none 
have indicated clearly that the industrial injuries are the sole 
cause of her back and neck problems and the loss of her job. 
Therefore, there is no medical evidence that specifically refutes 
the panel's findings. As it is the best founded and most complete 
medical analysis in this case and as it is not specifically refuted 
by any other evidence, the ALT adopts the medical panel conclusions 
as her own. 
Compensability/Relevancy of the 3 Industrial Accidents; 
The applicant did not file an application for hearing 
regarding the December 1987 industrial accident. Technically, this 
means that this accident is not part of the litigation that has 
gone forward in this case. The applicant missed no time from work 
as a result of this injury and saw no doctor specifically for this 
injury. The panel found a .85 % whole person cervical impairment 
and a .42% whole person low back impairment, or less than 2% whole 
person impairment, resulting from this injury. Clearly, it is not 
a significant injury and the applicant has not claimed it as having 
caused her permanent total disability. As such, the ALJ will 
consider the injury irrelevant for purposes of analyzing the 
permanent total disability claim. 
The 1990 injury must be considered non-compensable. Per the 
medical panel report, the applicant clearly had significant 
permanent impairment to her cervical and lumbar spine at the time 
of this injury. Therefore, per the legal causation requirements 
outlined in the case Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 
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(Utah 1986), in order for the 1990 injury to be compensable, the 
applicant must be able to show that the July 9, 1990 injury was 
incurred pursuant to exertion greater than what is expended in non-
employment life by individuals in the latter part of the 20th 
century. Since the description of the accident amounts to merely 
turning her head, the injury is not a separate compensable 
industrial accident. In addition, the panel attributed no 
impairment whatsoever to this incident. However, the ALJ should 
note that the applicant appears to now indicate that she is not 
claiming the July 9, 1990 incident as a separate compensable 
accident (per counsel for the applicant's January 12, 1993 letter 
to the ALJ) , but rather that it is merely the date when she 
discontinued working due to her earlier industrial accidents. In 
essence, the applicant has withdrawn her claim that the July 9, 
1990 incident is the cause of her permanent total disability. As 
such, the ALJ will not consider the July 9, 1990 incident in 
analyzing the applicant's claim for permanent total disability. 
Based on the foregoing two paragraphs, only the August 15, 
1988 accident is left as a possible industrial cause of the 
applicant's claimed permanent total disability. There has been no 
argument by the carrier that this incident was not a compensable 
industrial accident and thus the ALJ finds that this case boils 
down to a determination as to whether the August 15, 1988 
compensable industrial injury is the cause of the applicant's 
current permanent total disability. 
The Cause of the Applicant's Permanent Total Disability; 
In order to be entitled to permanent total disability 
benefits, the applicant must be able to show that the industrial 
injury at issue actually caused the permanent total disability. 
Hodges v. Western Piling and Sheeting Co.. 717 P.2d 713 (Utah 
1986), Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 
1988-) . The applicant's testimony, taken by itself, states that she 
recovered, returned to work and to most activities after her 1986 
non-industrial injury and her two 1987 surgeries that followed. 
The applicant testified that after the August 15, 1988 industrial 
injury, she became considerably worse and was forced to work in 
pain with the assistance of medication. She indicated that she 
needed to lay down periodically during the day, and especially 
after work. Per the applicant, she needed help with her housework 
and needed to use a neck brace in order to walk for exercise. All 
of these things the applicant attributes to the effects of the 
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August 15, 1988 injury, as she was not experiencing these 
limitations just prior to the August 15, 1988 injury* In addition, 
the applicant claims that her limitations actually became more 
severe after the July 9, 1990 incident where she turned her head at 
work. The applicant's testimony that she was worse after the 
August 15, 1988 injury is supported in the medical records by an 
indication of increase medication usage after that injury. Also, 
the records suggest increased complaints of neck and arm symptoms 
in late 1988 and in 1989. 
Looking at just the applicant's testimony, there is 
certainly an argument that the applicant's disabling symptoms 
gradually increased after the August 15, 1988 injury, thus strongly 
suggesting that the August 15, 1988 injury was the cause of her 
eventual complete disability beginning in July of 1990. However, 
there is alot of other evidence that leads one to the conclusion 
that the August 15, 1988 injury only minimally contributed to the 
applicant's overall disability. First, following the 1986 non-
industrial injury at the balloon show in New Mexico, the applicant 
had two separate surgeries on her spine and was off work for a 
total of 7 to 8 months. In contrast, neither the 1987 nor the 1988 
injury resulted in any immediate need for medical care and both 
involved no lost work time. No new objective findings on the 
applicant's X-rays were noted as a result of these two injuries. 
Also, the applicant was working overtime as late as 1990. The 
obvious conclusion from this comparison is that the 1986 non-
industrial injury was much more significant medically than were the 
1987 and 1988 industrial injuries. The minimal significance of the 
two industrial injuries is also supported by the medical panel 
impairment ratings, which attribute 80% of the applicant's neck 
impairment and 95% of the applicant's low back impairment to causes 
other than the industrial injuries. 
Secondly, the medical records reflect a number of non-
industrial medical problems that the applicant was experiencing in 
1988, 1989 and 1990. These other problems, some of which required 
significant treatment, could have affected the applicant's ability 
and motivation to continue working. The applicant saw the 
acupuncturist, Dr. Kotrady and Dr. Potter for fagtiue, bloating, 
s^-us headaches, ear problems, hot flushes, drug dependency and 
high cholesterol. In addition, Dr. Matthews diagnosed 
fibromyalgia, polyarthritis and hypothroidism in 1992 and he did 
not mention that any of these were related to the applicant's 
industrial injuries. Finally, the applicant was treated 
sporadically both before and after the industrial injuries for 
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depression/anxiety. Certainly, this condition must effect the 
applicant's motivation to continue working. There is no medical 
opinion that this problem is solely caused by the industrial 
injuries. The medical panel found that the applicant may need 
psychiatric care at this point, but that this is the result of 
multiple non-industrial factors. 
Lastly, there is the Social Security Disability decision to 
consider. This decision lists 10 separate medical problems that 
contribute to the applicant's disability status (see quote in 
Findings of Fact). Four of the problems are clearly unrelated to 
the industrial injuries (the 1987 surgeries, hypothyroidism, 
depression and passive dependent personality disorder) . There is 
a possiblity that the industrial injuries may have contributed in 
some degree to the remaining 6 problems listed, but there is no 
medical evidence that in fact this is the case. The medical 
records simply do not resolve what has caused or even aggravated 
the hand problems, the fibromyalgia, the polyarthritis, the 
polypharmacy, the degenerative joint disease or the degenerative 
disc disease. Even if one presumed that all of these conditions 
were aggravated by the industrial injuries, the medical panel 
report indicates that the medical care for thes€i problems is 
attributed to the industrial injuries in the same percentages that 
is reflected by the impairment percentages. Once again, even 
making a presumption heavily in favor of the applicant, without any 
real supporting evidence for such a presumption, the result is that 
the industrial injuries contributed little to the need for medical 
care related to these problems. 
The ALJ feels that there are cases where industrial injuries 
involving minimal impairment aggravate pre-existing medical 
problems sufficiently to support a finding that the injuries caused 
the permanent total disability. There is certainly some merit to 
the "straw-that-broke-the-camel's-back" theory. However, there 
needs to be more than just the applicant/s testimony to support 
such a theory. If one can show that there was an need for 
increased immediate medical care or a clear period of disability 
and inability to work that followed the industrial injury, then the 
actual impairment percentage attributed to the industrial injury 
takes on less significance. In this case, cis discussed above, 
those other factors are not present so as to allow the ALJ to 
discount the minimal impairment that the industrial injury or 
injuries caused. In addition, the applicant had significant pre-
existing impairment in the same areas of the body that the 
applicant currently indicates are the source of her disaiblity and 
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there are many non-industrial injuries that appear to be 
influencing her overall disability. The ALJ finds that the 
preponderance of the evidence does not support a finding that the 
August 15, 1988 injury is the cause of her current permanent total 
disability. 
The Objections to the Medical Panel Report: 
The applicant's attorney objects to the panel's finding that 
no temporary total disability (TTD) is attributable to the 1987 or 
1988 injuries. Counsel suggests that the panel should' have found 
TTD in proportion to the impairment rated by the panel for the 
industrial injuries. However, the ALJ believes the panel found no 
TTD related to these injuries simply because the facts of the case 
reflect that the applicant just kept working after both the 1987 
and 1988 injuries. The panel felt there was only TTD of 3 or 4 
weeks following the July 9, 1990 incident and the panel was 
unwilling to consider this as caused by the 1987 or 1988 injuries. 
There is certainly nothing inconsistent in stating that the 3 or 4 
weeks of disability following the July 9, 1990 incident was caused 
by the July 9, 1990 incident. To the ALJ, the panel's findings 
related to the TTD are entirely consistent and logical. Finally, 
it is true that Dr. Gaufin and Delvin McFarlane felt the applicant 
was disabled in 1991 and 1992, but neither definitively states this 
was due to the only compensable injury at issue, the August 15, 
1988 accident. As such, the panel's conclusions regarding the TTD 
are not refuted by either Dr. Gaufin or Delvin McFarlane. 
Counsel for the applicant argues that some portion of the 
applicant's depression must be attributed to the applicant's August 
15, 1988 industrial injury, because the panel admitted that social 
disruption caused by loss of her job was contributing to her 
depression. However, it has not been established that the 
applicant lost her job due to the August 15, 1988 industrial 
injury. She worked for nearly 2 years following that injury and 
thus there is not even a temporal inference that can be made with 
respect to the 1988 injury causing the discontinuance of work. The 
ALJ finds that the applicant may have stopped working due to the 
July 9, 1990 injury, but this is not clearly established as counsel 
for the defendants suggests in his response to the applicant's 
objections More than likely, there are a number of reasons for 
the applicant's decision to stop working in July of 1990. As the 
applicant was being treated for depression as early as 1973, and as 
her cessation of work has not been clearly linked to the 1988 
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accident, the ALJ does not find inconsistent the panel's conclusion 
that the depression is the result on multiple non-industrial 
factors. 
Concluding Remarks; 
The ALJ makes no separate finding with respect to the 
applicant's ability to work at this point* It is unnecessary to 
rule on this issue since the ALJ finds that any disability that may 
exist is not attributable to the August 15, 1988 industrial 
accident. However, just as commentary, it does appear that the 
applicant is probably totally disabled due to multiple factors as 
noted in the Social Security decision. Because the ALJ feels 
sympathy for the applicant and the difficult time she has had, the 
ALJ wishes she could just accept the applicant's testimony and 
award benefits. Unfortunately, the ALJ feels she cannot ignore the 
other substantial evidence that does not support the applicant's 
theory of the cause of her disability. The ALJ considered awarding 
the applicant just the very minimal permanent partial impairment 
(PPI) that is supported by the medical panel report, but it appears 
that the carrier has paid alot more TTC (from July 10, 1990 through 
March 4, 1991) than is supported by the panel report and this 
completely offsets any PPI that would be payable. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's claim for 
permanent total disability benefits and any alternative claim for 
temporary total compensation or permanent impairment benefits 
associated with the industrial injuries of August 15, 1988 and July 
9, 1990 is dismissed with prejudice. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. 
Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
Certified by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City* Utah, this 
^ ^ day of
 z^£s/*As**^f .1993. 
ATTEST: / 
Patricia O. Ashby / L^ 
Commission Secretary (f 
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Report of Medical Panel 
MADISON H. THOMAS. M.D. 
• TH AVENUE & C STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84143 
Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 R 300 SO./P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 
Date of Panel: 27 November 1992 
Re: Claudia Cox 
Inj: 8-15-88 & 7-9-90 
Emp: Utah Power & Light 
REPORT OF MEDICAL PANEL 
A medical panel consisting of Drs. Wallace E. Hess and Madison H. Thomas, with the latter 
as chairman, met to evaluate the case of Claudia Cox, with reference to an injuiy reported to 
have occurred on 15 August 1988 and 9 July 1990. 
The extensive Summary of Medical Records and Testimony was used as a general guide in 
reviewing her case. The file was reviewed by the panel members, and she was examined by 
them. X-rays were reviewed. 
The applicant indicates that her current symptoms are principally in her neck and back. She 
reports that she is never free of pain in the neck. This averages about a 6 on a scale from 1 to 
10, and at times goes to a 10. She points to approximately the cervicodorsal junction and 
indicates that the pain radiates like a "dagger" to her neck and to the base of her head, which 
feels as if it is in a vice-like grip. The pain spreads down her back and to her right shoulder and 
to the right shoulder blade and under her arm on the right. The pain is associated with a 
tingling, numbing feeling as well. Recently, she indicates the pain has gone towards the left side 
of her neck also. 
The pain is increased by simply carrying the weight of her head, which feels to her like a 16 
pound bowling ball. The pain is increased by sitting. Walking seems to jar her neck and head. 
Sitting seems to cause the pain to go up her spine from her back and leaning forward or 
standing seems to increase the pain. The pain seems to be increased also by bending or doing 
her hair, etc. 
The applicant indicates that the pain is helped by her medications. She takes two or three 
Fioricets per day. She also takes Soma 350 mg two or three times a day, but indicates she has 
not had these paid for for most of the past year. She takes Tylenol # 4 three or four times a 
week to relieve pain in other parts of her body, but not particularly pain in her neck. She has 
a traction ujiit that sometimes helps, but at other times seems to pull on her shoulders too 
00339 
Judge Barbara Elicerio 
27 November 1992 
page 2 
Re: Claudia Cox 
much. She wears a neck collar for walking and sitting, which tends at times to cause muscle 
spasm in her better muscles. She often leans against a wall to get relief. 
She indicates that she feels discomfort in the thumb and index finger on the right. She feels 
she has some decreased feeling in the right hand, so that she occasionally will drop an item such 
as a cup. She feels she has a slightly less loss of feeling on the left side, as well. There is a 
feeling going from the shoulder down the arm as if she had wrenched it. She is aware that an 
EMG was normal. Most of her limited activities are because of her neck problems. 
She indicates she gets to bed about 11 p.m., but she does not sleep well. After she awakens in 
the morning, it takes about two hours before she can get up and start moving. She then takes 
medications and lies on the couch for a time, after which she cleans up the house. Her 
daughter comes in to do the vacuuming, sweeping and making the beds. She does her own 
cooking in the microwave and uses the dishwasher. She drives her car and shops. She feels that 
lifting a quart of milk is about her limit She eats and writes using the right hand. 
The applicant indicates her back is her next difficulty. She has pain when she lifts or sits veiy 
long. She describes this as at about a 5 or 6 level, increasing at times to a 10. The pain in the 
lower back seems to go up towards her neck, and at these times, she has made occasional visits 
to the emergency room for pain relief. Her pain increases if she sits for as long as 30 minutes. 
She tries to sit through church meetings, but goes home after the first meeting. She lies down 
to watch television. She feels that changes in barometric pressure or weather changes may 
cause increased back difficulty. She is more miserable in cold weather. She lias not noticed any 
effects from coughing or sneezing. She feels as if there is a knot in her lower back, which then 
spreads to the right hip region and to her right leg like an electric cord She has continued to 
have some numbness in the ball of the right foot, which she indicates has been present since 
1988. 
The applicant's various symptoms with reference to her neck and back in relation to other 
health problems were reviewed with her. It is noted that in Dr. Mombergefs records, there is 
a report of low back pain in 1959. The applicant indicates that this related to her having a 
spinal anesthetic for delivery of her first son. She reports the pain was low in the pelvic area 
and tended to go down towards one spot in her lower back. This gradually cleared In 1962 
and 1963, she recalls having back pain and understood that her back would "go crooked," and 
she had chiropractic treatments for this. 
In 1964, she had a problem with bleeding when she had tonsils and adenoids removed. In 1973 
and 74, she recalls having anxiety and depression symptoms and relates this was in a background 
of contemplating a divorce. She recalls she cried a great deal for four or five months. She is 
noted as having fatigue, anemia, and depression, in a background of phlebitis, chest pain and 
palpitations. 
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She recalls that sometime before 1976, she went into the hospital for bladder problems, and the 
opening was found to be too small, so that this was operated on. She understands Dr. Kezerian 
recommended surgery, but Dr. Lamb did not, so that she did exercises instead. 
In 1977, she began working at Utah Power. 
In 1978, she saw a chiropractor for treatment of her low back problems and continued this for 
several years. She recalls that her back would seem to go crooked and one shoulder and hip 
would be higher. She understands she had an L4 disc. She recalls lying down on the floor for 
relief. 
In 1981, she had an otitis media with a perforation. During this time, she continued to see a 
chiropractor intermittently. 
In 1984, she had a slight heart murmur detected and had breast reconstruction surgery and a 
hysterectomy for fibroids. 
In 1984, she recalls putting on a stocking when she heard a pop in her back. The pain did not 
last long, but she was told that an X-ray showed disc wedging at L4 and 5. 
In August 1986, she was bent over when she was lifting up a suitcase and someone bumped into 
her. This caused low back pain for a couple of weeks. She continued with chiropractic 
treatment during these times. 
The applicant reports that on 4 October 1986, she was vacationing in New Mexico at a hot air 
balloon festival. She was involved in riding in the back of a pick-up truck in following the 
balloon. She was sitting in the back of the truck near the tail gate, leaning against the side of 
the truck with her feet extended straight out on the bed of the truck. When the truck hit a dip 
in the road, she was bounced upward and then landed back on the bed of the truck again. She 
recalls immediate pain in her lower back. She noted pain near the bottom of her spine which 
went all the way up to her head, including her neck. In spite of the pain, she helped with 
loading up the balloon and indicates partying that night and thinks she may have taken some 
alcohol to help control the pain. On the following day, she could scarcely walk. She consulted 
a chiropractor who worked on her for about an hour and a half. She used a back brace to ride 
in the car to return to Utah. She returned to work. She saw Dr. Sanders for further 
chiropractic treatment and then saw Dr. Momberger who suggested Dr. Ward see her for 
possible more wide-spread disorder. She continued to be seen at the Mental Health Clinic for 
depression while continuing to have chiropractic treatment. 
She was then sent to Dr. Gaufin who did a myelogram which caused a severe headache and 
kept her in the hospital for two or three days. 
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Dr. Gaufin opeiated on her lower back on 5 January 1987 with a foraminotomy and 
decompression at L4-5 on the right. The applicant recalled that this relieved her'symptoms for 
a time, perhaps up to two months before she began having additional difficulties. He continued 
to follow her for her neck symptoms, and on 10 March 1987 did an anterior cervical discectomy 
with decompression and interbody fusion at two levels, C4-5 and C5-6. The applicant recalls 
that this seemed to relieve the more serious symptoms of her neck and back as well. She did 
not seem to have a feeling of bouncing as she did before. She was released for work in August 
1987 and returned to work. 
In December 1987, the applicant was seen by Dr. Null regarding her symptoms of fatigue. She 
understood from him that she had simply been pushing herself too much and feeling stressed 
out, trying to work at decorating cakes, in addition to her regular job. 
In December 1987, she was at work when she went to sit down on a chair that rolled out from 
under her. She fell flat on her buttocks and felt feelings of shock, spasm and nausea at the 
time. She felt that she panicked because she thought she might have hurt herself seriously, but 
there is no evidence that she was examined or had any special treatment for this at the time, 
although she did have a refill of her Soma on 29 December. After this, she recalls she resumed 
most of her activities including cake decorating, social dancing, and walking two to three miles 
a day. She belonged to an association and other groups and felt she continued to do hard work 
at that time. She continued to refill her Soma during this time. 
She continued at work and on 15 August 1988, she went to pull out a bottom file drawer with 
her right hand while bending over. She got it partly out when it seemed to jam. She felt a 
sudden pain in the right arm, shoulder, neck and back. She felt a popping; sensation and had 
a sense of nausea. She believes she reported the injury but kept on working because the 
staffing was light. She continued to have discomfort but ignored it all until about October when 
her neck and head began hurting her more at nighttime. She recalls she saw her doctors about 
other things, such as an estrogen refill, a routine mammography, a check of her cholesterol and 
for her Soma refills. 
She confirmed the fact that she saw Dr. Gaufin on 3 October 1988. He noted that the MRI 
showed a stable fusion but with degenerative changes at C6-7. An EMG was noted as normal, 
and a lumbar spine film showed a mild bulge at L5-S1 without impingement on nerve roots. 
He did not recommend surgery. She continued on with her work, and had physical therapy 
during the winter months, which made her sometimes feel better and sometimes feel sick for 
a few days. In May 1989, she began having some acupuncture treatments which were sometimes 
helpful and sometimes not helpful. She felt she was being treated for every organ in her body. 
In November 1989, she had cervical pain and tingling and numbness. In December, she saw Dr. 
Towner at Salt Lake Clinic and described a "very active life style." Beginning in December 
1989, she had to fill in for a co-worker who was off to have a baby. She had extensive overtime 
work and had increasing symptoms during this time. She recalled that Dr. Kotrady had raised 
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the question of a pain clinic, but she felt she could not take time off for the two weeks that 
would be required. 
On 9 July 1990, she had an incident while working at her desk. She turned her head to speak 
to someone and developed neck spasms and symptoms spreading down her spine. She 
understands that X-rays were unchanged. She checked at the clinic the same day. She also saw 
Dr. Potter regarding hot flashes and headaches, and he gave her Prozac. She was seen in 
August by Dr. Gaufin, and an MRI showed no major changes. He understands that she was 
scheduled for surgery again in April 1991, but since Dr. Gaufin could not guarantee any definite 
results, she has been reluctant to consider this. She has continued using her neck brace and 
using physical therapy and continuing to take her medications. She underwent various 
evaluations and in June and July saw Dr. Potter and Null regarding her various symptoms. She 
saw Dr. Heiner for a Social Security evaluation and continued seeing Dr. Potter and it was 
noted she had a sensation of drooling from the right side of the mouth, but the applicant can't 
recall anything about this. 
In November 1991, she reported difficulty closing her hands and additional tests were made. 
Studies were normal, as was an MRI of the brain. In March 1992, she developed symptoms of 
dizziness and went off medication for a time. She was seen by Delvin McFarlane regarding 
counseling, and he felt she had shown some improvement. In April 1992, Dr. Matthews 
suggested fibromyalgia syndrome and inflammatory polyarthritis. She was noted to have 
hypothyroidism, and this has been treated 
The applicant indicates her past general health has been good, and she has a good attendance 
record at work. She believes she fractured a clavicle before she started school. She did not 
have an appendectomy in 1954, as the reference to this is from someone else's records. She 
understands that her thyroid was normal in 1989. She recalled varicose veins and thrombophle-
bitis in 1974, but has no problems now. She has no further symptoms of pulmonary embolus 
and no bladder symptoms. She understands she was checked out for multiple sclerosis or a 
brain tumor, and no signs of these were found. She has had variable symptoms of an allergic 
rhinitis. She had a perforated ear drum, but feels her hearing is all right now. Her blood 
pressure has generally been low in the 100-110 systolic level, but understands a recent reading 
was 140/90. She has no impairment of vision and is able to smell without difficulty. In 1983, 
she had a tennis elbow, with recovery. 
She indicates she currently weighs 150 pounds and was previously 125-130. Height is 5 feet 4 
inches. She has an occasional social cocktail but has never smoked and has had no drug 
involvement. She has been divorced for the past ten years. She graduated from high school 
and had a one quarter course in college when she learned to type. She has had ballet in the 
past. She has not worked since July 1990 and was compensated up until March 4, 1991. She 
has been denied by Social Security, but understands from some comments made after a recent 
meeting, she expects to receive these benefits. She confirmed her past history of periods of 
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depression. She recalls particular difficulties when her husband filed for bankruptcy and left 
her in 1982. Since then, her job has been her whole social life and she feds it 6ecame too 
important to her. She indicates that on holidays when payrolls were due, she would offer to 
work holiday time to accomplish this for the company. She sums thus up as "my job was my 
life." She has in the past considered suicide, but not currently. In the vrinter of 1991, she 
sometimes would sit in the dark. In May of 1991, she cried at night for almost three day. 
Reference is made to the psychologic evaluation done in a Dr. Ravsten (Ph.D.) on 12 
November 1992. After testing, he indicated his diagnosis of depression in a passive-dependent 
personality disorder-
EXAMINATION: 
Examination reveals this 52-year-old female to appear in a good general state of health. She 
walks and stands without difficulty, but sits in an unusual position while being interviewed. She 
sits tilting back on the chair and tilting her head to the right and backward to rest it on the wall 
behind her. She appeared to get up from the examining table in a sideways fashion. When 
observed using her soft neck collar, she turned her head and flexed and extended the head 
much more freely than was apparent during the formal examination of range of motion, during 
which time she performed more like a mannikin. She had a 2 inch lumbar scar and a transverse 
hysterectomy scar. She has a posterior cervical laminectomy scar which is well healed 
The head showed no abnormality. She has upper and lower dentures. Cranial nerve survey was 
not remarkable. Blood pressure was 150/100 and pulse 86 and regular. The heart showed a 
mild systolic murmur and lung sounds were normal. Chest expansion was 1 inch. 
Examination of the upper extremity showed full range of motion of the shoulders, elbows, 
wrists, hands and fingers. There was no atrophy in the hands. The grip was about 50% of 
normal strength with hooking the finger muscles to test individual muscles showing at least 90% 
on the right and 100% on the left. Ulnar, radial and median nerve function showed normal 
function in each of these. The nails were normal and pulse was normal. The upper arm 
measured 10 1/4 on the right and 10 1/8 on the left. Forearm measured 9 on each side. 
The cervical spine showed 4+ midline tenderness from the occiput to about T3. Lateral 
bending was 30 on each side. Flexion was 10*, extension 25° and rotation 35* to the right and 
30° to the left. Upward traction tended to relieve her discomfort, but was a<xompanied by pain 
in the upper trapezius area. Compression resulted in 4+ report of pain in the neck. There was 
1+ tenderness in the right occipital area and 2+ tenderness in the upper trapezius areas 
bilaterally. 
The dorsal spine showed no abnormal configuration or limitation. 
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Lumbosacral spine showed 2+ tenderness in the midline from L4 to S3. There was 1+ 
tenderness on the right in the superspinatus insertion and sciatic areas. Buttocks tone was good. 
Flexion and extension could not be adequately tested because of marked restriction of efforts 
to move. Rotation was 35° in each direction and lateral bending was 35° in each direction. 
Straight leg raising was 45° on the right, with tightness in the posterior thigh spreading to the 
back. The left leg was 50° with no referred limitation. Testing was cog-wheel in its pattern. 
The hip showed resistance to flexion above 75° on the right, with referred pain to the back. The 
left showed full flexion, with variable resistance. External rotation, abduction, internal rotation 
and adduction were normal, and strength in all directions was normal. 
The knees showed normal configuration, range of motion and strength. The feet and ankles 
showed a limitation of dorsiflexion on the right to 70°, with a giveway pattern. The left was 
normal. The right big toe showed a 60-100% giveway pattern, and the left showed a 90%, with 
similar characteristics. Eversion and inversion were normal on both sides. There was good 
plantar flexion. The right leg measured 1/4 inch shorter than the other. The peripheral pulses 
were good. The toes and fingers were relatively cool. The legs were well shaved. The thigh 
measured 19 3/8 on the right and 18 on the left. The calf measured 13 5/8 on the right and 13 
1/2 on the left. She could stand on heels or toes without difficulty and squatting was done 
satisfactorily. 
Biceps, triceps, knee jerks and ankle jerks were in the hyperactive-normal range and 
symmetrical. Babinskis were down. She reported pain on the right Achilles on palpation, with 
less on the left. 
Sensory examination showed her able to perceive the cotton throughout all areas, except for 
reported subjective hypesthesia over the right fifth toe. With cotton, she reported subjective 
decrease from the mid palm and wrist downward, including the index finger and thumb, which 
were hyperesthetic to a variable degree. The radial 2/3 of the forearm and the lateral half of 
the upper arm up to the mid portion of the upper arm was reported subjectively as diminished. 
There was a report of decreased sharpness reaching the midline on the face and extending from 
the chin to the hairline, as well as over the anterior chest, abdomen and the neck on the right. 
This included these areas anteriorly as well as posteriorly, including a midline diminution 
involving the entire posterior shoulder area, the right scalp and posterior neck area including 
the parietal occipital area. The right ear was reported as dull on the right side, representing 
a whole right forequarter subjective diminution. Tuning fork and position sense were 
symmetrical and within normal limits. There was subjective diminution of the sharp object to 
the upper calf and just above the elbow on the left. There was a variable report of the sharp 
object being sharper on the left in the area of the foot extending to the carpal metaphalangeal 
area on the right up to the mid foot. She reported the sharp object was duller on the bottom 
of both feet. 
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Assuming but not deciding that the applicant was involved in circumstances as outlined, the 
panel concludes in terms of reasonable medical probability as follows: 
1) There is a medically demonstrable causal connection between symptoms or problems 
experienced by the applicant as noted in the Summary and the conditions or injuries 
existing prior to October 4,1986 incident, the October 4, 1986 incident, the December 
1987 incident, the 15 August 1988 incident, and the 9 July 1990 incident. 
We have interpreted, the question as applying to symptoms throughout the course of the 
applicant's history which were aggravations of an underlying condition and caused 
increased symptomatology for a time, at least, in relationship to the incidents. 
2) The period of time during which the applicant has been temporarily totally disabled as 
a result of the above incidents is as follows: 
December 1987 - None. 
15 August 1987 - None. 
9 July 1990 - Three or four weeks resulting from the aggravation of her underlying 
difficulties. 
3) The applicant's condition has stabilized sufficiently that a percentage of permanent 
impairment can be determined 
4) The percentage of permanent impairment attributable to the various pre-existing and 
other incidents is as shown on the following table: 
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% WHOLE PERSON IMPAIRMENT 
1 
Cervical spine: surgically treated 
disc lesion, with multiple levels 
(9+2+6 ROM = 17% WP) 
Lower back: surgically treated 
disc lesion, with residual pain 
I and limitation of ROM 
(9+5 = 14% WP) 
Hypothyroidism: treated, not 
related to injuries 
! % 
\ Whole 

































5) A- Impairment assignable to conditions prevailing prior to 1986 and to the October 4, 
1986 accident were symptomatic. 
Comment: It is quite clear that the applicant solicited extensive chiropractic help for 
both of these circumstances. 
B. The impairment was permanently aggravated by the occurrences of 1987,1988 and 
1990. 
6) The medical care the applicant has received since December 1987 has been necessitated 
by the three industrial incidents in proportion to the reported contribution to the 
impairment. 
7) The proposed cervical surgery previously recommended by Dr. Gaufin does not seem 
likely to be considered necessary in view of the total status of the applicant at this time, 
but should a future event suggest it should be carried out, it would be necessitated by 
Vae more recent of the incidents noted in the above table. It seems reasonable the 
proportion should be distributed in proportion to the present impairment as indicated 
in the above table. 
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8) Future medical treatment reasonably required in treating the applicant's problems 
resulting from the industrial accidents is infrequent orthopedic or neurosurgical follow-
up with counsel with reference to her continuing exercise programs, appropriate 
activities, etc* 
Comment: The panel agrees with the recent clinical psychologic evaluation that the 
applicant's present major symptoms of depression in a background of pre-existing 
personality disorder were not caused primarily by any of the industrial or non-industrial 
injuries, except to the extent that the social disruption of limited social activities is 
involved. Her symptoms do not appear to stem directly from any injury, itself, but from 
the natural consequences of loss of work and other restrictions which are social rather 
than physical injury based. While she may need access to psychiatric treatment, 
counseling and medications for her depression, it is felt this is a result of multiple non-
industrial factors influencing her. 
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Members of the panel will be happy to try and respond to any additional qi^tidns if it would 
be helpful. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Madison H. Thomas, M.D. 
Panel Chairman 





Social Security Disability Award 
(801)748-2127 
NOTE TO PROCESSING CENTER 
FURTHER ACTION N2CES5ARY 
DEPARTMENT OP 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 
Social Security Administration 
OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
Refer to : 528-74-9096 
Claudia A. Cox 
P.O. Box 273 
Orangeville, UT 84537 
NOTICE OF FAVORABLE DECISION - PLEASE READ CAREFULLY 
This Decision Is Favorable To You 
• Another office will process the decision. You will receive a 
notice from that office. 
• Your local Social Security office or another office may ask 
you to give more information before you receive the notice. If 
so, please answer promptly. 
• If you hear nothing about this decision for 60 days, please 
contact your local Social Security office. 
If You Think the Decision is Wrong 
• You have the right to appeal. You must file your appeal 
within 60 days from the date you receive this notice. (It will 
be presumed that you received the notice within 5 days after the 
date shown below, unless you show us that you did not receive it 
within the 5-day period.) 
• When you appeal, you request the Appeals Council to review the 
decision. If the Appeals Council grants your request, it~will 
review the entire record in your case. It will review those 
parts of the decision which you think are wrong. It will also 
review those parts which you think are correct and may make them 
unfavorable or less favorable to you. You will receive a new 
decision. 
• You (or your representative) have to ask for the appeal in 
writing. You may sign a form HA-520, called "Request for Review 
by the Appeals Council," or write a letter. 
• You may submit your appeal to your local Social Security 
office, a hearing office, or mail it directly to the Appeals 
Council, Office of Hearings and Appeals, P.O. Box 3200, 
Arlington, VA 22203. 
OCOol 
2 
The Appeals Council Kay Review the Decision on it? Own Motion 
• Within 60 days f\ urn the date shown below, the Appeals Council 
may review the decision on its own motion. This could change the 
decision. 
• After the 60-day period, the Appeals Council may reopen and 
revise the decision in certain situations. 
• The Appeals Council will notify you if it decides to review 
the decision on its own motion or to reopen and revise the 
decision. 
Unless you request review or the Appeals Council reviews the 
decision on its own motion, you may not obtain ci court review of 
your case (sections 205(g), 1631(c)(3) or 1869(b) of the Social 
Security Act). 
This notice and the enclosed copy of 
decision mailed 
December 21, 1992 
cc: 
Name and Address of Representative 
• 
Chon Kandaris 
Utah Legal Services 
23 S. Carbon Ave., Suite 4 
Price, UT 84501 
(801)637-3049 
Replaces Form HA-L502-U7 
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DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 
Social Security Administration 
OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS 
DECISION 
IN THE CASE OF CLAIM FOR 
Period of Disability and 
Claudia A. Cox Disability Insurance Benefits 
(Claimant) 
528-74-9096 
(Wage Earner) (Social Security Number) 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This case is before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a 
request for hearing filed by the claimant, who is dissatisfied 
with the previous determinations finding that she is not 
disabled. 
The claimant appeared and testified at the hearing, represented 
by Chon Kandaris, a non-attorney representative. At the request 
of the ALJ, G. Barrie Nielson appeared and testified as a 
vocational expert. 
ISSUES 
The issues in this case are whether the claimant is under a 
disability as defined by the Social Security Act and if so, when 
her disability commenced, the duration of the disability, and 
whether the insured status requirements of the Act are met for 
the purpose of entitlement to a period of disability and 
disability insurance benefits. 
EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE 
After a thorough evaluation of the entire record, it is concluded 
that the claimant has been disabled since July 9, 1990, and met 
the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on 
that date and thereafter, through December 31, 1995. 
00053 
Claudia A. Cox 
528-74-9096 
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The claimant was 50 years old on the date her disability began. 
The claimant has a 12th grade education. The claimant has not 
engaged in any substantial gainful activity since the disability 
onset date. 
The claimant has the following impairments which are considered 
to be "severe11 under the Social Security Act and Regulations: a 
history of lumbar disk surgery in January 1987, and cervical disc 
surgery in March 1987; post traumatic right, greater than left, 
hand numbness with decreased grip and intermittent hand pain; 
fibromyalgia syndrome;" inflammatory polyarthritis; polypharmacy; 
hypothyroidism; degenerative joint disease; degenerative disc 
disease; depression; and passive dependant personality disorder. 
These impairments prevent the claimant from sustaining work 
activities. The claimant's condition fluctuates. She has some 
good days but the bad days out number the good days. Overall, 
she has a residual functional capacity for less than a full range 
of sedentary work. 
The claimant's description of her limitations is consistent with 
the record when considered in its entirety. The claimant cannot 
perform her past relevant work and does not have transferable 
skills to perform other work within her residual functional 
capacity. 
Given the claimant's residual functional capacity, and the 
vocational factors of her age, education and past relevant work 
experience, there are no jobs existing in significant numbers 
that the claimant is capable of performing. The claimant is 
under a disability as defined by the Social Security Act and 
Regulations. 
FINDINGS 
After consideration of the entire record, the Administrative Law 
Judge makes the following findings: 
1. The claimant met the insured status requirements of the Act 
on July 9, 1990. The claimant has not performed any 
substantial gainful activity since July 9, 1990. 
2. The claimant's impairments which are considered to be 
"severe" under the.Social Security Act are a history of 
lumbar disk surgery in January 1987, and cervical disc 
surgery in March 1987; post traumatic right, greater than 
left, hand numbness with decreased grip and intermittent 
hand pain; fibromyalgia syndrome; inflammatory 
polyarthritis; polypharmacy; hypothyroidism; degenerative 
joint disease; degenerative disc disease; depression; and 
passive dependant personality disorder. 
00 D3-1-
Claudia A. Cox 
528-74-9096 
3. The claimant's impairments do not meet or equal in severity 
the appropriate medical findings contained in 20 CFR Part 
404, Appendix 1 to Subpart P (Listing of Impairments). 
4. The claimant's allegations are found to be credible. 
5. The claimant's impairments prevent her from sustaining work 
activities. The claimant's condition fluctuates. She has 
some good days but the bad days out number the good days. 
6. The claimant is unable to perform her past relevant work. 
7. The claimant was 50 years old on the date disability began, 
which is defined as closely approaching advanced age. The 
claimant has a high school education. 
8. The claimant does not have transferable skills to perform 
other work within her physical and mental residual 
functional capacity. 
9. Based upon the claimant's residual functional capacity, and 
vocational factors, there are no jobs existing in 
significant numbers which she can perform. This finding is 
based upon the framework of Medical-Vocational Rule 201.14, 
2 0 CFR Part 4 04, Appendix 2 to Subpart P, and the testimony 
of the Vocational Expert. 
10. The claimant has been under a disability as defined by the 
Social Security Act and Regulations since July 9, 1990. 
DECISION 
Based on the Title II application filed on April 9, 1991, the 
claimant is entitled to a period of disability beginning on July 
9, 1990, and to disability insurance benefits under sections 
216(i) and 223, respectively, of the Social Security Act,-and the 
claimant's disability has continued through at least the date of 
this decision. 
Robin L.Uterine 
Administrative Law Judge 




LIST OF EXHIBITS 
Claudia A, Cox 528-74-9096 
CLAIMANT SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 
WAGE EARNER (If other than Clmt) SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 
Exhibit No. of 
No. Description pages 
1 Application for Disability Insurance Benefits, 
•filed 4-9-91 3 
2 Notice of Initial Denial of Disability 
Insurance Benefits, dated 10-25-91 2 
3 Request for Reconsideration, filed 12-17-91 2 
4 Notice of Reconsideration Denial of .Disability 
Insurance Benefits, dated 5-15-92 3 
5 Request for Hearing, filed 7-7-92 2 
6 Earnings Record, dated 7-22-91 2 
7 Disability Report(s), dated 1-28-91 8 
8 Reconsideration Disability Report, dated 11-20-91 6 
9 Vocational Report(s), dated 1-28-91 6 
10 Report of Contact, re: Company Disability Plan, 
dated 6-4-91 1 
11 Report of Contact, dated 10-2-91 1 
12 Claimant's Statement When Request for Hearing 
is Filed and the Issue Is Disability, 
dated 6-29-92 2 
13 Disability Determination(s) by State Agency, 
Title II, Initial dated 10-9-91; 
Reconsideration dated 4-28-92 with attachments 14 
14 Medical Records from Utah Valley Regional Medical 
Center, dated 1-5-87 to 1-13-87 10 
15 Medical Records from Utah Valley Regional Medical 
Center, dated 3-9-87 to 3-15-87 9 
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Medical Records from Emery Medical Center, P.C. 
dated 5-31-88 to 12-7-90 






Treatment notes covering the period from 
10-3-88 to 11-25-91 by Lynn Gaufin, M.D. 
Medical Records from Utah Valley Regional Medical 
Center, dated 11-25-91 to 2-4-92 
Medical Records from Sterling Potter, M.D., 







Medical Records from Joseph R. Watkins, M.D., 
dated 12-20-91 to 3-5-92 17 
Medical Report from Delvin McFarlane, LCSW, 
dated 3-30-92 1 
Resume of G. Barrie Nielson, Vocational Expert 2 
Medical Records from Jeffrey L. Mathews, M.D., 
dated 4/7/92 to 8/12/92. 13 




Industrial Commission Order 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6600 




UTAH POWER & LIGHT, ENERGY * 
MUTUAL INSURANCE and EMPLOYERS' * 
REINSURANCE FUND, * 
Respondents. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
The Industrial Commission of Utah (Commission) reviews the 
motion for review of respondent in the above captioned matter, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63 
-46b-12. 
The provisions of U.C.A. Sections 35-1-1 et. seq. are 
applicable in this case. 
The order of the administrative law judge (ALJ) is presumed to 
be lawful and reasonable "until it is found otherwise in an action 
brought for that purpose, or until altered or revoked by the 
commission." U.C.A. Section 35-1-20 (1953). 
The statutes further provide that: 
A substantial compliance with the requirements of 
this title [Title 35] shall be sufficient to give 
effect to the orders of the commission, and they 
shall not be declared inoperative, illegal or void 
for any omission of a technical nature. 
U.C.A. Section 35-1-33 (1953). 
The Commission has "the duty ... and ... full power, 
jurisdiction, and authority to ... administer and enforce all laws 
for the protection of life, health, safety, and welfare of 
employees," U.C.A. Section 35-1-16(1)(a)(1953), and to "consider 
and determine" the matters in issue, U.C.A. Section 35-1-24 (1953). 
Additional evidence that the Commission has been granted 
discretion in its determinations is shown by U.C.A. Section 35-1-88 
(1965) which provides: 
...The commission may make its investigation in 
such manner as in its judgment is best calcula-
ted to ascertain the substantial rights of the 
parties and to carry out justly the spirit of 
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the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
The preceding statute relates to matters at hearing, and 
shows the extent to which the legislature desired to provide the 
Commission with the necessary discretion to reach a decision. This 
statute also provides the authority for the Commission to deviate 
from common-law rules, statutory rules of evidence, technical or 
formal rules of procedure, unless provided for in the workers' 
compensation act, or unless otherwise adopted by Commission rules. 
Id. 
Thus, the statutes expressly and impliedly give the 
Commission, commensurate with its statutory duty, broad authority 
and discretion to interpret, construe, consider, and determine the 
matters before it in the workers' compensation arena. 
The applicant filed this motion for review challenging the 
ALJ's ruling that she failed to prove that her permanent total 
disability ("PTD") was caused by her industrial accident of August 
15, 1988. The applicant argues that she is entitled to benefits 
because she showed a "medically demonstrable causal link11 under 
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986) between 
her August 15, 1988 industrial accident and her disability. The 
respondent asserts that Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 
954 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988) requires that a claimant "prove medically 
that his disability was caused by an industrial accident." 
Finally, the applicant asserts that under the odd-lot doctrine, she 
is entitled to PTD benefits. 
In Allen v. Industrial Commission, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that a claimant for workers' compensation benefits who has a pre-
existing condition must prove both legal and medical causation1 
before he is entitled to benefits. The Court discussed the causal 
connection required to sustain a claim for permanent total 
disability benefits in Hodges v. Western Piling & Sheeting Co.. 717 
P.2d 718 (Utah 1986). Hodges requires that a claimant for 
permanent total disability benefits prove that his disability was 
caused by an industrial accident. Id. at 721. The Utah Court of 
Appeals applied Allen and Hodges to sustain the commission's denial 
of benefits to a PTD claimant whose disability was determined to be 
the result of pre-existing conditions and not an industrial 
1
 Legal causation requires a showing that the employment 
contributed something substantial to increase the risk he already 
faced in everyday life because of his pre-existing condition. 
Medical causation requires a showing that the disability is 
medically the result of an exertion or injury that occurred during 
work related activity. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 





accident. Large v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1988). 
It is important to note that there is a distinction between 
the terms "impairment" and "disability." "Impairment" is a medical 
appraisal of the "nature and extent of the patient's illness or 
injury as it affects his personal efficiency in one or more of the 
activities of daily living." "Disability" is the worker's 
impairment of earning capacity. Northwest Carriers, Inc. v. 
Industrial Commission, 639 P.2d 138, 140, n. 3 (Utah 1951). A 
determination of whether a claimant is permanently and totally 
disabled is a question of fact. On review, an ALJ's 
determination of factual issues must be supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. Grace Drilling v. Board of Review. 776 
P.2d 63 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989). We will review the record to 
determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record to 
support the ALJ's finding that the applicant did not become 
permanently and totally disabled as a result of her August 15, 1988 
industrial injury. 
Review of the medical records shows that the applicant first 
sought chiropractic care from Castle Chiropractic for lumbo-sacral 
strain in September 1978. She continued to see her chiropractor as 
needed through November 1991. In October 1986, the applicant was 
riding in the back of a pickup truck chasing a hot air balloon in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico, when the truck hit a dip in the road which 
caused her to bounce up off the bed of the truck and land hard on 
her buttocks in a seated position. She sought emergency 
chiropractic care that evening at Care More Chiropractic in 
Albuquerque, and was provided a back brace for her trip home to 
Utah. 
Upon her return, the applicant was treated by Dr. R. Sanders 
at Castle Chiropractic Center. Dr. Sanders referred her to Dr. 
Gaufin at the Utah Neurological Clinic on November 24, 1986. Dr. 
Gaufin diagnosed acute and chronic lumbar radiculopathy secondary 
to a centrally herniated L4-5 disc, mild disc bulge L3-4, cervical 
radiculopathy secondary to encroachment upon the nerve roots at C4-
5 and C5-6 bilaterally and prescribed pain medication. Dr. Gaufin 
performed a semi-hemi laminotomy, foraminotomy and nerve root 
decompression at L4-5 on the right at Utah Valley Regional Medical 
Center on January 5, 1987. He performed an anterior cervical 
discectomy with nerve root decompression and interbody fusion at 
C4-5 and C5-6 on March 10, 1987. 
The applicant was released to return to work on August 5, 1987 
and sought follow up care with her family physician at Emery 
Medic 1 Clinic. The medical records show that the applicant saw 
her doctor primarily for medication refills during the period from 





Sometime during December 1987, the exact date is not noted in 
the record, the applicant suffered the first of three alleged 
industrial injuries. As she attempted to sit at her desk, her 
chair which was equipped with wheels, rolled away and she fell to 
the floor landing on her buttocks. The applicant sought no 
immediate medical care as a result of this fall, but did refill her 
prescription for Soma on December 29, 1987. The applicant missed 
no work and no Employer's First Report of Injury was filed for this 
incident. The application for a hearing alleged that the applicant 
suffered industrial accidents on August 15, 1988 and July 9, 1990. 
The ALJ considered the December 1987 injury irrelevant to the 
applicant's PTD claim. 
A second industrial incident occurred on August 15, 1988. The 
applicant was doing work for one of her co-workers, Carma O'Brien, 
who was off that day. As the applicant attempted to open the 
bottom drawer of Ms. O'Brien's file cabinet, the drawer stuck and 
the applicant felt something give in the middle of her back, and 
her neck, shoulder and right arm felt wrenched. She completed her 
shift on August 15, 1988 and continued to work thereafter. The 
applicant testified that, following this accident, she took pain 
medications and muscle relaxants daily and went straight to bed 
after work. There were no immediate doctor's visits associated 
with the August 15, 1988 injury. 
The first mention of the December 1987 and August 15, 1988 
accidents in the medical records was in Dr. Gaufin's office note 
dated October 3, 1988. Dr. Gaufin referred the applicant for an 
MRI of her cervical and lumbar spine. The cervical films were read 
to show a stable fusion at C4-5 and C5-6, and degenerative disc 
disease at C6-7, producing a bar type defect obliterating the 
thecal sac and impinging on the nerve roots bilaterally, greater on 
the right than the left. The lumbar films showed no evidence of a 
recurrent disc injury, but a mild bulge not impinging on the nerve 
root or thecal sac was noted at L5-S1. Nerve conduction tests 
performed on October 7, 1988 were read as normal by Dr. J. Andrews 
at Western Neurological Associates. In a November 23, 1988 letter 
to Dr. Kotrady at Emery Medical Center, Dr. Gaufin opined that the 
applicant's industrial accidents had aggravated a pre-existing mild 
degenerative change at C6-7 and created a mild bulge at L5-S1. 
Conservative treatment was recommended. 
The applicant continued to use pain medications and muscle 
relaxants. She also tried physical therapy and acupuncture for 
pain control. The applicant continued to work, although she 
testified that her daughter helped with housework and she was 
unable to engage in her hobby of cake decorating. However, the 
applicant worked overtime between January and April of 1990 after a 
co-worker failed to return from maternity leave. In May 1990, the 





right hand, constant headaches, and pain in the right leg with 
parasthesias in the toes after walking. Dr. Kotrady wrote Dr. 
Gaufin on July 2, 1990 recommending that the applicant be 
reevaluated by Gaufin. Kotrady stated that he would recommend a 
pain clinic if Gaufin determined that surgery was not the 
recommended course of treatment. Dr. Kotrady believed that there 
was an emotional stress component blocking successful treatment of 
the applicant's symptoms. 
On July 9, 1990, the applicant suffered her final industrial 
incident. She was sitting at her desk and turned her head, 
bringing on muscle spasms in her neck and spine. The applicant 
went to the Emery Medical Center that day and a cervical X-ray was 
made which showed no changes from previous studies. An acute 
strain was diagnosed and Soma and Lortab were prescribed. Physical 
therapy was postponed until after the applicant saw Dr. Gaufin.^ An 
MRI was done on at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center on August 9, 
1990. The MRI showed no major changes since the previous MRI 
performed on October 7, 1988. This incident is not a compensable 
industrial accident under Allen, because the applicant's employment 
did not contribute anything substantial to increase the risk she 
already faced in nonemployment life. 
Dr. Gaufin examined the applicant on August 15, 1990. He 
opined that the applicant had acute chronic cervical radiculopathy 
secondary to spondylosis and protrusion of the disc at C6-7 
bilaterally. He recommended surgery to decompress the nerve roots, 
but the applicant did not want surgery at that time. Dr. Gaufin 
recommended that the applicant avoid jolting or jarring the neck# 
use of a soft cervical collar, cervical traction taught by a 
physical therapist, and anti-inflammatory and muscle relaxants. In 
January 1991, Dr. Gaufin gave the applicant a 33% whole person 
impairment rating due to her industrial injuries. 
On April 29, 1991 Dr. Harris examined the applicant upon the 
insurance carrier's request. He gave the applicant a 34% 
impairment rating, but apportioned the majority of the rating to 
1986 nonindustrial injury and subsequent surgeries. 
The applicant saw Dr. Potter for depression and headaches in 
June and July 1991. On October 25, 1991 the applicant's request 
for Social Security disability benefits was denied. The Social 
Security Administration determined in an order dated October 25, 
1991, that the applicant could work an 8-hour day with normal 
breaks. The applicant saw Dr. Potter on November 7, 1991, and he 
noted that the applicant was having problems closing her hands. 
Dr. Watkins, r neurologist, saw the applicant on December 20, 1991. 
He ordered a nerve conduction velocity test, EMG's of both arms and 
a MRI of the Drain, all of which were within normal limits. On 





developed dizziness, had gone off all medications, and was taking 
meclizine for the dizziness. 
A March 31, 1992 functional capacity evaluation at Carbon 
Emery Physical Therapy classified the applicant for light/sedentary 
work. The report noted that the applicant was not in control of 
her pain and was limited by her fear of reinjury. Dr. Matthews 
diagnosed the applicant with fibromyalgia syndrome and inflammatory 
polyarthritis on April 6, 1992. He also tested her for multiple 
sclerosis, lyme disease and hypothyroidism. He returned a 
diagnosis of hypothyroidism and chronic pain on June 1, 1992. Dr. 
Potter, on May 19# 1992, noted hand pain, leg swelling and 
diagnosed possible fibromyacitis and fatigue. 
A Career Guidance Center report dated June 15, 1992 concluded 
that there were jobs available for which the applicant was trained, 
but that it might be difficult for the applicant to find an 
employer willing to accommodate her disabilities. The applicant is 
a high school graduate with a 20 year work history in retail sales, 
accounting and clerical positions. She believes that she can no 
longer perform these types of work due to her inability to sit and 
work for long periods at a desk or to bend, lift, reach and stand 
as required in retail sales. 
The ALJ referred this matter to a medical panel for an 
apportionment of the applicant's impairment among several possible 
causes. The medical panel attributed 1.27 % of the applicant's 
permanent impairment to her December 1987 accident, 2.83% of the 
applicant's permanent impairment to her August 15, 1988 accident, 
and 33.17% to various pre-existing causes. No permanent impairment 
was attributed to the July 9, 1990 incident. The medical panel 
further concluded that the applicant's depression and pre-existing 
personality disorder were caused by non-industrial factors. 
The applicant received Social Security disability benefits 
pursuant to a decision dated December 21, 1992. The decision 
stated that the following impairments were relevant to the award of 
disability benefits: 
[A] history of lumbar disc surgery in January 
1987, and cervical disc surgery in March 1987; 
post traumatic right, greater than left, hand 
numbness with decreased grip and intermittent 
hand pain; fibromyalgia syndrome; inflammatory 
polyarthritis; polypharmacy; hypothyroidism; 
degenerative joint disease; degenerative disc 
disease; depression; and passive dependent 
personality disorder. 





medical problems which contribute to the applicant's disability 
status. Four of those medical problems are clearly unrelated to 
the applicant's industrial injuries (the 1987 surgeries, 
hypothyroidism, depression and passive dependant personality 
disorder). The industrial injuries may have contributed to the 
other six conditions, but the medical evidence does not show a 
causal connection between the applicant's hand problems, 
fibromyalgia, polyarthritis, polypharmacy, degenerative joint 
disease, and degenerative disc disease and the applicant's 
industrial accident of August 15, 1988. The medical panel assigned 
95% of the applicant's 14% lower back impairment and 80% of the 
applicant's 17% cervical spine impairment to the applicant's 
balloon chasing accident and other pre-existing impairments. The 
relatively small proportion of the applicant's impairment that was 
attributed to the industrial accident of August 15, 1988, is, in 
our view, insufficient to support a finding that the applicant's 
permanent total disability was caused by that industrial accident. 
Therefore, the applicant has not proved by a preponderance of 
the evidence that her disability was caused by her industrial 
accident of August 15, 1988. Therefore, under Hodges and Large, 
she is not entitled to permanent total disability benefits. The 
applicant's claim for permanent total disability benefits under the 
odd-lot doctrine likewise fails due to the lack of a causal 
connection between the industrial accident and her permanent total 
disability. We therefore, find that the ALJ's finding that the 
applicant is not entitled to permanent total disability benefits is 
supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the Order of the administrative law judge 
dated February 4, 1993 is hereby affirmed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within 3 0 days from the date of this order, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, 
and 63-46b-16, and Couriers v. Dept. of Employment Security, 201 





all costs to prepare a transcript of the hearing for appeals 
purposes. 
Stephen M. Had1ey_ 
CJtiair^nan 0 / 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
/SS*£'S, j4-
Colleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
<^-/££. 
Certified this '!£_! day of 
ATTEST: 
// - y 
t > / 1993. 
Patricia 0. Ashby / 
Commission Secretary 
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Robert A. ALLEN, Plaintiff, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, Board of 
Review, Jer Ken, Inc., State Insurance 
Fund and Second Injury Fund, Defend-
ants. 
No. 20026. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 14, 1986. 
Worker, who sustained lower back in-
juries while stacking milk crates containing 
four to six gallons of milk, sought review 
of an order of the Industrial Commission, 
denying his motion for review of an order 
of an administrative law judge denying his 
workers' compensation claim. The Su-
preme Court, Durham, J., held that: (1) 
finding that worker's injury was not "by 
accident" was not based on the evidence 
and, thus, was erroneous, but (2) worker's 
claim would be remanded for further fact 
finding as to whether action of worker, 
who had previous back problems, in lifting 
several piles of milk crates exceeded exer-
tion which average person typically under-
took in nonemployment life and whether 
medically demonstrable causal link existed 
between worker's lifting and injury to his 
back. 
Vacated and remanded. 
Hall, CJ., filed opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, with Stewart, 
Associate C J., joining in the dissent 
Stewart, Associate CJ., dissented and 
filed opinion. 
1. Evidence =^»I8 
Supreme Court took judicial notice that 
liquid milk weighs about the same as liquid 
water or approximately eight and one-third 
pounds per gallon; thus, four gallons of 
milk weigh about S3 pounds without the 
containers and crate, and six gallons of 
milk weigh about 50 pounds without con-
tainers and crate. 
ALLEN v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N Utah 15 
Cite as 729 P2A 15 (Utah 1986) 
2. Workers* Compensation *»515 
For purposes of workers' compensa-
tion, key requirement of an "accident" is 
that occurrence be unanticipated, un-
planned, and unintended; where either 
cause of injury or result of exertion is 
different from what would normally be ex-
pected to occur, occurrence is unplanned, 
unforeseen, and unintended and, thus, by 
"accident"; clarifying Catling v. Industri-
al Commission, 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 
202. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Workers' Compensation e=»515 
For purposes of workers' compensa-
tion, proof of unusual event may be" helpful 
in determining causal connection between 
injury and employment; however, proof of 
unusual event is not required as an element 
of requirement that injury be "by acci-
dent" U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
4. Workers* Compensation *=»515 
An "accident," for purposes of require-
ment that injury be "by accident" to be 
compensable under Workers' Compensation 
Act, is an unexpected or unintended occur-
rence that may be either the cause or the 
result of an injury; abandoning Redman 
Warehousing Corp. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 P.2d 283; 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. Industrial Commission, 590 
P.2d 328 (Utah); Farmer's Grain Cooper-
ative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah); 
Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 
(Utah); Billings Computer Corp. v. Tar-
ango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah). U.C.A.1953, 
35-1-45. 
5. Workers' Compensation fc=*568 
Key question in workers' compensation 
case in determining causation is whether, 
given worker's body and worker's exertion, 
the exertion in fact contributed to the inju-
ry. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
6. Workers' Compensation e»552, 568 
Only those injuries which occur be-
cause some condition or exertion required 
by employment increases risk of injury 
16 Utah 729 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
which worker normally faces in his every-
day life is compensable under Workers 
Compensation Act; injuries which coinci-
dentally occur at work because preexist*' .b 
condition results in symptoms which appear 
during work hours without any enhance-
ment from the work place are not compen-
sable. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
7. Workers' Compensation ®»597 
For purposes of workers' compensa-
tion, two-part causation test, requiring con-
sideration of legal cause and medical cause 
of injury, is required in determining wheth-
er causal connection exists between injury 
and worker's employment; abandoning 
Billings Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674 
P.2d 104 (Utah); Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. 
Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah), Church of Je-
sus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Indies-
trial Commission, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah); 
IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828 
(Utah); Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construc-
tion and Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144 
(Utah); Jones v. California Packing 
Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640; Robert-
son v. Industrial Commission, 109 Utah 
25, 163 P.2d 331; Thomas D. Dee Memori-
al Hospital Assfn v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d 233; Kaiser 
Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 
(Utah); Schmidt v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah); Residential and 
Commercial Construction Co. v. Indus-
trial Commission, 529 P.2d 427 (Utah); 
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 
Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740; Baker v. Indus-
trial Commission, 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 
P.2d 613; Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961. 
U.C.A.1953, 3&-1-45. 
8. Workers' Compensation &=>55Z 
Where claimant suffers from preexist-
ing condition which contributes to injury, 
unusual or extraordinary exertion is re-
quired to prove "legal causation," for pur-
poses of two-part causation test for deter-
mining whether causal connection exists 
between claimant's injury and claimant's 
employment; where there is no preexisting 
condition, a usual or an ordinary exertion is 
sufficient to prove legal causation. U.C.A. 
1953, 35-1-45. 
9. Workers' Compensation <*=>597 
For purposes of legal causation ele-
ment of two-part test for determining 
whether causal connection erists between 
claimant's injury and claimant's employ-
ment, precipitating exertion must be com-
pared with usual wear and tear and exer-
tions of nonemployment life of people in 
general, not nonemployment life of the par-
ticular claimant in question. U.C.A.1953, 
35-1-45. 
10. Workers' Compensation £»597 
Under medical causation portion of 
two-part test for determining whether 
causal connection exists between claimant's 
injury and claimant's employment, claimant 
must show by evidence, opinion, or other-
wise that stress, strain, or exertion re-
quired by his or her occupation led to re-
sulting injury or disability. U.C.A.1953, 
35-1-45. 
1J. Workers' Compensation <*=>1390 
Evidence of ordinariness or usualness 
of employee's exertions may be relevant to 
medical conclusion of causal connection be-
tween claimant's injury and claimant's em-
ployment U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
12. Workers' Compensation <*=>1533 
Finding that claimant's lower back in-
jury was not "by accident" as claimant was 
stacking milk crates was not based on the 
evidence and, thus, was erroneous; claim-
ant experienced unexpected and unantic-
ipated injury to his back as he lifted crate 
of milk in cramped area of cooler, claimant 
had not complained of pain or limitations at 
his job, and no evidence indicated that inju-
ry was predictable or developed gradually 
as with occupational disease or progressive 
back disorder. U.C.A.1953, 35--1-45. 
13. Workers' Compensation «==1950 
Compensation claim of worker, who 
had preexisting back problems and sus-
tained lower back injuries while stacking 
crates containing four to six gallons of 
milk, was remanded for further fact find-
ing on issue as to whether moving and 
ALLEN v. INDUSTRIAL COM?* 
ate *» 729 PJtd 15 (Utah 1986) 
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lifting several piles of crates wei,ghin£ 30 
to 50 pounds in confined area of cooler 
exceeded exertion average person typically 
undertook in nonemployment life and 
whether there was medically demonstrable 
causal link between worker's action in lift-
ing milk crates and injury to his back and, 
thus, ultimately, whether his injury "arose 
out of or in the course of employment." 
ILC.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
Michael E. Bulson, Ogden, for plaintiff. 
Gilbert Martinez, Salt Lake City, for Sec-
ond Injury. 
Fred R. Silvester, James R. Black, Salt 
Lake City, for State Ins. Fund. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
Claimant Robert A. Allen seeks a review 
from the Industrial Commission's denial of 
his motion for review of an administrative 
law judge order denying him compensation 
for a back injury sustained at work. For 
the reasons stated below, we reverse and 
remand. 
[1] On November 23, 1982, the claim-
ant, aged 36, was employed as night man-
ager of Kent's Foods. The claimant testi-
fied to the following version of events at a 
hearing before an administrative law 
judge. The claimant was working in a 
confined cooler in the store stacking crates, 
containing four to six gallons1 of milk, 
from the floor onto a cooler shelf. While 
lifting one crate to about chest level, he 
suddenly felt a sharp pain in his lower 
back. He immediately set down the crate 
and asked another employee to continue 
stocking the shelves. The claimant com-
pleted the one-half hour remaining in his 
shift doimj desk work. That night the pain 
increased, and by morning his left leg felt 
numb. Four or five days later, he saw Dr. 
Ivan Wright about his back problem. Ini-
tial doctor visits during December were 
followed through with the prescribed treat-
1. We take judicial notice that liquid milk weighs 
about the same as liquid water or approximately 
8V3 pounds per gallon. Thus, four gallons of 
milk weigh about 33 pounds without the con-
ment of bed rest and medication, A myelo-
gram finally revealed a herniated disc, and 
the claimant spent ten days in traction in 
the hospital in early January. He did not 
•return to work. 
The claimant also testified he had a histo-
ry of prior back injuries, including a fall 
from a telephone pole at age fourteen 
which required him to wear a back brace 
for several months, a back injury in 1977 
while lifting sand bags for the Logan 
School District, and another fall while 
working for that employer when he slipped 
on a slick concrete ramp and broke his 
coccyx. None of the prior injuries resulted 
in prolonged absences from work. 
The testimony from other sources varied 
slightly from the report given by the claim-
ant The employer's report of injury de-
scribes the accident as "picking up freight 
and stocking it on shelves, lifting boxes 
and stacking them from truck." No specif-
ic event was mentioned in the employer's 
report. The medical records of treating 
physicians described the claimant's previ-
ous injuries, but omitted any reference to a 
specific incident in the cooler. Dr. Hannan, 
who examined the claimant on December 
81, 1982, wrote, "He does not remember 
any distinct episode as having precipitated 
his current problem, however." And in a 
letter from Dr. Bryner to Dr. Wright dated 
January 13, 1983, the claimant's history 
was related as follows: "About six weeks 
ago, however, he was lifting material at 
work, and recalls no specific injury or 
stress but developed discomfort in his left 
groin area which ultimately extended into 
his big toe." 
The administrative law judge found that 
the claimant's injury to his back on Novem-
ber 23, 1982, was not "an injury by acci-
dent arising out of or in the course of 
employment" It is apparent that the ad-
ministrative law judge, using a specific epi-
sode analysis, concluded there was no "ac-
cident" because there was no identifiable 
tainers and crate. Six gallons of milk weigh 
approximately 50 pounds without the containers 
and crfete. 
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event that caused the injury and because 
lifting the crates of milk was a routine and 
commonplace exertion expected of the job. 
The administrative law judge analogized 
the facts of this case to Farmer's Grain 
Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 
1980), where a gradually developed back 
injury was held to be not compensable 
where the condition worsened without the 
intervention of any external occurrence or 
trauma. 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the 
claimant, who had suffered preexisting 
back problems and was injured as the re-
sult of an exertion usual and typical for his 
job, was injured "by accident arising out of 
or in the course of employment" as re-
quired by the Workers' Compensation Act, 
U.C.A., 1953, § 3&-1-45 (Supp.1986). That 
Act, in pertinent part, provides: 
Every employee . . . who is injured . . . 
by accident arising out of or in the 
course of his employment . . . shall be 
paid compensation for loss sustained on 
account of the injury 
Id This statute creates two prerequisites 
for a finding of a compensable injury. 
First, the injury must be "by accident" 
Second, the language "arising out of or in 
the course of employment'' requires that 
there be a causal connection between the 
injury and the employment. See Pitts-
burgh Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 657 
P.2d 1367, 1370 (Utah 1983). Prior deci-
sions by this Court have often failed to 
distinguish the analysis of the accident 
question from the discussion of causation 
elements.2 As a result, this Court and the 
Commission are faced with confusing and 
often inconsistent precedent For this rea-
2. We note that many of our prior opinions so 
intermingled the causation and accident analy-
ses that it is impossible to segregate them and 
determine the basis for the Court's decision. 
For example, the opinion in Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. 
Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982). mixes the acci-
dent and causation elements in the following 
language I t appears to be mere coincidence 
that defendant's injury . . occurred at work. 
Defendant bears the burden of showing other-
wise. Proof of the causal relationship of duties 
of employment to unexpected injury is simply 
lacking [T]he Commission's conclusion 
that an accident occurred is without any sub-
son we now undertake a fresh look at the 
policy ard historical background of the 
workers' compensation statute in an at-
tempt \r )rovide a clear and workable rule 
for future application by the Commission. 
I. 
The term "by accident" is not defined in 
the workers' compensation statutes. The 
most frequently referenced authority for 
the definition of "'by accident" is the case 
of Carting v. Industrial Commission, 16 
Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (] 965), where the 
term was defined as follows: 
[An accident] connotes an unanticipated, 
unintended occurrence different from 
what would normally be expected to oc-
cur in the usual course of events 
[Tjhis is not necessarily restricted to 
some single incident which happened sud-
denly at one particular time and does not 
preclude the possibility that due to exer-
tion, stress or other repetitive cause, a 
climax might be reached in such manner 
as to properly fall within 1-he definition of 
an accident as just stated above. How-
ever, such an occurrence must be distin-
guished from gradually developing condi-
tions which are classified as occupational 
diseases 
Id at 261-62, 399 VM at 203 (citing Jones 
v. California Packing Corp., 121 Utah 
612, 616, 244 P.2d 640, €42 (1952), and 
Purity Biscuit Co v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949)). 
Some confusion hits developed as to wheth-
er "by accident" requires proof of an un-
usual event This issue frequently arises 
when the employee suffers an internal fail-
ure* brought about by exertions in the 
stantive support in the record." Id. at 726 (foot-
notes omitted). See also Chutch of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Comm'n, 590 
P.2d 328. 329-30 (Utah 1979); Pmtar v. Industri-
al Comm'n, 14 Utah 2d 276, 382 P.2d 414 (1963). 
For an example of an opinion which does sepa-
rate the accident and causation analysis, see 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 590 P.2d 328, 330-31 (Utah 
1979) (Wilkms. J., dissenting). 
3. An "internal failure" refers to a category of 
injuries that arise from general organ or struc-
tural failure brought alwut by an exertion in the 
ALLEN v. INDUSTRIAL COM*N 
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workplace. It is clear, however, that our 
cases have defined "by accident" to include 
internal failures resulting from both usual 
and unusual exertions. See Schmidt v. 
Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693, 695 
(Utah 1980). 
This Court first discussed the term "by 
accident" in Tintic Milling Co. v. Industri-
al Commission, 60 Utah 14, 206 P. 278 
(1922), where an accident was said to be 
"something out of the ordinary, unex-
pected, and definitely located as to time 
and place." 60 Utah at 22, 206 P. at 281. 
This definition was used to distinguish inju-
ries which occurred gradually and were 
covered under statutory provisions for oc-
cupational disease. Id. The Court in Tin-
tic Milling also acknowledged that where 
the claimant suffers an internal failure the 
"unexpected result" rule of the seminal 
English case of Fenton v. Thorley, [1903] 
A.C. 443, 72 LJ.K. 789, 5 W.C.C. 1, is 
appropriate. The Court in Tintic Milling 
observed: 
"Since the case of Fenton v. Thorley, 
nothing more is required than that the 
harm that the plaintiff has sustained 
shall be unexpected It is enough 
that the causes, themselves known and 
usual, should produce a result which on 
a particular occasion is neither designed 
nor expected. The test as to whether an 
injury is unexpected, and so, if received 
on a single occasion, occurs *by accident/ 
is that the sufferer did not intend or 
expect that injury would on that particu-
lar occasion result from what he was 
doing." 
60 Utah at 26, 206 P. at 282 (quoting Boh-
len, A Problem in The Drafting of Work-
men '8 Compensation Acts, 25 Harv.L.Rev. 
828, 340 (1912) (emphasis added)). Accord-
ingly, the Court in Tintic affirmed a find-
ing that the employee, whose previous res-
piratory problems were aggravated by en-
tering a roasting flue, had suffered a com-
pensable accident. 
workplace. Internal failure claims evaluated by 
this Court include heart attacks, hernias, and 
back injuries. See generally, Note, Schmidt v. 
Industrial Commission and Injury Compensabih-
After Tintic Milling, the Court tempo-
rarily rejected the "unexpected result" def-
inition of Fenton v. Thorley in internal 
failure cases on the ground that the defini-
tion of "by accident" required an unusual 
occurrence or exertion. In Bamberger v. 
Industrial Commission, 66 Utah 203, 240 
P. 1103 (1925), the Court denied compensa-
tion to a worker who unexpectedly suf-
fered a heart attack while manually unload-
ing a railroad car of coal on the ground 
that no overexertion occurred during the 
work. 66 Utah at 208, 240 P. at 1104. 
That decision was apparently overruled, 
however, when the Court embraced the 
"unexpected result" rule and awarded com-
pensation to an employee who suffered a 
heart attack after overexertions while rou-
tinely cleaning the weirs to a city reservoir. 
Hammond v. Industrial Commission, 84 
Utah 67, 87, 34 P.2d 687, 695 (1934) (Mof-
fat, J., concurring). Hammond was fol-
lowed in Columbia Steel Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 92 Utah 72, 66 P.2d 124 
(1937), where a unanimous Court held that 
the employee, who had suffered a ruptured 
aorta from riding a caterpillar tractor over 
rough ground, suffered an injury "by acci-
dent" since the result was "an unusual, 
unforeseen, and unexpected event or occur-
rence" and definite as to time and place. 
Id. at 92, 66 P.2d at 134. And, in Thomas 
D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass 'n. v. Indus-
trial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d 
233 (1943), the Court sustained an award of 
benefits to a claimant who had suffered 
from heart disease and experienced a heart 
attack shortly after moving 52 boxes 
weighing 50 to 100 pounds and 28 sacks of 
fire clay—work that was unusually heavy 
and greatly in excess of his ordinary 
duties. The Court pointed out, in dicta, 
that the English common law would have 
awarded compensation even if the exer-
tions were ordinary and usually required as 
part of the job. 104 Utah at 67-71, 138 
P.2d at 235-39. Quoting from the Bohlen 
article, supra, the Court observed: 
ty under Utah Workers Compensation Law: A 
Just Result or Just Another "Living Corpse"?, 
1981 Utah LRev. 393. 
20 Utah 729 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
"[N]othing more is required than that 
the harm that the plaintiff has sustained 
shall be unexpected The element of 
unexpectedness inherent in the word 'ac-
cident* is sufficiently supplied . . . if, 
though the act is usual and the condi-
tions normal, it causes a harm unfore-
seen by him who suffers it" 
104 Utah at 70, 138 P.2d at 237. 
Six years later in Purity Biscuit Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 115 Utah 1, 201 
P.2d 961 (1949), this Court explicitly 
adopted the English rule for the definition 
of an accident and awarded benefits to a 
claimant who unexpectedly injured his back 
while stepping on the brake pedal of a 
delivery truck—a usual and ordinary activi-
ty. See 115 Utah 14-20, 201 P.2d 967-70. 
After summarizing early Utah cases inter-
preting "by accident" the Court concluded 
that "since 1922 this court has uniformly 
held that an unexpected internal failure 
meets the requirements of ["by accident"] 
4. The holding of Purity Biscuit was questioned 
in Mellen v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Utah 2d 373, 
431 P.2d 798 (1967), where the opinion errone-
ously stated that Purity Biscuit l i a s never been 
cited by this or any other court to support the 
law of that case/' 19 Utah 2d at 375, 431 P.2d at 
799. In fact, by 1967 Purity Biscuit had been 
relied upon in decisions from the courts of nine 
other states. Alabama Textiles Prods. Corp. v. 
Grantham, 263 Ala. 179. 183-84, 82 So.2d 204, 
208 (1955) (finding of unusual strain or exertion 
unnecessary to support conclusion that claimant 
suffered injury by accident); Bryant Stave & 
Heading Co. v. White, 227 Ark. 147, 151-52, 296 
S.W.2d 436, 439-40 (1956) (Purity Biscuit cited 
as stating majority position that usual exertion 
causing an internal failure may be by accident); 
Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 
231 Cal.App.2d 111, 41 Cal.Rptr. 628, 635 (1964) 
(relying upon causation rule of Purity Biscuit); 
Spivey v. Battagha Fruit Co., 138 So.2d 308, 314 
(Fla 1962) (back herniation from rupture of in-
tervertebral disc satisfies statutory requirement 
of suddenness); Roman v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 
268 Minn. 367, 380, 129 N.W.2d 550, 559 (1964) 
(calls Purity Biscuit "a well-considered work-
men's compensation case" that supported an 
award where many factors led to the disability); 
Murphy v. Anaconda Co., 133 Mont. 198, 208, 
321 P.2d 1094, 1100 (1958) (quoting favorably 
the reliance on Purity Biscuit in Bryant Stave, 
227 Ark. at 151-52, 296 S.W.2d at 439-40, and 
holding that a usual exertion may lead to a 
compensable injury where the causal relation-
ship is established), Neylon v. Ford Motor Co., 
10 N J. 325, 327-28, 91 A.2d 569, 570 (1952) (Pu-
and the legislature by failing to amend has 
acquiesced in that construction." 115 Utah 
at 15, 201 P.2d at 968. 
The holding of Purity Biscuit also 
squarely embraced th<* concept that an or-
dinary or usual exertion that results in an 
unexpected injury is compensable. See 115 
Utah at 18-19, 201 P. at 969-70. After 
carefully considering the legislative pur-
pose of the workers' compensation statute, 
prior precedent, and public policy, the 
Court rejected the requirement that proof 
of an unusual activity or exertion be a 
required element of the "by accident" defi-
nition. 115 Utah at 14-20, 201 P.2d at 
967-70. The Court concluded that "there 
is nothing in the statute which would justi-
fy a holding that an injury is compensable 
where overexertion is shown but is not 
compensable where only ordinary exertion 
is shown, provided that in both cases it is 
shown that the exertion causes the inju-
ry."4 115 Utah at 19, 201 P.2d at 970. 
rity Biscuit cited in support of rule that internal 
failure from ordinary or usual exertion is an 
"injury by accidenf); Olson v. State Indust 
Accident Comm'n, 222 Or. 407, 416-17, 352 P.2d 
1096, 1101 (1960) (O'Connell, J., specially con-
curring) (dissenl to Purity Biscuit quoted); Coo-
per v. Vinatieri, 73 S.D. 418, 424, 43 N.W^d 747, 
750-51 (1950) (Purity Biscuit cited as an exam-
ple of the divergent viewpoints for defining a 
compensable accident). 
In addition, the decision in Purity Biscuit was 
relied upon by the majority in three Utah cases. 
See Jones v. California Packing Co., 121 Utah 
612, 244 P2d 640, 642; Carling v. Industrial 
Commission, 16 ULih 2d 260, 399 PJ2d 202; 
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 
140, 427 P.2d 740. Despite this support for the 
decision in Purity Biscuit, the Court in Mellen 
concluded without further discussion that M[t]he 
Purity Biscuit decision certainly needs a healthy 
reappraisement." 19 Utah 2d at 376, 431 P.2d at 
800. Two years later in Redman Warehousing 
Corp v. Industrial Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 
P.2d 283 (1969), the Court again questioned the 
Purity Biscuit decision in a superficial analysis 
that concluded: "Purity enjoys the unique and 
doubtful distinction of being a living corpse." 
22 Utah 2d at 403, 454 T2d at 286. After 
considering those cases from Utah and other 
jurisdictions that have relied on Purity Biscuit, 
we now cannot agree that it was a l iv ing 
corpse." Moreover, even if Purity Biscuit lay 
dormant, it was resurrected by Schmidt v. In-
dustrial Commission, 617 ?2d 693, 695 (Utah 
1980). 
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Since Purity Biscuit, numerous cases 
have held that an internal injury may be 
compensable if it results from either a 
usual or unusual exertion in the course of 
employment. See, e.g., Champion Home 
Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 
P.2d 306 (Utah 1985) (perforated ulcer 
caused by lifting an unusually heavy 
beam); Pittsburg Testing Laboratories v. 
Keller, 657 P.2d at 1367 (unforeseen and 
unanticipated heart attack resulting from 
exertion while inspecting roof structure); 
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 
888 (Utah 1981) (back injury resulting from 
shoveling coal compensable despite usual-
ness of activity and presence of preexisting 
conditions); Painter Motor v. Ostler, 617 
P.2d 975 (Utah 1980) (back injury resulting 
from moving heavy boxes and installing 
electrical equipment); Schmidt v. Industri-
al Commission, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980) 
(back injury resulting from carrying steel 
plates compensable despite prior history of 
back disorders and ordinary activity); 
United States Steel Corp. v. Draper, 613 
P.2d 508 (Utah 1980) (heart attack result-
ing from exertion while rushing to drown-
ing accident); IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 
584 P.2d 828 (Utah 1978) (heart attack re-
sulting from heavy lifting); Nuzum v. Roo-
sendahl Construction & Mining Corp., 
665 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1977) (truck driver 
suffered heart attack after repeatedly 
climbing long steps); Residential & Com-
mercial Construction Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 529 P.2d 427 (Utah 1974) 
(back injury resulting from moving lum-
ber); Powers v. Industrial Commission, 
19 Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740 (1967) (heart 
distress occurring over a period of several 
months compensable despite preexisting 
conditions); Baker v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 17 Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965) 
(back injury resulting from filing papers in 
lower drawer compensable). 
Despite the strong precedential support 
for applying the "unexpected result" rule 
of Purity Biscuit to internal failure cases, 
a separate line of opposing authority has 
developed which requires overexertion or 
an unusual event to prove an injury oc-
curred "by accident." Typically, these 
cases denied compensation because the 
claimants' ordinary work duties precipitat-
ed the injury. Consequently, there were no 
events or exertions that were unusual or 
extraordinary to qualify as "by accident." 
See, e.g., Billings Computer Corp. v. Tar-
ango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983) (compensa-
tion for knee injury denied where circum-
stances precipitating the injury were com-
monplace and usual); Sabo's Electronic 
Service v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 1982) 
(back injury from loading box of twelve 
radios into van not compensable); Farm-
er's Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 
237 (Utah 1980) (back injury to claimant 
with preexisting condition resulting from 
delivery of 100-pound sacks not compensa-
ble since the activity was not unusual or 
unexpected); Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979) (back injury 
suffered by janitor upon standing up not 
compensable without evidence that activi-
ties were unusual); Redman Warehousing 
Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 22 Utah 
2d 398, 454 P.2d 283 (1969) (back injury 
precipitated by sitting and driving a mov-
ing van not compensable without proof of 
an unusual event). These cases will not be 
collectively referred to as the Redman line 
of cases. 
[2] We are now convinced that the Red-
man line of cases has misconstrued the 
historical and logical definition of "by acci-
dent." The Redman line of cases relied on 
the following abridged version of the defi-
nition of an accident found in Carting v. 
Industrial Commission: "[Accident] con-
notes an unanticipated, unintended occur-
rence different from what would normal-
ly be expected to occur in the usual 
course of events.91 16 Utah at 261, 399 
P.2d at 203 (emphasis added; footnotes 
omitted). In Redman, the highlighted 
phrase was interpreted to require an un-
usual event before there can be an acci-
dent This interpretation misconstrues the 
Carting decision itself and is inconsistent 
with the English definition of "by accident" 
used by this Court since 1922. The key 
requirement of an accident under the Car-
2 2 Utah 729 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
ling decision, as well as prior decisions, 
was that the occurrence be unanticipated, 
unplanned and unintended. The highlight-
ed phrase emphasized that where either the 
cause of the injury or the result of an 
exertion was different from what would 
normally be expected to occur, the occur-
rence was unplanned, unforeseen, unin-
tended and therefore "by accident" 
Policy considerations also militate in fa-
vor of rejecting the notion that the phrase 
"by accident" requires an unusual event. 
There is nothing in the term "accident" 
that suggests that only that which is un-
usual is accidental See Robertson v. In-
dustrial Commission, 109 Utah at 33, 40, 
163 P.2d at 335, 338 (Wade, J., concurring; 
Wolfe, J., dissenting). An accident does 
not occur simply because a worker is in-
jured during an unusual activity. This ar-
gument is illustrated by Professor Larson 
in his treatise on workmen's compensation 
with the following example: 
If an employee intentionally and know-
ingly undertakes to lift an unusual load, 
the cause (i.e., the lifting) is no more 
accidental than if he deliberately lifted a 
normal load. Or if a gardener deliberate-
ly continues to mow the lawn in the rain, 
a passerby observing him would not say 
that he was undergoing an accident 
merely because it is unusual to mow 
lawns in the rain. 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 38.-
62, at 7-162 (1986) (footnotes omitted). 
Larson also criticizes the usual-unusual 
distinction as being unworkable in practice. 
Realistically, it is impossible to determine 
what are the usual and normal require-
ments of a job. People work in good 
weather and bad, lift heavy items as well 
as light ones, and work for long hours as 
well as short ones. None of these activi-
ties may be unusual or unexpected. Id. 
§ 38.63 at 7-164 to -168. 
The unworkability of the usual-unusual 
event requirement is further evidenced by 
comparing seemingly irreconcilable deci-
sions by this Court. Compare Kaiser 
Steel v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (back inju-
ry to miner with previous back problems 
held to be a comj)ensable accr'snt despite 
being caused by slioveling coal m the usual 
course of employment), with Farmer's 
Grain Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237 
(no accident where worker with previous 
back problems sustained back injury while 
delivering 100-pound bags of whey); com-
pare Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 
Utah 2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (compensable 
accident for back injury resulting from fil-
ing paper in lower drawer) with Billings 
Computer Corp, v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 
(no accident where worker sustained knee 
injury resulting from bending to pick up 
small parts). 
[3,4] We believe that the Court's real 
concern in the Redman line of cases was 
the presence or absence of proof of causa-
tion to support an award of compensation. 
See generally Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints, 590 P.2d at 332 (Wil-
kins, J., dissenting). As will be discussed 
in the next section, the Court has developed 
two parallel lines of authority on the causa-
tion issue, one of which requires an un-
usual event in order to meet the statutory 
causation requirement. Although proof of 
an unusual event may be helpful in deter-
mining causation, it is not required as an 
element of "by accident" in section 35-1-
45. "[T]he basic and indispensable ingredi-
ent of 'accident* is unexpectedness." 
Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 696 (Wilkins, J., con-
curring) (quoting IB Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation, at 7-5 (1980). We there-
fore reaffirm these cases which hold that 
an accident is an unexpected or unintended 
occurrence that may be either the cause or 
the result of an injury. We thus necessar-
ily abandon the analysis of "by accident" in 
the Redman line of cases which predicates 
the "accident" determination upon the oc-
currence of an unusual event 
II. 
The second element of a compensable 
accident requires proof of a causal connec-
tion between the injury and the worker's 
employment duties. Pittsburg Testing 
Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367, 1370 
(Utah 1983). In workers' compensation 
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cases involving internal failures, the key 
issue is usually one of causation. Ordinari-
ly, causation is proved by the production 
and interpretation of medical evidence ei-
ther alone or together with other evidence. 
See Keller, 657 P.2d at 1367, 1370; 
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 
P.2d 693, 695 (Utah 1980). Because of the 
difficulties of diagnosis of internal failures 
and because of the possibility that a preex-
isting condition may have contributed to 
the injury, special causation rules have 
been developed for internal failure cases. 
See Larson, supra, § 38.81, at 7-269; Pu-
rity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 115 Utah 1, 20-21, 201 P.2d 970-71 
(Wolfe, J., concurring specially). 
This Court initially responded to the 
problem of causation in internal failure 
cases by suggesting that the Commission 
use a clear and convincing evidence stan-
dard when an internal failure was caused 
by an exertion in the workplace.6 See 
Thomas D. Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n. 
v. Industrial Commission, 104 Utah 61, 
74, 138 P.2d 233, 238 (1943). The clear and 
convincing evidence standard was rejected, 
however, in Lipman v. Industrial Com-
mission, 592 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah 1979), 
with the rationale that such a standard 
would make workers' compensation bene-
fits nearly impossible to recover where the 
deceased suffered from a preexisting condi-
tion. Accordingly, the standard to prove 
causal connection is preponderance of the 
evidence. Id. 
The second method that has been used to 
ensure causal connection in internal failure 
cases is to require proof that an unusual 
event or activity precipitated the injury. 
Presumably, this requirement was used to 
prevent compensating a person predisposed 
to internal failure where the preexisting 
condition contributed more to the injury 
than his usual work activity. The follow-
ing internal failure cases illustrate that evi-
dence of an unusual event or activity is 
necessary to prove causation. Billings 
6, In Nebraska, an enhanced standard of proof is 
still used where the employee suffers from a 
preexisting condition. See Mann v. City of 
Computer Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104, 
106-07 (Utah 1983); Sabo's Electronic Ser-
vice v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722, 726 n. 12 (Utah 
1982); Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Industrial Commission, 
590 P.2d 328, 329 (Utah 1979); IGA Food 
Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 829 (Utah 
1978); Nuzum v. Roosendahl Construc-
tion & Mining Corp., 565 P.2d 1144, 1146 
(Utah 1977); Jones v. California Packing 
Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P.2d 640 (1952); 
Robertson v. Industrial Commission, 109 
Utah 25, 163 P.2d 331 (1945); Thomas D. 
Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n v. Industri-
al Commission, 104 Utah 61, 138 P.2d at 
233; see Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 697-99 
(Crockett, J., dissenting); Farmer's Grain 
Cooperative v. Mason, 606 P.2d 237, 238-
39 (Utah 1980); Mellen v. Industrial Com-
mission, 19 Utah 2d 373, 374, 431 P.2d 798, 
799 (1967); Purity Biscuit, 115 Utah at 30, 
201 P.2d at 975 (Latimer, J., dissenting). 
Defendants argue that any rule that 
awards compensation based on usual exer-
tion will open the floodgates for payment 
of benefits for all internal injuries that 
coincidentally occur at work. They claim 
that the unusual exertion requirement is 
necessary to prevent the employer from 
becoming a general insurer. They argue 
that without the unusual exertion rule, em-
ployment opportunities for persons with a 
history or indication of physical disability 
or handicap will be reduced. 
Despite precedent supporting the "un-
usual exertion" rule, the claimant urges us 
to follow a separate line of authority that 
awards compensation for injuries that oc-
cur during usual and ordinary workplace 
activity. These cases typically award com-
pensation where the claimant was engaged 
in a workplace activity and where there is 
adequate evidence of medical causation. 
See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 
631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981) (award for com-
pensation affirmed for a coal miner's back 
injury despite absence of unusual incident); 
Schmidt v. Industrial Commission, 617 
P.2d at 695 (compensation awarded for 
Omaha, 211 Neb. 583, 592, 319 NAOd 454, 458 
(1982). 
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back injuries arising from ordinary duties 
upon proof of medical causal connection 
between workplace exertions and the inju-
ry); Residential and Commercial Con-
struction Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
529 P.2d 427 (Utah 1974) (carpenter's back 
injury from lifting, bending, and twisting in 
the ordinary course of work compensable); 
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 
Utah 2d 140, 427 P.2d 740, 742 (1967) 
(awarding compensation to fireman for ex-
ertions in the normal course of employ-
ment—the Court rejecting the unusual ex-
ertion test in favor of ordinary exertion); 
Baker v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 
2d 141, 405 P.2d 613 (1965) (back injury 
from filing papers in lower drawer of cabi-
net compensable); Purity Biscuit Co. v. 
Industrial Commissiori, 115 Utah 1, 201 
P.2d 961 (1949). Although the usual exer-
tion rule was questioned in Mellen v. In-
dustrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d at 375-
76, 431 P.2d at 800, that decision failed to 
explicitly overrule the usual exertion line of 
cases. Moreover, Residential and Com-
mercial Construction Co., Schmidt, and 
Kaiser Steel have awarded compensation 
for usual workplace activity after the Mel-
len decision. Clearly, the usual exertion 
rule is not simply an aberration in Utah 
law. 
When read in chronological sequence, 
our opinions demonstrate an inconsistent 
and confused approach to determining 
when an accident arose out of or in the 
course of employment. Much of this con-
fusion can be traced to fundamental prob-
lems stemming from the use of the usual-
unusual distinction as a means of proving 
causation. Larson criticizes the unusual 
exertion requirement by itself as a "clumsy 
and ill-fitting device with which to ensure 
causal connection." Larson, supra, § 38.-
81, at 7-270. The problems in determining 
what activities were usual or unusual were 
6. Larson's observation is consistent with this 
Court's rationale for rejecting the unusual exer-
tion requirement in Purity Biscuit, 115 Utah at 
16, 201 P.2d at 968: 
[I]f [overexertion! is the test no one will ever 
know what this court will consider sufficient 
overexertion. Also under that test if the work 
recognized as long ago as 1949 when Jus-
tice Wolfe wrote that a "Pandora's box of 
difficulties . . . may be opened by the re-
finements between usual and unusual, ex-
ertion and overexertion, ordinary and ex-
traordinary exertion measured by the indi-
vidual involved or by the industrial func-
tion performed by him or both." Purity 
Biscuit, 115 Utah at 23, 201 P.2d at 972 
(Wolfe, J., concurring specially). The con-
tents of the Pandora's box feared by Jus-
tice Wolfe are now evident in the plethora 
of our cases struggling with a definition of 
a compensable accident based upon the 
usualness or ordinariness of an activity. 
professor Larson has also criticized the 
usual-unusual distinction because the ordi-
nariness of the activity fails to consider 
that some occupations routinely require a 
usual exertion capable of causing injury, 
likewise, other occupations, such as desk-
work, require so little physical effort that 
an "unusual exertion" may be insufficient 
to prove that the resulting accident arose 
out of the employment. Larson, supra, 
§ 38.81, at 7-270.* 
{5] Because we find the present use of 
the usual-unusual distinction unhelpful and 
our prior precedent inconsistent, we take 
this opportunity to examine an alternative 
causation analysis that may better meet 
the objectives of the workers' compensa-
tion laws. We are mindful that the key 
question in determining causation is wheth-
er, given this body and this exertion, the 
exertion in fact contributed to the injury. 
Id. § 38.82, at 7-271; Purity Biscuit, 115 
Utah at 23, 201 P.2d at 972 (Wolfe, J., 
concurring specially). 
[6] The language "arising out of or in 
the course of his employment" found in 
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45 (Supp.1986), was 
apparently intended to ensure that compen-
sation is only awarded where there is a 
usually required by the job is so great that it 
would break the strongest man even he will 
not be able to recover. But if it is more than 
usual exertion which causes the injury the 
employee can recover no matter how light the 
work is which causes the injury. 
Id. 
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disability and the working conditions. The 
causation requirement makes it necessary 
to distinguish those injuries which (a) coin-
cidentally occur at work because a preexist-
ing condition results in symptoms which 
appear during work hours without any en-
hancement from the workplace, and (b) 
those injuries which occur because some 
condition or exertion required by the em-
ployment increases the risk of injury which 
the worker normally faces in his everyday 
life. See Bryant v. Masters Machine Co., 
444 A.2d 329, 337 (Me.1982). Only the 
latter type of injury is compensable under 
U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45. There is no fixed 
formula by which the causation issue may 
be resolved, and the issue must be deter-
mined on the facts of each case. 
[7] Professor Larson has suggested a 
two-part causation test which is consistent 
with the purpose of our workers' compen-
sation laws and helpful in determining cau-
sation. We therefore adopt that test. Lar-
son suggests that compensable injuries can 
best be identified by first considering the 
legal cause of the injury and then its medi-
cal cause. Larson, supra, § 38.83(a), at 
7-273. "Under the legal test, the law must 
define what kind of exertion satisfies the 
test of 'arising out of the employment* . . . 
[then] the doctors must say whether the 
exertion (having been held legally suffi-
cient to support compensation) in fact 
7. Cases from other jurisdictions which have ac-
cepted the dual-causation standard suggested by 
Larson include Market Foods Distribs, Inc. v. 
Levenson, 383 So.2d 726 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1980) 
(claimant with preexisting spinal disease denied 
compensation where injury could have been 
triggered at any time during normal movement 
and exertion at work not greater than typical 
nonemployment exertion); Guidry v. Shne In-
dus. Painters, Inc., 418 So.2d 626 (La.1982) 
(claimant granted compensation where injury 
resulted from stress, exertion, and strain greater 
than that in everyday nonemployment life); 
Bryant v. Masters Mack Co., 444 A.2d 329 (Me. 
1982) (claimant with preexisting condition 
awarded compe **tion for back injury resulting 
from fall from his stool at work because of 
increased risk of falling where employees 
moved around aim at work), Barrett v. Herbert 
Eng'g, Inc., 371 A.2d 633 (Me.1977) (claimant 
with preexisting back condition denied compen-
Larson, supra, 
§ 38.83(a), at 7-276 to -277. 
[8] 1. Legal Cause—Whether an inju-
ry arose out of or in the course of employ-
ment is difficult to determine where the 
employee brings to the workplace a person-
al element of risk such as a preexisting 
condition. Just because a person suffers a 
preexisting condition, he or she is not dis-
qualified from obtaining compensation. 
Our cases make clear that "the aggrava-
tion or lighting up of a pre-existing disease 
by an industrial accident is compensa-
ble " Powers v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 19 Utah 2d 140,143-44, 427 P.2d 740, 
743 (1967) (footnote omitted). To meet the 
legal causation requirement, a claimant 
with a preexisting condition must show 
that the employment contributed some-
thing substantial to increase the risk he 
already faced in everyday life because of 
his condition. This additional element of 
risk in the workplace is usually supplied by 
an exertion greater than that undertaken in 
normal, everyday life. This extra exertion 
serves to offset the preexisting condition of 
the employee as a likely cause of the inju-
ry, thereby eliminating claims for impair-
ments resulting from a personal risk rather 
than exertions at work. Larson, supra, 
§ 38.83(b), at 7-278. Larson summarized 
how the legal cause rule would work in 
practice as follows: 
sation for injury resulting from working at nor-
mal gait since there was no work-related en-
hancement of personal risk), Mann v. City of 
Omaha, 211 Neb 583, 319 N.W.2d 454 (1982) 
(policeman with history of heart disease award-
ed compensation for heart attack at home 
where claimant's physician testified that attack 
was caused by stress of police work rather than 
personal risk factors); Sellens v. Allen Prods. 
Co., 206 Neb. 506, 293 N.W^d 415 (1980) 
(claimant with preexisting heart problems de-
nied compensation for heart attack suffered 
while unloading 28-pound cases from truck 
trailer despite sedentary nonworking lifestyle 
using objective standard of average worker in 
nonemployment life); Couture v. Mammoth 
Groceries, Inc., 116 N.H. 181, 355 A.2d 421 
(1976) (claimant with no preexisting heart prob-
lems awarded benefits upon proof that lifting 
beef medically caused the fatal heart attack). 
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If there is some personal causal contri-
bution in the form of a [preexisting con-
dition], the employment contribution 
must take the form of an exertion great-
er than that of nonemployment life 
If there is no personal causal contribu-
tion, that is, if there is no prior weakness 
or disease, any exertion connected with 
the employment and causally connected 
with the [injury] as a matter of medical 
fact is adequate to satisfy the legal test 
of causation. 
Id. Thus, where the claimant suffers from 
a preexisting condition which contributes to 
the injury, an unusual or extraordinary ex-
ertion is required to prove legal causation. 
Where there is no preexisting condition, a 
usua\ or ordinary exertion is sufficient* 
[9] We also accept Larson's suggestion 
that the comparison between the usual and 
unusual exertion be defined according to an 
objective standard. ''Note that the com-
parison is not with this employee's usual 
exertion in his employment but with the 
exertions of normal nonemployment life of 
this or any other person." Larson, supra, 
§ 38.83(b), at 7-279 (emphasis in original). 
See also Johns-Manville Products v. In-
dustrial Commission, 78 IU.2d 171,178, 35 
Ill.Dec. 540, 544, 399 N.E.2d 606, 610 (1979) 
(compensation denied where the risk of the 
employment activity "is no greater than 
that to which he would have been exposed 
had he not been so employed"); Strickland 
8. Larson highlights the difference between the 
unusual-usual exertion test with the rule we 
today adopt with the following examples of ex-
treme cases in the heart attack area: 
Suppose Xs job involves frequent lifting or 
200-pound bags, and one such 200-pound lift 
medically produces a heart attack. Under the 
old unusual-exertion rule there would be no 
compensation, regardless of previous heart 
condition. Under the suggested rule there 
would be compensation, even in the presence 
of a history of heart disease, because people 
generally do not lift 200-pound weights as a 
part of nonemployment life, and therefore 
this episode cannot be ascribed to the ordi-
nary wear and tear of life. 
Suppose Y*s job involves no lifting. Sup-
pose he lifts a 20-pound weight on the job, 
and suppose there is medical testimony that 
this lift caused his heart attack. Under the 
old test, exclusively concerned with the com-
v. National Gypsum Co., 348 So.2d 497, 
499 (Ala.Civ.App.1977) (employment risk 
must be " 'a danger or risk materially in 
excess of that to which people not so em-
ployed are exposed—'" Quoting from 
City of Tuscaloosa v. Howard, 55 Ala.App. 
701, 705-06, 318 So.2d 729, 732 (1975)). 
But see Market Foods Distributors, Inc. v. 
Levenson, 383 So.2d 726, 727 (Fla.DistCt 
ApP-1980) (subjective test "the employ-
ment must involve an exertion greater than 
that normally performed by the employee 
during his non-employment life"). Thus, 
the precipitating exertion must be com-
pared with the usual wear and tear and 
exertions of nonemployment life, not the 
nonemployment life of the particular work-
er. 
We believe an objective standard of com-
parison will provide a more consistent and 
predictable standard for the Commission 
and this Court to follow. In evaluating 
typical nonemployment activity, the focus 
is on what typical nonemployment activities 
are generally expected of people in today's 
society, not what this particular claimant is 
accustomed to doing. Typical activities 
and exertions expected of men and women 
in the latter part of the 20th century, for 
example, include taking full garbage cans 
to the street, lifting and carrying baggage 
for travel, changing a flat tire on an auto-
mobile, lifting a small child to chest height, 
and climbing the stains in buildings. By 
parison between this employee's usual exer-
tions and the precipitating exertion, there 
would be compensation. Under the suggested 
rule the result would! depend on whether 
there was a personal causal element in the 
form of a previously weakened heart. If 
there was not, compensation would be award-
ed, since the employment contributed some-
thing and trie employee's personal life nothing 
to the cause of the collapse. If there was [a 
previously weakened heart], compensation 
would be denied in spite of the medical causal 
contribution, because legally the personal 
causal contribution wa:; substantial, while the 
employment added nothing to the usual wear 
and tear of life—which certainly includes lift-
ing objects weighing 20 pounds such as bags 
of golf club 5, minnow ]>ails, and step ladders. 
Larson, supra, § 38.83, at 7-280-81 (footnote 
omitted). 
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using an objective standard, the case law 
will eventually define a standard for typical 
"nonemployment activity" in much the way 
case law has developed the standard of 
care for the reasonable man in tort law. 
[10] 2. Medical Cause-—The second 
part of Larson's dual-causation test re-
quires that the claimant prove the disability 
is medically the result of an exertion or 
injury that occurred during a work-related 
activity^ The purpose of the medical cause 
test is to ensure that there is a medically 
demonstrable causal link between the 
work-related exertions and the unexpected 
injuries that resulted from those strains. 
The medical causal requirement will pre-
vent an employer from becoming a general 
insurer of his employees and discourage 
fraudulent claims. 
With the issue being one primarily of 
causation, the importance of the . . . 
medical panel becomes manifest It is 
through the expertise of the medical pan-
el that the Commission should be able to 
make the determination of whether the 
injury sustained by a claimant is causally 
connected or contributed to by the claim-
ant's employment. 
Schmidt, 617 P.2d at 697 (Wilkins, J., con" 
curring). Under the medical cause test, the 
claimant must show by evidence, opinion, 
or otherwise that the stress, strain, or exer-
tion required by his or her occupation led to 
the resulting injury or disability. In the 
event the claimant cannot show a medical 
causal connection, compensation should be 
denied.* 
III. 
[11] We now undertake to apply the 
foregoing analysis to the case before us. 
In reviewing findings of fact of the Indus-
trial Commission, we determine whether 
there is substantial evidence to support the 
Commission's findings. Champion Home 
9. Evidence of the ordinariness or usualness of 
the employee's exertions may be relevant to the 
medical conclusion of causal connection. 
Where the injury results from latent symptoms 
with an illness such as hear disease, proof of 
medical causation may be especially difficult 
Larson's treatise cites many examples of cases 
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70S Guilders v. Industrial Commission, 
P*2d 306, 307 (Utah 1985). 
[121 We have previously stated that the 
key element of whether an injury occurred 
"by accident" is whether the injury was 
unexpected. After reviewing the record, 
we find no substantial evidence that the 
injury was not unexpected. It is clear 
from the uncontradicted testimony of the 
claimant that he experienced an unexpected 
&ud unanticipated injury to his back as he 
lifted a crate of milk in the cramped area of 
the cooler. Although the claimant had in-
jured his back on prior jobs, he had not 
complained of pain or limitations at his job 
with Kent's Foods. There is no evidence 
which indicates that this injury was predict-
able or that it developed gradually as witfi 
a& occupational disease or progressive back 
disorder. While the employer's report of 
injury and the medical records do not cor-
roborate that a sudden and identifiable in-
jury occurred in the cooler, the reports are 
unhelpful in determining whether the inju-
ry was unexpected. 
It appears that the administrative law 
judge applied the "unusual event or trau-
ma" rule in defining an accident We have 
ejected that test in lieu of a test based on 
unexpectedness. Moreover, the adminis-
trative law judge's emphasis on prior inju-
ries is not determinative of whether an 
accident occurred. We have previously 
held that the aggravation or "lighting up" 
of a preexisting condition by an internal 
failure is a compensable accident Pouters 
t>. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140, 
143, 427 P.2d 740, 743 (1967). We conclude 
therefore that the decision of the Commis-
sion that the claimant's injury was not 'lay 
accident" was not based on the evidence, 
ahd that decision is, therefore, erroneous. 
[13] The key issue in this case, like 
n\ost internal failure cases, is whether the 
injury "arose out of or in the course of 
where compensation claims were defeated be-
cause of inadequate proof of medical causation. 
See Larson, supra, § 38.83(i), at 7-319 to -321. 
Compare Guidry v. Sline Indus Painters, Inc., 
418 So.2d 626 (La. 1982) (heart attack triggered 
by stress, exertion, and strain greater than sed-
entary life of average worker compensable). 
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employment." Since the claimant had pre 
vious back problems, to meet the legal cau-
sation requirement he must show that mov-
ing and lifting several piles of dairy prod-
ucts weighing thirty to fifty pounds in the 
confined area of the cooler exceeded the 
exertion that the average person typically 
undertakes in nonemployment life. The ev-
idence presented by the claimant was insuf-
ficient for us to make a determination re-
garding legal causation. It is unclear from 
the record how many crates were moved by 
the claimant, the distance the crates were 
moved, the precise weight of the crates, 
and the size of the area in which the lifting 
and moving took place. Because the claim-
ant did not have the benefit of the fore-
going opinion, we remand for further fact-
finding on this issue. 
Moreover, the record is insufficient to 
show medical causation. It is unclear from 
the medical reports whether the doctors 
were aware of the specific incident in the 
cooler. Further, the case was not sub-
mitted to a medical panel for its evaluation. 
Without sufficient evidence of medical cau-
sation, we are unable to determine whether 
there is a medically demonstrable causal 
link between the lift in the cooler and the 
injury to the claimant's back. We there-
fore remand to the Industrial Commission 
for additional evidence and findings on the 
question of medical causation. 
The decision of the Commission is vacat-
ed and remanded. 
HOWE and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
HALL, Chief Justice: (concurring and 
dissenting). 
I concur in remanding this case to the 
Gommv&sioiv for the purpose of detertamitvg 
1. Powers v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Utah 2d 140, 
143-44, 427 ?2d 740, 743 (1967). 
2. 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949). 
3. Emery Mining Corp. v. DeFriez. 694 P.2d 606 
(Utah 1984); Giles v. Industrial Comm'n, 692 
P.2d 743 (Utah 1984); Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Jacobs, 
689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1984); Billings Computer 
Corp. v. Tarango, 674 P.2d 104 (Utah 1983), 
Sabo's Elec. Serv. v. Sabo, 642 P.2d 722 (Utah 
1982), Kaiser Steel v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 
(Utah 1981); Farmers Grain Cooperative v. Ma-
whether the work incident aggravated a 
preexisting condition such as would war-
rant an award of compensation.1 However, 
I do not join the Court in adopting an 
"unexpected result" standard to be applied 
in determining the existence of a compensa-
ble accident. 
I do not believe that this Court has "mis-
construed the historical and logical" defini-
tion of "by accident" in the bulk of its 
recent cases concerning the issue at bar. 
The majority's reliance upon Purity Bis-
cuit Co. v. Industrial Commission1 is 
misplaced. The holding therein is without 
precedential value because it has been sim-
ply ignored* The only case in which this 
Court followed Purity Biscuit is Schmidt 
v. Industrial Commission, 4 which support 
is similarly without precedential value be-
cause it has also been ignored beginning 
with Painter Motor Co. v. Ostler* the very 
next accident case handed down. In that 
case, the Court cited and relied upon Car-
ling v. Industrial Commission • and again 
defined "accident" as an unanticipated, 
unintended occurrence different from what 
would normally be exacted to occur in the 
usual course of events. In my view, Puri-
ty Biscuit and Schmidt emerge as aberra-
tions in our post-war case law. 
The majority opinion holds that hence-
forth an injury by accident "is an unex-
pected or unintended occurrence that may 
be either the cause or the result of an 
injury." (Emphasis in original.) However, 
the legislature, whose prerogative it is to 
establish policy, has chosen wording which 
precludes such an interpretation. The rea-
soning of Justice Latimer'* di&sent in Pvxi-
son, 606 P.2d 237 (Utah 1980); Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Industrial Comm'n, 
590 P.2d 328 (Utah 1979); Redman Warehousing 
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 22 Utah 2d 398, 454 
P.2d 283 (1969), Carlmg v. Industrial Comm'n, 
16 Utah 2d 260, 399 V2<\ 202 (1965). 
4. 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980). 
§. 617 P.2d 975 (Utah 1980). 
*. 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P.2d 202 (1965). 
ALLEN v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N 
ate u 729 F2d 15 (Utah 1986) 
Utah 29 
ty Biscuit illustrates the shortcomings of 
the majority's interpretation. The word 
"accident," when viewed in isolation, may 
be used to denote both an unexpected oc-
currence which produces injury as well as 
an unexpected injury. The word "injury," 
on the other hand, denotes a result and not 
a cause. Had the legislature only used the 
word "injury" in section 35-1-45 (U.C.A., 
1953, § 35-1-45 (Repl. Vol. 4B, 1974 ed., 
Supp.1986)), then that statute would cover 
all results regardless of the cause. Had 
the legislature only used the word "acci-
dent," then I would agree with the majori-
ty's holding today that the legislature in-
tended to cover both the cause and the 
result. In fact, however, the legislature 
has used both words "injury" and "acci-
dent." It follows that the word "accident" 
must be interpreted as focusing upon the 
cause and not the result. In short, the 
majority's interpretation writes the word 
"injury" out of the statute. Such a deci-
sion is unwarranted in my view. 
The legislature recently amended section 
35-1-45,7 but chose to leave intact the stan-
dard which limits the payment of compen-
sation to those injured "by accident arising 
out of or in the course of . . . employ-
ment." 8 Moreover, the singular "injury by 
accident" standard has not been altered or 
amended since its inception in 1917.f The 
legislature thus being satisfied with the 
Court's interpretation of the term "acci-
dent" in the long line of cases beginning 
with Carting v. Industrial Commission,10 
I decline to embark upon a new effort to 
redefine that term. 
STEWART, Justice: (dissenting). 
I dissent. The majority defines the stat-
utory term "accident" to mean "unex-
pected result," regardless of whether it is 
produced by a usual or an unusual event. 
The majority also defines the term "arising 
out of or in the course of employment" to 
impose legal and medical causation require-
ments. See U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-45. 
Curiously, the requirement of "legal cau-
sation" has two different meanings, de-
pending upon the physical condition of the 
worker at the time he is injured. A worker 
having no preexisting medical condition or 
handicap need only prove that the accident 
was caused by a "usual or ordinary exer-
tion." But for congenitally handicapped 
persons and for persons who have suffered 
preexisting industrial injuries (which pre-
sumably have left the worker with some 
physical weakness or deterioration), legal 
causation has a different meaning. Such a 
worker may receive compensation only if 
the "employment contribution" to the inter-
nal breakdown is "greater than that of 
nonemployment life." According to the 
majority, such a worker must now prove 
that his internal breakdown was caused by 
"an unusual or extraordinary exertion" 
in order to establish the requisite legal 
causation, even though the majority opin-
ion itself criticizes at length the "usual-un-
usual distinction as a means of proving 
causation." How the majority can reject 
that standard for persons having no preex-
isting condition, yet embrace that standard 
for persons with preexisting conditions, is 
baffling. 
Furthermore, the difference between the 
"unusual or extraordinary exertion" which 
a worker with a preexisting condition must 
demonstrate and the "usual exertion" 
which a person with no preexisting condi-
tion must demonstrate is far from clear. 
The latter standard is to be judged with 
respect to the " 'normal nonemployment 
life of this or any other person.'" The 
Court emphasizes that the "precipitating 
exertion must be compared with the usual 
wear and tear and exertions of nonem-
ployment life, not the nonemployment life 
of the particular worker." What the term 
"usual wear and tear and exertions of non-
employment" means is not defined by the 
7. Act of Jan. 27, 1984, ch. 75, § 1, 1984 Utah 9. Act of March 18, 1917, ch. 100, § 52a, 1917 
Laws 610, 610. Utah Laws 306, 322-23. 
8. U.CJL, 1953, § 35-1-45 (Rcpl.Vol. 4B, 1974
 1A .. __ , _ . __ _ „ , „ /fft__x 
cd., Supp.1986). I0- 16 Utah 2d 260, 399 P^d 202 (1965). 
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majority. The few examples set out do 
little to explain the concept aimed at, other 
than to suggest that the term means some-
thing more than simple, life-sustaining ac-
tivities. 
I wholly fail to understand why persons 
who have a preexisting condition should be 
placed in the disadvantaged position, in-
deed the near-remediless position, that the 
majority opinion imposes upon them. The 
purpose of the Second Injury Fund is to 
provide compensation for workers who 
have preexisting medical conditions and 
therefore run a greater risk of injury when 
they expose themselves to the hazards of 
the work place. But the law should en-
courage such persons to work rather than 
encouraging them to abandon the work 
force for some kind of unearned support. 
This Court has repeatedly stated that the 
Second Injury Fund was designed to en-
courage employers to hire persons with 
preexisting conditions by spreading the 
risk throughout the industry to assure such 
persons that their injuries will be cared for 
without imposing extraordinary liabilities 
on the employers who hire them. Inter-
mountain Smelting Corp. v. Capitano, 
610 P.2d 334, 337 (Utah 1980); McPhie v. 
United States Steel Corp., 551 P.2d 504, 
505 (Utah 1976). Society certainly ought to 
favor those policies which encourage peo-
ple to work, rather than policies that deter 
employers from offering gainful employ-
ment to those who have a higher risk of 
work-related injury. There is little person-
al or social benefit from a policy that tends 
to discourage persons from working be-
cause of prior injuries or disabilities. 
Further, it is fundamentally unfair and 
flatly inconsistent with the basic purposes 
of the workmen's compensation laws to 
impose higher standards for compensation 
on those with preexisting medical condi-
tions than on those without Tort law gen-
erally does not do so. A defendant in a 
negligence action is required to take the 
victim as the defendant finds him; whatev-
er unusual vulnerabilities the victim may 
have are disregarded. That principle 
should not be, and until now has not been, 
different in workmen's compensation law, 
which is really a substitute for tort law 
remedies. In short, handicapped or previ-
ously injured persons who are injured by 
an industrial accident are simply discrimi-
nated against by having to meet the majori-
ty's rigorous legal cause requirement. 
I am also unable to understand how an 
administrative law judge, the Industrial 
Commission, or an appellate court is sup-
posed to determine what "typical nonem-
ployment activities" are "in today's socie-
ty," as they now must do for the purpose 
of determining legal causation for workers 
with preexisting medical conditions. Does 
that mean what a typical sixty-five-year-old 
does or a typical twenty-one-year-old does 
during his or her nonemployment activi-
ties? Is it whait a professional football 
player does in his leistire time or what a 
ballet dancer does? Is it what a sedentary 
worker does in his or her off-hours or what 
a forest ranger does? 
Instead of defining a meaningful stan-
dard, the majority provides examples which 
supposedly illustrate the unarticulated 
principle. The examples "include taking 
full garbage cans* to the street, lifting and 
carrying baggage for travel, changing a 
flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small 
child to chest height, and climbing the 
stairs in buildings." These few examples, 
which I find to be arguable in any event 
since they reflect only what some people 
may do from time to time, do not substitute 
for a legal standard. ][ seriously wonder 
whether changing a flat tire on an automo-
bile is a typical activity in today's society, 
and I do not know how much luggage the 
"typical" individual lifts or how far he or 
she carries it. The point is that the majori-
ty has not set forth a workable standard at 
all. In fact, I have serious doubt that such 
an artificial construct as "typical nonem-
ployment activities" will produce more fair 
and rational decisions than our past cases. 
The majority simply assumes a "typical" 
individual for the purpose of establishing a 
rational standard. Unfortunately, disabili-
ties happen to real people, not to "average" 
people, and the law has always recognized 
HOLLOWAY v. INDUSTRIAL COJVTN OF UTAH Utah 3 1 
CiteM729P.2d31 (Utah 1986) 
as much. In short, I do not think that the 
majority's newly established standard will 
produce decisions one whit more consistent 
or rational than those produced in the 
past.1 
The majority also holds that an injured 
person must prove that the disability is 
"medically the result of an exertion or inju-
ry that occurred during a work-related ac-
tivity." With a degree of hope that I think 
is unwarranted, the majority states that 
"[t]he medical causal requirement will pre-
vent an employer from becoming a general 
insurer of his employees and discourage 
fraudulent claims." I am fearful that that 
hope is seriously misplaced. 
Certainly Professor Larson, largely the 
source of the Court's new standards and 
analysis, is highly acclaimed in this field of 
law, but there is much to be said for the 
case-by-case approach in hammering out 
legal doctrine, even if it does on occasion 
produce inconsistencies. I readily concede 
that present law needs to be rationalized 
and that some cases should be overruled 
because they are hopelessly inconsistent 
with other cases, but I do not believe that 
the law needs to be revolutionized in such a 
manner as to defeat those humane policies 
intended to allow for the injuries of work-
ers who come to the work place in an 
impaired condition. 
I also join the Chief Justice's dissent. 
= ttYKUMBIR SYSTEM, is> 
1. In my view, the decisions of this Court are 
generally reconcilable with only a few glaring 
exceptions and most of them prior to 1980 
That there are more inconsistencies the further 
Richard E. HOLLOWAY, Plaintiff, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF the 
STATE OF UTAH, Richard E. Hollo-
way Trucking [Employer], and the 
State Insurance Fund [Insurance carri-
er for the Employer], Defendants. 
No. 20621. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 21, 1986. 
Virginius Dabney, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., James R. 
Black, Mary A. Rudolph, Salt Lake City, 
for defendants. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Plaintiff Richard E. Holloway is a self-
employed truck driver. On July 11, 1984, 
after driving for about six hours, he 
stopped at a rest stop. He claims that he 
slipped while walking across an oil spill on 
his way to the restroom and that the slip 
caused him to jerk to regain his balance. Af-
ter returning from the restroom, Holloway 
bent over to inspect one of his truck tires. 
While crouching, he experienced an imme-
diate sharp pain in his back which made 
him fall to the ground, landing on his arms 
and jaw. His wife, also a truck driver, 
drove for the rest of the trip. Two days 
after the incident Holloway consulted a chi-
ropractor in Georgia. He consulted anoth-
er chiropractor on returning to Salt Lake 
City. The slip on the oil spill was not 
mentioned in the reports of the chiropractors 
who examined Holloway, in the First Re-
port of Injury, or in the claimant's report 
of how the injury occurred. 
The Commission denied review of the 
administrative law judge's order. The 
judge ruled that *\e plaintiffs injury was 
not the result of an "accident" as that term 
back one goes in our body of law is not particu-
larly unexpected In any event, I doubt that the 
new approach will produce unwavering consist-
ency over the years. 
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Robert C. LARGE, Plaintiff, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Howard Trucking of Utah, Inc., and/or 
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah 
and the Second Injury Fund, Defend-
ants. 
No. 870437-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Aug. 3, 1988. 
Plaintiff was injured when applying 
for job and sought permanent total disabili-
ty benefits for his injury. The Industrial 
Commission denied him benefits, and plain-
tiff appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Greenwood, J., held that (1) finding that 
injury sustained while applying for job was 
not the medical cause of plaintiffs perma-
nent total disability status was supported 
by substantial evidence, and (2) claimant 
was not entitled to disability benefits, since 
his disability was the result of preexisting 
conditions and not an industrial accident 
Affirmed. 
1. Workers' Compensation *=>6 
Proximate cause analysis primarily 
used in tort law and involving analysis of 
foreseeability, negligence and intervening 
causes, is not appropriate in workers* com-
pensation cases. 
2. Workers* Compensation *=>1533 
Finding that worker's back injury sus-
tained during job application process, upon 
stepping off truck, was not medical cause 
of worker's permanent total disability sta-
tus was supported by substantial evidence, 
which indicated that worker had sustained 
prior back injury, had difficulty walking 
due to obesity, and lacked transferable job 
skills. 
3. Workers' Compensation *=»554 
Where a disability is the result of 
preexisting conditions and not an industrial 
accident, a claimant is not entitled to dis-
ability benefits. 
Jack C. Helgesen (argued), Helgesen & 
Waterfall, Ogden, for plaintiff. 
James R. Black (argued), Wendy B. 
Moseley, Black & Moore, Salt Lake City, 
for defendants. 
Barbara Elicerio, Legal Counsel, Indus-
trial Com'n, Salt Lake City, for Industrial 
Com'n of Utah. 
Before GREENWOOD, BILLINGS 
and DAVIDSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Robert C. Large appeals an Industrial 
Commission order which denied him perma-
nent total disability benefits. We affirm. 
On March 25, 1985, Large applied for a 
job as a truck driver with Howard Truck-
ing. For about two and one-half years 
before applying for the job, Large was 
self-employed. Prior to that time, he had 
been a truck driver for forty years. 
As part of the job application process, 
Large was required to take a driving test. 
He climbed into a truck but discovered the 
truck's clutch was not working properly. 
As Large stepped out of the truck, he 
slipped and fell on his back. At the time of 
the accident, Large was sixty-one years 
old, about six feet two and one-half inches 
tall and weighed S76 pounds. He was 
transported to Dixie Medical Center where 
X-rays were taken. The X-rays did not 
reveal a fracture, and the emergency room 
physician prescribed twenty-four hours bed 
rest. Large drove to his home in Phoenix, 
Arizona the following day and made an 
appointment with Dr. Delbridge, an osteo-
pathic physician. Dr. Delbridge had seen 
Large sue months earlier and had noted at 
that time that Large's past history included 
back problems. Dr. Delbridge examined 
Large and diagnosed his condition as acute 
lumbosacral sprain and arthritis and fibro-
sitis of the lumbosacral spine. Dr. Del-
bridge stated that Lar had difficulty 
walking due to his weight and back injuries 
and that, in his opinion, Large was unem-
LARGE v. INDUSTRI 
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ployable but might be trainable for work 
he could perform while sitting. In April 
1985, Dr. Ditchek examined Large and stat-
ed that "tractive sclerosis is present and 
suggests that this may be of some age, but 
the possibility of new compression superim-
posed on old changes must be considered." 
In December 1985, Large saw Dr. Robert 
S. Barbosa who reported that Large's X-
rays revealed evidence of advanced arthro-
sis and a suggestion of a compression frac-
ture. Dr. Barbosa attributed 5% of 
Large's disability to his previous injury and 
5% to the present injury. Dr. Barbosa also 
recommended that Large undergo a CT 
scan to determine the extent of the frac-
ture and if it extended into the spinal canal. 
On April 22,1986, an Administrative Law 
Judge (A.LJ.) held a hearing on Large's 
application for temporary benefits. After 
the hearing, the A.LJ. wrote to Dr. Barbo-
sa and asked if the 10% permanent physical 
impairment was attributable to the March 
25, 1985 injury, if that injury aggravated 
Large's pre-existing condition and what 
percentage impairment rating he would as-
sign to Large's condition prior to March 25, 
1985. Dr. Barbosa responded, stating: 
At this point, to answer your 4 questions, 
I feel that the fall in March directly 
aggravated the patient's preexisting con-
dition, although, according to his testimo-
ny he was quite active. The patient also 
has a 10% permanent physical impair-
ment judging from his previous laminec-
tomy surgery which certainly contributes 
to what I feel is now a permanent physi-
cal impairment since the patient does 
have a less of strength, especially of the 
right lower extremity, rather severe dis-
comfort extending from the lumbar 
spine. I would give it approximately 5% 
due to the patient's previous lumbar sur-
gery, performed in 1953. This surgery 
was done for herniated lumbar disc. 
Based on this letter and the medical re-
ports submitted at the hearing, the A.LJ. 
entered findings of fact and conclusions of 
law in September 1986 awarding Large 
temporary total disability benefits. Specifi-
cally, the A.LJ. found that some of Large's 
J, O W N OF UTAH Utah 9 5 5 
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impairment* related to an earlier back inju-
ry Large sustained in 1953 and that further 
medical work was needed to determine the 
relationship between the present and the 
prior injury. The A.LJ. also stated that 
even though no Utah case addressed 
whether workers' compensation should cov-
er those injured during a "try-out" period, 
the statute should be construed liberally in 
favor of coverage. Neither party appealed 
the award of temporary total disability ben-
efits. 
In April 1987, Large requested perma-
nent total disability benefits. Attached to 
his request wais a medical report prepared 
by Dr. David Plone. The report, based on 
an X-ray examination, noted moderate de-
generative changes throughout the lumbar 
spine, facet joint hypertrophy and arthritic 
disease. Further, the report stated, "There 
is compression of the superior vertebral 
body plate of L3, but this appears to be an 
old compression fracture." Without hold-
ing a further hearing, the A.LJ. entered 
supplemental findings and conclusions, 
stating that Large had a 10% disability, 5% 
attributable to the 1953 injury and 5% at-
tributable to the 1985 injury. The A.LJ. 
also stated that although Large was an 
employee for purposes of temporary total 
and permanent partial disability, he was 
not an employee for purpeses of permanent 
total disability. The A.LJ. then found that 
Large's age, obesity, lack of transferable 
skills and prior back suigery constituted 
the proximate or dominsint cause of his 
disability. The A.LJ. concluded that Large 
was entitled to permanent partial disability 
benefits but not permanent total disability 
benefits because the proximate or domi-
nant cause of his unemployability was not 
the March 25, 1985 accident Large subse-
quently filed a motion fcr review, which 
the Industrial Commission denied. The 
Commission noted that the only issue on 
review was whether Large was entitled to 
permanent total disability benefits and 
agreed with the A.LJ. that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-457 (1985)' implies a causal connec-
tion between the injury and the permanent 
total disability. The Commission further 
1. This section governs procedures and payments for permanent total disability. 
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stated, 'The concept of proximate cause 
serves the purpose of allowing those whose 
disabilities are truly the result of the indus-
trial injury to be properly compensated." 
This appeal followed. 
[1] On appeal, Large claims that the 
Commission erred in finding that factors 
other than the 1985 accident were the prox-
imate or dominant cause of his permanent 
total disability, and concluding, as a result 
of that finding, that he was not entitled to 
permanent total disability benefits. We 
agree that a "proximate cause" analysis, as 
that term is commonly used, is not appro-
priate in workers' compensation cases. 
Proximate cause is used primarily in tort 
law and involves analysis of foreseeability, 
negligence and intervening causes. These 
factors are not present in the statutory 
workers' compensation system, which ex-
cludes consideration of fault. A. Larson, 1 
Workmen's Compensation Law § 6.60 
(1985). 
Although proximate cause is not an ap-
propriate standard, the Utah Supreme 
Court has, nevertheless, required proof of 
a causal relationship as a prerequisite to 
awarding workers' compensation benefits. 
Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 
(Utah 1986). In Allen, the Utah Supreme 
Court interpreted Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-45 (1986) *, and explained that "by 
accident arising out of or in the course of 
employment" requires: (1) proof that the 
injury occurred "by accident"; and (2) 
proof of a causal connection between the 
accident and the activities or exertions re-
quired in the workplace. Id. at 18. In 
analyzing the causal connection, the Court 
adopted a two-part test which requires a 
claimant to establish legal cause and medi-
cal cause. Under the legal cause test "a 
claimant with a preexisting condition must 
show that the employment contributed 
something substantial to increase the risk 
he already faced in everyday life because 
of his condition." Id. at 27. Further, un-
der the medical cause test, the claimant 
must prove "the disability is medically the 
2. The statute provides that "Every employee . . . 
who is injured . . . by accident arising out of or 
in the course of his employment . . . shall be 
result of an exertion or injury that oc-
curred during a work-related activity." Id. 
hi 26. The standard of proof for causation 
is by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. 
at 23. In Hodges v. Western Piling & 
Sheeting Co., 717 P.2d 718 (Utah 1986), the 
Court considered an Industrial Commission 
determination which awarded permanent 
partial disability benefits but denied perma-
nent total disability benefits to a sixty-
eight year old worker who injured his arm 
in an industrial accident. The Court af-
firmed, finding that "[w]hile it is unques-
tioned that the medical panel found peti-
tioner to be one hundred percent physically 
impaired, the panel also found that the 
total impairment was due to the onset of 
severe arthritic problems." Id. at 721. 
The petitioner had a prior asymptomatic 
arthritic condition which flared up after the 
accident, but which was found to have no 
causal relationship to the industrial acci-
dent Professor Larson has also observed 
that there is a distinction "between a pre-
existing disability that independently pro-
duces all or part of the final disability, and 
a pre-existing condition that in some way 
combines with or is acted upon by the 
industrial injury." A. Larson, 2 Work-
men 's Compensation Law § 59.22(b) (1987). 
Therefore, a claimant for permanent total 
disability benefits must prove medically 
that his disability was caused by an indus-
trial accident. 
[2] The critical inquiry in this case, 
therefore, is whether the Commission's de-
cision should be affirmed because Large 
did not prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the industrial accident was 
the medical cause of his disability. In re-
viewing the Industrial Commission's factu-
al findings, we will not disturb those find-
ings unless they are " 'arbitrary and capri-
cious/ or ^wholly without cause/ or 'con-
trary to the one [inevitable] conclusion 
from the evidence/ or Vithout any sub-
stantial evidence to support them.'" Lan-
caster v. Gilbert Dev.t 736 P.2d 237, 238 
(Utah 1987) (quoting Kaiser Steel Corp. v. 
paid compensation for loss sustained on ac-
count of the injury " 
HEATON v. SECOND INJURY FUND 
Cite M 758 P.2d 957 (UuhApp. 1988) 
Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah 1981)). isting injury.3 We disagree 
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The medical reports in this case indicate 
that prior to the accident Large had back 
problems relating to a 1953 injury and her-
niated lumbar disc surgery. In addition, 
Dr. Delbridge's letter stated that Large 
had difficulty walking due to his weight 
and back injuries. Dr. Barbosa's medical 
report stated that Large's X-rays suggested 
a compression fracture but that a CT scan 
was required to determine the extent of the 
fracture. Subsequently, Dr. Plone stated 
that the compression fracture "appears to 
be an old compression fracture." Al-
though the Industrial Commission errone-
ously applied the proximate cause test rath-
er than the causation test articulated in 
Allen and Hodges, we find substantial evi-
dence in the record to support a finding 
that the 1985 injury was not the medical 
cause of Large's permanent total disability 
status and that Large's age, obesity, lack 
of transferable skills and prior back sur-
gery resulted in his disability. 
Large also asserts that the A.LJ. erred 
in finding that he was not an employee for 
purposes of permanent total disability ben-
efits. However, the A.LJ.'s findings of fact 
and conclusions of law and the Commis-
sion's denial of the motion for review are 
based on the inadequate causal link be-
tween the disability and the injury and not 
on Large's employee status. Therefore, 
the issue of whether Large was injured "in 
the course of his employment," while per-
forming "try-out" tasks, is not before us 
and is not addressed in this opinion. 
[3] Finally, Large claims that he is enti-
tled to permanent total disability benefits 
under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-69 (1985) 
because the accident aggravated his pre-ex-
3. The version of section 35-1-69 which was in 
effect in 1985 when Large was injured stated: 
If any employee who has previously incurred 
a permanent incapacity by accidental injury 
. . . sustains an industrial injury for which 
either compensation or medical care, or both, 
is provided by this chapter that results in 
permanent incapacity which is substantially 
greater than he would have incurred if he had 
not had the pre-existing incapacity, or which 
aggravates or is aggravated by such pre-exist-
ing incapacity, compensation shall be award-
ed on the basis of the combined injuries, but 
the liability of the employer for such compen-
Section 35-1-
69 determines the apportionment of com-
pensation between the Second Injury Fund 
and the employer or its insurance carrier 
and does not address entitlement to perma-
nent total disability benefits. Entitlement 
to benefits is a prerequisite to considera-
tion of apportionment. Where the disabili-
ty is the result of pre-existing conditions 
and not an industrial accident, a claimant is 
not entitled to disability benefits. 
Affirmed. 
BILLINGS and DAVIDSON, JJ., 
concur. 
= KEY NUMBER SYSTEM, 
n^»^»^V & 
Sharon L. HEATON, Plaintiff, 
• • 
SECOND INJURY FUND, Defendant 
No. 870336-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Aug. 8, 1988. 
Certiorari Denied Sept 22,1988. 
Injured worker petitioned for judicial 
review of decision of the Industrial Com-
mission that workers permanent total dis-
ability benefit should commence only on 
date of medical confirmation of worker's 
disability. The Court of Appeals, Green-
wood, J., held that (1) Industrial Commis-
sation . . . shall be for the industrial injury 
only. The remainder shall be paid out of the 
Second Injury Fund.... 
The stalute also provides that any aggravation 
of a pre-existing condition shall be deemed "sub-
stantially greater." Recently, section 35-1-69 
was repealed and reenacted. Under the current 
version of section 3S-1-69, the test for appor-
tioning liability for compensation is not the 
"substantially greater" test. Instead, the statute 
requires a 10% pre-oristing whole person per-
manent impairment l>efore liability for compen-
sation is apportioned. 
LUCKAU T. BOARD OF REVIEW 
QtenMO PJd SU (UuhApp. 1992) 
has no right to conveyance of the unplatted al disease death benefits. 
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property; (6) we reverse the court's conclu-
sion regarding White Pine's liability for 
taxes on the unplatted property; (7) we 
reverse the court's conclusion that the par-
ties subsequently modified the Contract re-
garding the Roadway; (8) we remand for 
the trial court to order Sharps to convey 
the Roadway; (9) we affirm the court's 
conclusion that White Pine is not entitled to 
benefit of the bargain damages; (10) we 
affirm the court's conclusion that evidence 
of construction interest is irrelevant; (11) 
we remand for the court to determine a 
reasonable attorney fee to be paid by 
Sharps for amounts reasonably incurred by 
White Pine at trial and on appeal as a 
result of White Pine's suit for specific per-
formance of the release of Lot 6 and the 
Roadway and for other amounts reason-
ably expended in enforcing the Contract 
"or any right arising out of breach or de-
fault thereof; (12) we remand for the 
court to determine a reasonable attorney 
fee incurred by Sharps in pursuing White 
Pine for unpaid taxes on Lots 1 to 6 and 
the Roadway; and (13) we affirm the re-
straining order barring Sharps from dispos-
ing of the property. 
JACKSON, J., concurs. 
ORME, J., concurs, except that as to 
section VIII I concur only in the result 
f O I KEY NUMUR SYSTEM> 
f ^ ^ ^ t ^ V " 
Becky LUCKAU, In the Matter of 
Rodney Luckau, Deceased, 
Petitioner, 
• . 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF the INDUSTRI-
AL COMMISSION OF UTAH; Work-
ers' Compensation Fund; and Broad-
way Shoe Rebuilders, Respondents. 
No. 910715-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Oct 16, 1992. 
Claimant appealed from decision of the 
Industrial Commission denying occupation-
The Court of 
Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that Last In-
jurious Exposure Rule encompasses all sit-
uations in which employee is exposed to 
material or substances which contribute to 
illness from which employee suffers or 
which caused employee's death, in amount 
sufficient to have caused or contributed to 
any degree to that condition; any exposure 
which did contribute or could have contrib-
uted to condition is sufficient 
Reversed and remanded. 
Bench, PJ., dissented and filed opin-
ion. 
1. Administrative Law and Procedure 
*=>800 
Where legislature either expressly or 
implicitly grants agency discretion to inter-
pret or apply statutory term, Court of Ap-
peals reviews agency's interpretation or ap-
plication under reasonableness standard. 
2. Administrative Law and Procedure 
«=>800 
In appeals under Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act (UAPA) it would be helpful 
for parties to distinguish between grants of 
discretion to apply the law and grants of 
discretion to interpret statute, to specify 
whether statute contains explicit or implicit 
grant of discretion, and to specifically iden-
tify grant of discretion if one is claimed. 
U.CJL1953, 63-46b-16(4), (4Xd). 
8. Statutes *=»219(9) 
Occupational Disease and Disability 
Act does not implicitly grant Industrial 
Commission discretion to interpret 1988 
Last Injurious Exposure Rule. U.C.A. 
1953, 85-2-1 et seq., 85-2-14. 
4. Administrative Law and Procedure 
#=•797 
Correction-of-error standard would be 
applied by Court of Appeals in reviewing 
Industrial Commission's interpretation of 
1988 Last Injurious Rule. U.C.A.1953, 35-
2-14. 
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5. Constitutional Law *»70.1(2) 
In interpreting statute, courts should 
avoid addLfe to or deleting from statutory 
language unless absolutely necessary to 
make it a rational statute. 
6. Workers' Compensation *=>201 
Prior version of Last Injurious Expo-
sure Rule encompasses all situations in 
which employee is exposed to material or 
substances which contribute to illness from 
which employee suffers or which caused 
employee's death, in amount sufficient to 
have caused or contributed to any degree 
to that condition; any exposure which did 
contribute or could have contributed to con-
dition is sufficient U.C.A1953, 3&-2-
13(b), 85-2-14. 
7. Statutes *»223.2 
Later ^ersioivs of statute do not neces-
sarily reveal intent behind earlier version. 
8. Workers' Compensation «»73 
Amendment to Occupational Disease 
Disability Act, providing that exposure to 
hazardous substance must be substantial 
contributing medical cause of disease and 
that employee must have been employed at 
least 12 consecutive months by employer in 
order to be compensated, was not merely 
explanatory clarifying amendment, but 
rather substantively changed Last Injuri-
ous Exposure Rule. U.C.A.1953, 35-2-14, 
85-2-105. 
Edward B. Havas, Salt Lake City, for 
petitioner. 
Richard 6. Sumsion, Salt Lake City, for 
respondents. 




Petitioner Becky Luckau appeals the In-
dustrial Commission's denial of occupation-
al disease death benefits. We reverse and 
remand. 
BACKGROUND 
Petitioner's husband, Rodney Luckau 
(decedent), died in 1990 of mesothelioma, a 
cancer usually caused by asbestos expo-
sure. Petitioner filed a claim with the In-
dustrial Commission alleging that decedent 
was exposed to injurious amounts of asbes-
tos while employed at Broadway Shoe Re-
builders (Broadway). She sought occupa-
tional disease death benefits under the Oc-
cupational Disease Disability Act 
Decedent held numerous jobs during his 
life. Of relevant to this proceeding are 
his jobs in a boiler room in Colorado, where 
he removed and installed asbestos pipe lin-
ing, and as a sales clerk for Broadway. 
Consistent with ihe typical latency period 
for mesothelioma, decedent was most likely 
to have contracted the cancer while em-
ployed in Colorado and/or by Broadway. 
He worked in Colorado for fifteen to six-
teen montlis in ithe early 1960s, and at 
Broadway for six to nine months in 1964. 
Petitioner contends that Broadway is liable 
for occupational disease death benefits un-
der the Last Injurious Exposure Rule, as 
codified in Utah Code Annotated section 
35-2-14 (1988). 
A hearing was held before an Adminis-
trative Law Judge (ALJ) on May 24, 1991. 
Petitioner called two witnesses, Kevin 
Potts and Jeffrey Throckmorton, both of 
whom had inspected Broadway's premises 
for asbestos, conducted air sampling tests, 
and compiled a rei>ort indicating that they 
had found asbestos in the basement and on 
a pipe in the shop. Petitioner also intro-
duced depositions of her husband, taken 
before his detath, and her husband's doctor. 
Respondents also called Potts and 
Throckmorton, as well as Joe Bollinger, 
President of Broadway, and Dr. Attilio 
Renzetti, a mesothelioma expert Dr. Ren-
zetti testified that in his opinion, decedent's 
mesothelioma was caused by his exposure 
to asbestos while working in Colorado, not 
at Broadway. He agreed, however, that 
there could have been a cumulative dose 
effect between the Colorado and Broadway 
exposures. 
In his findings of fact, the ALJ stated 
that "there is no doubt that [decedent's] 
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mesothelioma was caused by asbestos ex-
posure/' and that his exposure both in Col-
orado and at Broadway "comport well with 
the latency period for mesothelia [sic]/1 
The ALJ also determined that an injurious 
exposure required a "substantial dosage of 
exposure, and/or duration of exposure." 
He denied petitioner benefits, however, be-
cause he concluded that she had failed to 
meet her burden of proving that decedent 
was exposed to injurious amounts of asbes-
tos at Broadway, as required under Utah 
Code Annotated section 85-2-14 (1988). 
Petitioner filed a motion for review with 
the Board of Review. The Board denied 
her motion and this appeal followed. On 
appeal, petitioner argues that the Commis-
sion erred in determining that she was not 
entitled to benefits under section 86-2-14. 
Specifically, petitioner claims that the ALJ 
erred in interpreting and in applying the 
statute. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Section 63-46b-16(4) (1988) of the Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) 
outlines "the circumstances under which a 
reviewing court may grant relief from for-
mal agency action." Anderson v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n, 839 P.2d 822, 824 (Utah 
1992). "Under [section] 63-46b-16(4)(d), 
we may grant relief if 'the agency has 
erroneously interpreted or applied the 
law.'" Id (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-16(4Xd) (1988)). 
[1] " *[A]bsent a grant of discretion, a 
correction of error standard is used in re-
viewing an agency's interpretation or appli-
cation of a statutory term.'" Stokes v. 
Board of Review, 832 P.2d 66, 68 (Utah 
App.1992) (quoting Morton lnt% Inc. v. 
Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 681, 688 (Utah 
1991)). However, where the legislature ei-
ther expressly or implicitly grants the 
agency discretion to interpret or apply a 
statutory term, we review the agency's in-
terpretation or application under a reason-
ableness standard. Anderson, 839 P.2d at 
824 (citing Morton, 814 P.2d at 687); 
Stokes, 832 P.2d at 68. 
[2] Respondents claim the applicable 
standard of review is an "[intermediate 
standard of reasonableness and rationality 
with appropriate deference to the decision 
of the administrative agency." Petitioner 
contends that this court should apply a 
correction of error standard to the ALJ's 
interpretation of the law and application of 
the facts to the law, and a substantial 
evidence test to the ALJ's factual findings. 
Neither party provides any detailed discus-
sion or analysis. The disparity between 
these claims, however, demonstrates why 
"parties would be wise to assist this court 
in properly determining our standard of 
review." Bhatia v. Department of Em-
ployment Security, 834 P.2d 674, 581 
(Utah App.1992) (Bench, J., concurring). 
In appeals under UAPA, it would be help-
ful for parties to "distinguish between 
grants of discretion to apply the law and 
grants of discretion to interpret a statute," 
id, to specify whether the statute contains 
an explicit or implicit grant of discretion, 
id., and to specifically identify the grant of 
discretion if one is claimed. 
[3,4] The Occupational Disease and 
Disability Act does not expressly grant the 
Commission discretion to interpret the 1988 
Last Injurious Exposure Rule. The Com-
mission has not articulated any sound rea-
son under Morton why we should find an 
implicit grant of discretion. Because we 
can ascertain the Rule's meaning by apply-
ing traditional rules of statutory construc-
tion, we find no implicit grant of discretion. 
See Morton, 814 P.2d at 689; Nucor Corp. 
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 832 P.2d 1294, 
129&-1297 & n. 5 (Utah 1992); Ferro v. 
Utah Dep't of Commerce, 828 P.2d 607, 
610 (Utah App.1992). We accordingly ap-
ply a correction of error standard in re-
viewing the Commission's interpretation of 
this statute. 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Petitioner brought her claim under the 
Occupational Disease Disability Act which 
imposes liability upon an employer to com-
pensate the dependents of an employee 
who dies from an occupational disease. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 85~2-13(b) 0 r 8). Sec-
tion 35-2-13(b) states in pertinent part 
There is imposed upon every employer a 
liability for the payment of compensation 
to the dependents of every employee in 
cases where death results from an occu-
pational disease. 
Section 85-2-14 (1988) contains what is 
known as the Last Injurious Exposure 
Rule. It states in pertinent part1: 
Where compensation is payable for an 
occupational disease the only employer 
liable shall be the employer in whose 
employment the employee was last injuri-
ously exposed to the hazards of such 
disease 
Petitioner claims that in denying her bene-
fits, the ALT erroneously interpreted the 
phrase "injuriously exposed to the hazards 
of such disease" to require a "substantial 
dosage of exposure, and/or duration of ex-
posure." 
The phrase "injuriously exposed to the 
hazards of such disease" has been various-
ly interpreted. Although it is clear that 
"there must have been some exposure of a 
kind contributing to the condition, . . . once 
the requirement of some contributing expo-
sure has been met, the question remains: 
Was this enough of an exposure to be 
deemed injurious?" 4 Arthur Larson, 
Workmen's Compensation Law } 95.26(a) 
(1990). Traditionally, courts 
have not gone on past the original find-
ing of some exposure to weigh the rela-
tive amount or duration of exposure un-
der various carriers and employers. As 
long as there was some exposure of a 
kind which could have caused the dis-
ease, the last insurer at risk is liable for 
1. The Last Injurious Exposure Rule, as stated in 
Utah Code Annotated section 35-2-14 (1988) 
differs from the version of the rule that is now 
in effect The legislature amended section 35-
2-14 (1988) and codified it as section 35-2-105 
(1991), effective April 29, 1991. The Rule now 
reads: 
(1) To the extent compensation is payable un-
der this chapter for an occupational disease 
which arises out of and in the course of an 
employee's employment for more than one 
employer, the only employer liable shall be 
the employer in whose employment the em-
ployee was last injuriously exposed to the 
hazards of the disease if: 
all disability from that disease. Thus, 
insurers or employee who have been at 
risk for relatively brief periods have ne-
vertheless been charged with full liability 
for a condition that could only have de-
veloped over a numlber of years. 
Id. For example, in Meyer v. SAIF, 71 
Or-App. 871, 692 P.2d 656 (1984), review 
denied, 299 Or. 203, 700 P.2d 251 (1985), 
claimant suffered from asbestosis and 
sought benefits from his last employer, for 
whom he had worked only six days remov-
ing asbestos insulation from pipes. He had 
been exposed to asbestos throughout his 
life as a pipe-fitter and plumber for several 
different employers .and had exhibited 
signs of the disease for over twelve years. 
Medical evidence showed that his exposure 
during the six-day employment was not the 
actual cause of the disease, but the court 
nevertheless held the employer liable for 
benefits. The court stated that "the appro-
priate inquiry under the last injurious expo-
sure rule is not whether the conditions of 
the last employment actually caused the 
disease, but whether those conditions were 
of a kind which could have caused the 
disease over some indefinite period of 
time." Id. 692 P.2d at 658; see also, Os-
teen v. AC. £ &, Inc., 209 Neb. 282, 807 
N.W.2d 514, 520 (1981) (last of forty em-
ployers held liable for claimant's mesotheli-
oma because exposure to asbestos was of 
type that could have caused the disease had 
he been exposed for a "long time"); Union 
Carbide Corp. v Industrial Comm'n, 196 
Colo. 56, 581 P.2d 734, 738 (1978) (en banc) 
(employer for whom employee worked for 
eight days during which he was exposed to 
radiation which amounted to one-ten-thou-
(a) the employee's exposure in the course of 
employment with that employer was a sub-
stantial contributing medical cause of the al-
leged occupational disease; and 
(b) the employee was employed by the em-
ployer for at least 12 consecutive months. (2) 
Should the conditions of Subsection (1) not be 
met, liability for disability, death, and medical 
benefits shall be apportioned between em-
ployers based on the involved employers' 
causal contribution to the occupational dis-
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sandth of his total exposure during his 
mining career was liable for death benefits 
on the basis that there was sufficient evi-
dence that, had he worked in those condi-
tions for a year, the concentration would 
have exceeded federal exposure standards); 
Wood v. Harry Harmon Insulation, 511 
So.2d 690, 693 (FlaApp.1987), review de-
nied, 520 So.2d 584 (Fla.1988) (it is not 
necessary to prove that the last injurious 
exposure actually injured claimant, if it 
was of a kind which over time would be 
harmful). 
Other courts, however, have held that 
the exposure "must have been of such 
length or degree that it could have actually 
caused the disease." Larson, { 95.26(a). 
See e.g., Olson v. Federal Am. Partners, 
667 ?J2d 710, 718 (Wyo.1977) (claimant de-
nied benefits because she failed to prove a 
direct causal connection between work con-
ditions and the disease); Fossum v. SAIF, 
52 OrApp. 769, 629 P.2d 857, 860 (1981) 
(exposure must be the cause of the disease 
for employer to be liable under Last Injuri-
ous Exposure Rule), affd on other 
grounds, 293 Or. 252, 646 P.2d 1337 (1982). 
[5] Because either definition could be 
applied to the phrase as used in section 35-
2-14, we turn to traditional rules of statu-
tory construction for assistance in deter-
mining the legislature's intended meaning. 
Osuala v. Aetna Life & Cos., 608 P.2d 242 
(Utah 1980) describes cardinal rules of stat-
utory construction as follows: "[TJf there is 
doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or 
application of an act, it is appropriate to 
analyze the act in its entirety, in the light 
of its objective, and to harmonize its provi-
sions in accordance with the legislative in-
tent and purpose/1 Id at 243; see also 
Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, 
Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984) (courts 
should construe parts of an act so as to 
harmonize with the purpose of the whole 
act). In interpreting a statute, courts 
should avoid adding to or deleting from 
statutory language, unless absolutely nec-
essary to "make it a rational statute." 2A 
Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory 
Construction § 47.38 (5th ed. 1992); see 
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Lightfoot, 938 
R2d 65, 66-67 (7th Cir.1991). 
Neither petitioner nor respondents have 
provided us with any legislative history or 
other evidence of legislative intent to guide 
us in interpreting this statute. However, 
we should attempt to construe statutory 
words in accordance with their plain mean-
ing, keeping in mind that the "best indica-
tion of legislative intent is the statute's 
plain language." Berube v. Fashion Cen-
tre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989). 
Specific provisions in the Utah Occupa-
tional Disease Disability Act demonstrate 
sound reasoning behind the Utah Supreme 
Court's statements concerning the broad" 
legislative purpose of the Act For exam-
ple, for employees who sustain health inju-
ries arising out of the course of employ-
ment, compensation pursuant to the provi-
sions of this act is "the exclusive remedy 
against the employer/' Utah Code Ann. 
§ 85*2-3 (1988), and for dependents, pay-
ment under the Act "discharges] all other 
claims thereof/' id at § 85-2-32 (1988). 
Furthermore, the legislature instructed the 
Commission to determine employer liability 
in a manner calculated "to ascertain the 
substantial rights of the parties and to 
carry out justly the spirit of the Utah Occu-
pational Disease Disability Law." Id at 
{ 35-2-42 (1988). Mindful of the exclusive 
nature of the employees' remedy and the 
directive to the Commission, the Utah Su-
preme Court stated that in order to fulfill 
the purpose of workers' compensation, "the 
Act should be liberally construed and ap-
plied to provide coverage" and any doubts 
should be resolved in favor of the appli-
cant. State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984); 
see also McPhie v. Industrial Comm'n, 
567 P.2d 153,155 (Utah 1977); USX Corp. 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 781 P.2d 883, 886 
(Utah App.1989). In dealing specifically 
with the Occupational Disease Disability 
Act, the supreme court also stated that 
"[p)olicy considerations . . . dictate that 
statutes should be liberally construed in 
favor of an award." Ttsco Intermountain 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 744 P.2d 1340,1343 
(Utah 1987). 
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[6-8] Based upon an interpretation con-
sonant with the Act's objectives, with the 
plain meaning of the statutory language, 
and with the majority view, we conclude 
that the 1988 statute encompasses all situa-
tions in which an employee is exposed to 
material or substances which contribute to 
the illness from which the employee suf-
fers or which caused the employee's death, 
in an amount sufficient to have caused or 
contributed to any degree to that condition. 
This interpretation of the phrase in ques-
tion is consistent with the employer's re-
sponsibility to provide employees with a 
safe environment in which to work. Al-
though the statute is ambiguous in some 
aspects, its plain language does not include 
the quantitative or temporal requirements 
added in the ALJ's definition. Therefore, 
any exposure which did or could have con-
tributed to the condition is sufficient2 
This view is also consistent with two early 
Utah Supreme Court cases decided under a 
version of the Last Injurious Exposure 
Rule similar to that in section 35-2-14. 
Uta-Carbon v. Industrial Comm'n, 104 
Utah 567, 140 P.2d 649, 653 (Utah 1943) 
("[I]t is not necessary . . . that evidence 
should have been introduced to show that 
whatever exposure he may have had in the 
coal mine could have produced the dis-
ease."); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 115 Utah 451, 205 P.2d 829, 
831 (Utah 1949) (surveys tending to show 
that quantities of silicone dust were not 
"harmful" did not necessitate such a find-
ing and court affirmed award of benefits to 
claimant). In Kennecott, the court stated 
that liability is "predicated not on having 
contracted such ailment in [employer's] em-
ploy, but for exposing such employee to 
2. We realize that the legislature has now amend-
ed the statute to add requirements that the expo-
sure be Ma substantial contributing medical 
cause of the . . . disease" and that the employee 
be employed at least twelve consecutive months 
by the employer. Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-105 
(1991). See fn. 1. However, later versions of a 
statute do not necessarily reveal the intent be-
hind an earlier version. See 1A Norman J. 
Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction 
§ 2230 (4th ed. 1985) (a statutory amendment 
"indicates that [the legislature] intended to 
change the original act by creating a new right 
or withdrawing an existing one"). We disagree 
with the dissent's view that the amendment here 
ha' lful quantities of the dust" Id. 205 
P.2d at 833. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the A U erred in interpreting 
the requirements of Utah Code Ann. sec-
tion 35-2-14 (1988), we remand to the Com-
mission for consideration of the facts in 
light of the interpretation of the statute 
established ici this opinion. It would be 
presumptuous for us ito apply the law to 
the facts of Ithis case, that being the Com-
mission's responsibility. 
Reversed and remanded. 
BILLINGS, J., concurs. 
BENCH, Presiding Judge (dissenting): 
I respectfully dissent. While I generally 
agree with the standard set forth, I dis-
agree with the analysis used by the majori-
ty. I also believe that the ALJ properly 
applied the standard set forth and that 
Luckau will not receive a more favorable 
outcome on reconsideration. Therefore, I 
would affirm the Commission's decision. 
I write primajily to address the majori-
ty's analytical approach to this case. The 
majority sets forth an expansive collection 
of legal propositions, but then fails to apply 
many of them to this ease. I join Justice 
Wolfe in "deploying] the setting out of 
many abstract propositions of law . . . 
which plague one critically reading an opin-
ion and require endless time to analyze 
when they do not seem necessary to a 
decision of the case." Hess v. Robinson, 
109 Utah 60, 70, 163 P.2d 510, 514 (1945) 
(Wolfe, J., concurring in the result). Since 
was merely explanatory. The amendment add-
ed new substantive requirements for liability to 
attach—that the exposure "substantially" con-
tribute to the disease and that employment be 
for at least twelve montiis. "Every amendment 
not expressly characterized as a clarification 
carries the rebuttable presumption that it is 
intended to change existing legal rights and lia-
bilities." Suite v. Amador, 804 P.2d 1233, 1234 
(Utah App 1991) (citing Madsen v. Borthick, 769 
P-2d 245, 252 n. 11 (Utah 1988)). We, unlike 
our colleague in dissent, conclude this amend-
ment was not a clarifying one, but one which 
substantively changed the act 
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the majority does not utilize many of the 
legal principles it recites, readers are left 
to guess how they apply. In order to avoid 
future confusion, the principles cited 
should have been either used or deleted 
from the opinion. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
While the majority has attempted to set 
forth the standard of review found in Mor-
ton International, Inc. v. State Tax Com-
mission, 814 P.2d 581, 688-89 (Utah 1991), 
it has not precisely followed the supreme 
court's directions. When a petitioner 
claims that an agency has misinterpreted a 
statute, the first question to be answered is 
whether the statute is ambiguous. Id, "If 
the statute is clear and unambiguous, there 
is no implicit grant of discretion possible 
because there is no interpretation required 
by the agency." Ferro v. Department of 
Commerce, 828 P.2d 507, 510 (Utah App. 
1992). "Where statutory language is plain 
and unambiguous, this Court will not look 
beyond to divine legislative intent" Alii-
sen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763 
P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988). Rather, "the 
plain language of the statute must be tak-
en as the expression of the Legislature's 
intent" RLE. Employees Fed. Credit 
Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, 1151 (1988). 
"A statute is ambiguous if it can be 
understood by reasonably well-informed 
persons to have different meanings." Tan-
ner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 231, 233 
(Utah App.1990). The majority in this case 
seems to hold that Utah Code Ann. § 35-2-
14 (hereinafter section 14) is ambiguous 
because it sets forth two interpretations, or 
"definitions," of the last injurious exposure 
1. The majority purports to "analyze the act in its 
entirety," but it never considers any other provi-
sion of the Act Instead, it quotes Tisco Inter-
mountain v. Industrial Commission, 744 P.2d 
1340, 1343 (Utah 1987). also a mesothelioma 
case, for the proposition that Tpjolicy consider-
ations in workers' compensation cases dictate 
that statutes should be liberally construed in 
favor of an award." The majority omits the 
next sentence in Tisco: "However, policy con-
siderations have no application in the absence 
of any evidence to support an award, nor can 
they be used to controvert the clear meaning of 
the statutory requirements upon which an 
award must be based." Id. (emphasis added). 
rule. It also purportedly utilizes the rule 
that the entire statute should be considered 
when interpreting ambiguous statutory 
language.1 The majority, however, never 
identifies the different plausible interpreta-
tions of section 14 that render it ambigu-
ous. 
Identifying the ambiguous language at 
issue, and its plausible interpretations, is 
the threshold question when statutory lan-
guage does not have a plain meaning. If 
the majority would attempt to articulate 
the plausible interpretations of the specific 
language actually used by the legislature 
in section 14, rather than focus on general 
policy considerations, it would find that 
section 14 is not ambiguous.2 
ANALYSIS 
Plain Meaning 
The phrase "last injuriously exposed to 
the hazards of such disease'1 has only one 
plausible meaning. It refers to the last 
time the employee was exposed to the haz-
ards of the disease in a manner that injured 
the employee. The plain meaning of the 
term ''injuriously exposed" logically re-
quires a showing that the exposure injured 
the employee by causing or contributing to 
the employee's disease. The exposure 
therefore must either be in an amount or 
over a period of time sufficient to cause or 
contribute to the disease in order for it to 
be deemed injurious. "JTJhe duration and 
extent of exposure must have some signifi-
cance or the plain meaning of the words 
lose their significance.9' Larson, Work-
men's Compensation Law, § 95.26(a). 
The majority may therefore reach its stan-
2. Under the analysis set forth in Morton, it is 
improper for this court to embark on a policy 
quest If section 14 is ambiguous and we are 
unable to identify the legislature's policy deter-
minations by using the rules of statutory con-
struction, we must defer to the agency's policy 
determination as evidenced by its interpreta-
tion S14 ?2d at 589 (we are to assume the 
legislature intended that the agency apply its 
expertise to resolve any questions where legisla-
tive intent is not discernible). 
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dard by simply looking to the plain mean-
ing of the language used by the legislature 
in section 14. 
There is additional plain language in sec-
tion 14 that makes it clear that the last 
injurious exposure rule only applies after a 
causal connection has been otherwise es-
tablished. Section 14 begins with the fol-
lowing precondition: "When compensation 
is payable " As is clear from this lan-
guage, Luckau must show that compensa-
tion is otherwise payable by Broadway for 
a covered exposure before she may invoke 
the last injurious exposure rule to place 
full liability on Broadway. Section 35-2-
27 (hereinafter section 27) of the Act makes 
it clear that compensation is not payable 
unless causation is established. It there-
fore follows, as a matter of logic, that 
before section 14 may be applied, Luckau 
must prove that the exposure at Broadway 
could have directly caused or contributed to 
the mesothelioma as required by section 27. 
Resolving Ambiguity 
Subsequent to the initiation of this mat-
ter, but prior to hearing, the legislature 
amended section 14 by adding a clarifying 
provision clearly describing the degree of 
injurious exposure required. The amend-
ment provides that in order for the last 
injurious exposure rule to apply, the em-
ployer's exposure must have been "a sub-
stantial contributing medical cause of the 
alleged occupational disease." Utah Code 
Ann. ( 35-2-105 (Supp.1992) (effective 
April 29, 1991). 
If the majority is correct in assuming 
that section 14 is ambiguous, it fails to 
properly interpret it in light of the clarify-
ing amendment Under traditional rules, 
"[w]hen a statute is amended, the amend-
ment is persuasive evidence of the legisla-
ture's intent when it passed the former, 
unamended statute." State v. Bishop, 753 
3. The majority fails to provide any justifiable 
reason for not applying the clarifying amend-
ment retroactively. It erroneously relies upon 
the "presumption of change" rule. The pre-
sumption of change rule, however, only applies 
to material changes in the original language, not 
to mere additions that only add explanatory 
language. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Con-
VM 439, 486 (Utah 198$. See also Foil v. 
Ballinger, 601 93? 144, 150 (Utah 1979) 
(amendment clarlied original legislative in-
tent by adding language explaining when 
original language is applicable); Okland 
Constr. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 520 
P.2d 208, 210-11 (Utah 1974) (amendment 
dealing with "clarification or amplification 
as to how the law should have been under-
stood" prior to the amendment should be 
applied retroactively); State v. Davis, 787 
P.2d 517, 523 (Utah App.1990) (legislature 
clarified its original intentions by subse-
quently adding prohibition); Larson v. Ov-
erland Thrift and Loan, 818 P.2d 1316, 
1320 n. 3 (Utah App.1991); Shelter Amer-
ica Corp. v. Ohio Cos. and Ins. Co., 745 
P.2d 843, 845 (Utah App.1987). If the ma-
jority were to consider the 1991 amend-
ment, there would be no debate as to the 
legislature's intended standard.1 
PREJUDICE 
Before we may grant relief from an 
agency action, we are statutorily required 
to find that a petitioner would have likely 
received a more favorable outcome had an 
alleged error not been made. Morton, 814 
P.2d at 584 (interpreting Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-16(4) (1989)). Luckau alleges 
that the ALT misinterpreted section 14 by 
stating that the last injurious exposure rule 
requires a ''substantial dosage of exposure, 
and/or duration of exposure." The majori-
ty remands because it holds that this state-
ment was an erroneous Btatement of the 
law. Luckau, however, hiis not shown how 
this statement hast prejudiced her claim. 
A review of the record reveals that de-
spite the apparent indication of a more 
demanding standard, the ALT actually ap-
plied the very standard set forth today, and 
found against Luckau. The AU expressly 
found that decedent's death was not cov-
ered because any exposure' to asbestos suf-
struction, Vol. 1A § 11230 at 265 (4th ed. 198S). 
"An amendment of an unambiguous statute in-
dicates a purpose to change the law, whereas no 
such purpose is indicated by the mere fact of an 
amendment of an ambiguous provision." Id. at 
266 (emphasis added). If the majority finds 
section 14 to be ambiguous, it clearly ens in 
relying upon the presumption of change rule. 
STATE T. BELGARD 
QteatS40 POd 819 (UuhApp. 1992) 
Utah 819 
f ered by the decedent at Broadway was not 
a "conjunctive cause of the decedent's fatal 
mesothelioma." The ALJ expressly found 
that decedent's exposure to asbestos at the 
shop was "only a de minimis exposure, of 
no more consequence on this 6 to 9 month 
daily basis, than what we are all exposed to 
in a non-industrial, ambient air setting." 4 
These factual findings have not been chal-
lenged and therefore remain undisturbed. 
Consequently, when the Commission recon-
siders the facts in light of the standard 
identified today, it will necessarily deny 
benefits. 
A further review of the record also re-
veals that Luckau is not entitled to compen-
sation because she has not satisfied other 
requirements found in section 27. In par-
ticular, there is no showing that the dece-
dent's mesothelioma was "incidental to the 
character of the business" as required by 
subsection 27(5). In Palmer v. Del Webb's 
High Sierra, 838 P.2d 435 (Nev.1992), the 
Nevada Supreme Court held that an em-
ployee's lung disease that resulted from 
exposure to environmental smoke at the 
casino where the employee worked was not 
an occupational disease because the disease 
Was not related to the nature or character 
of the job. The court reasoned that the 
requirement that the disease-causing condi-
tions be "incidental to the character of the 
business" makes it "apparent that the leg-
islature intended that there must be a con-
nection between the kind of job and the 
kind of disease. Mere causation is not 
enough." Id. at 435-436. Luckau has not 
made any claim, nor presented any evi-
dence, that the nature or character of the 
shoe repair business creates a risk that 
shoe repairers will contract mesothelioma. 
The record is unequivocal that decedent's 
exposure to asbestos, if any, was caused by 
the physical structure wherein the shoe 
repair business was located, not by the 
character of shoe repair. Since the dece-
dent's alleged exposure to asbestos was 
purportedly caused by his structural sur-
roundings, and not by the nature or charac-
4. The last sentence of section 27 explicitly pro-
vides that. "No disease or injury to health shall 
be found compensable where it is of a character 
ter of his occupation, it appears that even if 
the alleged exposure was a contributing 
cause, it was not covered under the Act 
It also appears that section 85-2-13(bX4) 
of the Act requires that decedent's death 
occur within three years from the last date 
on which he actually worked for Broadway 
in order to be covered. Since decedent 
passed away more than three years after 
he worked for Broadway, any claim is ap-
parently barred under the express terms of 
the Act Tisco, 744 P.2d at 1842. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the plain language of the Act, the 
last injurious exposure rule only applies 
when the exposure caused by the target 
employer is shown to have caused or con-
tributed to the disease. The Commission 
found that the decedent's exposure to as-
bestos at Broadway was not a contributing 
cause of the disease. Since Luckau has not 
made any showing of the likelihood of a 
different result on remand, the majority 
errs in reversing. 
I would therefore affirm the Commis-
sion's decision to deny benefits. 
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Defendant was convicted for posses-
sion of dangerous weapon by restricted 
person after bench trial in the Third Dis-
to which the general public is commonly ex-
posed." 
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elements of the offense to which he is entering 
the plea; that upon trial the prosecution would 
have the burden of proving each of those 
-elements beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the 
plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(e) the defendant knows the minimum and 
maximum sentence that may be imposed upon 
him for each offense to which a plea is entered, 
including the possibility of the imposition of 
consecutive sentences; 
(f) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea 
discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what 
agreement has been reached; and 
(g) the defendant has been advised of the time 
limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of 
guilty or no contest. 
A 1989 amendment redesignated the subdivisions in 
the rule. 
4. The district court rules of practice in effect at the 
time when both Willet and Stilling entered their pleas, 
required the court to determine "that there is a factual 
basis for the plea." Rules of Practice, Utah District 
and Circuit Courts, Rule 3.6(c) (replaced by the Code 
of Judicial Administration). 
5. Although in Alford, the Court found a "strong" 
factual basis for the plea under the particular facts, we 
do not read the opinion as specifying the quantum of 
evidence needed to establish the required factual basis. 
6. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
provides: "Notwithstandingtheacceptanceof a plea of 
guilty, the court should not enter a judgment upon 
such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy 
it that there is a factual basis for the plea." Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 11(f). Rule 11 of Utah's Criminal Procedure 
Code does not contain the same provision See State 
v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 478 n3 (Utah App. 1991) 
(Utah may have deliberately omitted 11(f) from our 
rules). 
7. See, e.g., Johnston v. State, 829 P.2d 1179, 1182 
(Wyo. 1992), Amerson v. State, 812 P.2d 301, 303 
(Idaho App. 1991), Simons v. State, 773 P.2d 1156, 
1163 (l<&ho App. 1989), Tiger v. State, 654 P.2d 
1031, 1033 (Nev. 1982). 
8. We note a possible conflict between our holding in 
this case and State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 478 n.4 
(Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 
1992). To the extent that Smith implied that a factual 
basis was not necessary for an Alford plea, it was 
incorrect. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 
38 n.10, 91 S.Ct. 160, 167 n.10 (1970) 
9. In Willeti, the supreme court remanded the case to 
the trial court to determine if the preliminary hearing 
transcript contained evidence of a factual basis for the 
guilty plea. WilUtt, 842 P.2d at 863. Similarly, Alford 
plea cases have examined the record of both the plea 
and preliminary hearings to deduce the factual basis 
for a defendant's charges. See State v. Hamilton, 6fcS 
P.2d 983, 985 (Ariz. 1984). However, because 
Stilling did not have a preliminary hearing, we are 
precluded from issuing a similar remand order. 
10. Because the affidavit was initially submitted in 
response to Stilling** claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, it did not violate the attorney-clientprivilege. 
Utah R. Evid. 504(d)(3). See also Hunt v. Blackburn, 
128 U.S. 464,470-71,9 S. a . 125, 127 (1888); Rule 
1.6(b)(3) Utah R. Prof. Conduct. 
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GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Petitioner Kerry L. Willardson appeals from 
the Industrial Commission's denial of permanent 
total disability benefits. The Commission denied 
benefits because it found no medical causation 
between the industrial accident and petitioner's 
disability. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
Based upon a claim that he injured his back in 
an industrial accident, petitioner sought 
permanent disability benefits from the Industrial 
Commission (the Commission). During the 
hearing on petitioner's application for benefits, 
he acknowledged a substantial medical history of 
pre-existing back problems. According to 
petitioner, he first injured his back in 1970 
while working in Colorado and underwent a 
lumbar laminectomy in 1971. He sought further 
treatment for pain in his back, shoulders and left 
hip in 1983. His treating physician ordered 
x-rays and diagnosed petitioner as having severe 
degenerative osteoarthritis of the lumbar spine 
with multi-level degenerative disc disease and 
scoliosis. In January of 1988 he was injured 
during a fall at home. This accident caused a 
tboracic-cervicalst rain/sprain, intervertebrald isc 
syndrome, and brachial extension neuralgia of 
the right shoulder and arm, Tor which petitioner 
received medical treatment nineteen times during 
the next three months. 
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On the date of the alleged industrial injury, 
April 15, 1988, petitioner, who was fifty-seven 
years old, had worked for Beaver Creek Coal 
Company (respondent) for about three years as 
a conveyer belt supervisor. Petitioner testified 
that he was replacing heavy wire mesh guards 
on a conveyer belt so that no rock would fall off 
the belt. While trying to jerk one of the guards 
free from its stack, petitioner stated that he felt 
a sharp pain in his lower back at about belt 
level. Because of the pain, he left work. 
Although petitioner was treated that same day 
by Dr. Kotrady, he did not mention jerking wire 
screens as the cause of his discomfort. Dr. 
Kotrady ordered x-rays and diagnosed petitioner 
as having severe degenerative arthritic hips, 
pelvis and lumbar spine; degenerative disc 
disease at all levels of the lumbar spine; and 
scoliosis. Similarity between these x-rays and 
those taken in 1983 indicated that the 
degenerative arthritis and disc disease 
pre-existed the industrial accident. Dr. Kotrady 
told petitioner he could return to work th? next 
week. However, 4lue to recurrent pain, 
petitioner sought further treatment. This 
treatment, which included a CT scan, disclosed 
extensive degenerative and arthritic lumbar 
changes, but no fractures or acute herniations. 
Beginning on April 30, 1988, Dr. Heiner and 
Dr. Gaufin both treated petitioner. Although 
neither doctor had petitioner's prior medical 
records, they indicated by filling in blanks on 
forms provided by petitioner's attorney, that 
one-half of petitioner's lumbar spine impairment 
was due to the April 15,1988 industrial incident 
and one-half to pre-existing conditions. Dr. 
Gaufin rated petitioner with a fifteen percent 
whole person impairment, while Dr. Heiner 
rated petitioner with a thirty percent whole 
person impairment. 
Petitioner filed for permanent total disability 
benefits in 1988. In response to petitioner's 
claim, respondent argued that even if he did 
sustain a compensable industrial injury, his 
current disability was an inevitable consequence 
of his pre-existing condition. 
After a hearing and review of the medical 
records, the administrative law judge (ALT) 
found that petitioner had not established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the incident 
on April 15, 1988 contributed to his disability. 
Further, the ALJ concluded that the disability 
after April 15, 1988 resulted from petitioner's 
long-standing degenerative condition in his 
lumbar spine. Without referring the matter to a 
medical panel, the ALJ dismissed petitioner's 
claim for failure to establish a compensable 
industrial injury. Petitioner then filed a request 
for review with the Commission. The 
Commission essentially adopted the ALTs 
findings and conclusions and affirmed the ALTs 
order. This appeal followed. 
ISSUES 
On appeal petitioner (1) challenges the finding 
that the industrial accident was not the medical 
cause of petitioner's disability, (2) claims the 
ALJ applied the wrong standard of proof, and 
(3) argues the ALJ abused her discretion by 
failing to convene a medical panel. 
ANALYSIS 
Standard of Review 
The Commission's findings of fact regarding 
medical causation "will be affirmed if they are 
'supported by substantial evidence when viewed 
in light of the whole record.*" Stewart v. Board 
of Review, 831 P. 2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1992) 
(quoting Merriam v. Board of Review, 812 P.2d 
447, 450 (Utah App. 1991)). See also Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(g)(1989). Substantial 
evidence is "'such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
support a conclusion.'" Department of Air Force 
v. Swider, 824 P.2d 448, 451 (Utah App. 1991) 
(citations omitted.) 
We review the Commission's interpretation of 
general - questions of law under a 
correction-of-error standard, with no deference, 
given to the expertise of the Commission. 
Questar Pipeline v. Tax Comm'n, 817 P.2d 316, 
317-18(Utah 1991); King v. IndustrialComm'n, 
850 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1993). 
Statutory interpretation or application by the 
Commission will be reviewed without deference 
unless there is. an express or implied grant of 
discretion to the Commission. Morton Int'l, Inc. 
v. Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 589 (Utah 
1991). Because the Commission has issued a 
rule limiting the discretion granted to it under 
Utah Code Arm. §35-1-77(1 )(a) (1988), 
concerning when it may appoint a medical panel, 
we Teview the agency^s action for 
reasonableness; Hinder Utah Code Ann. 
§63-46b-14(h)(ii). See SEMECO v. Tax 
Comm'n, 849 P.2d 1167, 1174 (Utah 1993) 
(Durham, J., dissenting). 
Medical Causation 
We first address petitioner's contention that 
the industrial accident was a medical cause of 
his disability. Utah Code Ann. §35-1^5 (1988) 
mandates compensation where a sufficient causal 
connection exists between the disability and the 
working conditions. A claimant must establish 
both legal and medical causation in order to find 
a compensable injury under Utah's workers' 
compensation scheme. Mi era v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 728 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1986). 
Medical causation demands that petitioner 
"prove [his] dusability is medically the result of 
an exertion1 or injury that occurred during a 
work-related activity" Allen v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986). If "the 
claimant cannot show a medical causal 
connection, compensation should be denied." Id. 
Only those injuries which occur because some 
condition or exertion required by employment 
increases the risk of injury which a worker 
normally faces in h.is everyday life is 
compensable, while symptoms which 
coincidentallv appear alt work because of a 
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preexisting condition without any enhancement 
from the work place are not compensable. Id. at 
25. 
Generally, industrial injuries that aggravate 
or "light up" pre-existing conditions and are 
causally connected to the subsequent onset 
of symptoms of the disease or condition, are 
compensable . . . « [but,] a claimant must 
prove the subsequent disability is "medically 
the result of an exertion or injury that 
occurred during a work-related activity . . . 
and not solely the result of a pre-existing 
condition." 
Virgin v. Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284,1288 
(Utah App. 1990) (quoting Allen, 729 P.2d at 
27). See also Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev.9 736 
P.2d 237 (Utah 1987); Olsen v. Industrial 
Comm'n, lie P.2d 937, 939 (Utah App. 1989) 
off'd, 797 P.2d 1098 (Utah 1990). The ALJ has 
the responsibility to resolve factual conflicts. 
Lancaster, 736 P.2d at 241. . 
Petitioner concedes that he has a lengthy 
medical history of pre-existing back problems. 
His medical records indicate that for some 
seventeen years before the date of the alleged 
industrial injury, petitioner had undergone 
extensive treatments for his back problems, 
which included degenerative arthritis, disc 
disease and scoliosis. The x-rays taken on April 
15, 1988 were similar to those taken in 1983, 
demonstrating the presence of degenerative 
arthritis and disc disease, but cot indicating 
fractures or acute herniations. Accordingly, no 
surgery was needed to correct any problem 
allegedly aggravated by the incident on April 15, 
1988. In light of petitioner's f>re-existing 
physically degenerative condition, -he bore the 
burden of proving that the April 15,1988 injury 
he sustained ~was sot his physical body's 
inevitable breaking point. 
While petitioner argues that his work activities 
while jerking the belt screens aggravated his 
pre-existing disability, the evidence before the 
A D does not unequivocally support that 
contention. Although both Dr. Heiner's and Dr. 
Gau fill's reports diagnosed petitioner as 
suffering from degenerative osteoarthritis and 
rated him respectively with a thirty and fifteen 
percent impairment, neither explained the 
relationship of the impairment to the industrial 
incident. Therefore, their attribution of fifty 
percent of petitioner's impairment to the 
industrial accident lacks a rational or factual 
basis. The ALJ also found the attribution to be 
further weakened because the doctors used 
pre-printed fill-in-the-blank forms in which they 
merely inserted a percentage figure and because 
they did not have or refer to petitioner's prior 
medical history. The ALJ's finding of "no 
medical causation" was also based on Dr. 
Kotrady's medical opinion of pre-existing 
medical condition. 
We find substantial evidence in the record to 
support findings th* t the 1988 injury was not the 
medical cause of petitioner's disability and that 
his pre-existinp condition caused his disability 
"Where the disability is the result of pre-existing 
conditions and not an industrial accident, a 
claimant is not entitled to disability benefits." 
Large K Industrial Convn Vi, 758 P.2d 954, 957 
(Utah App. 1988). See also Giesbrecht v. Board 
of Review, 828 P.2d 544, 547 (Utah App. 
1992). 
Standard of Proof 
Petitioner also argues the ALJ applied the 
wrong standard of proof to his claim for 
benefits. The ALJ's conclusions of law state that 
"the preponderance of the medical evidence 
strongly suggests that the applicant's symptoms 
and disability after April 15, 1988 were the 
result of his long-standing and significant 
degenerative condition in his lumbar spine and 
were not the result of any significant 
contribution by the activities of April 15,1988." 
(Emphasis added.) Petitioner correctly asserts 
that there is no requirement in the appbcable 
statute that the work-related activities 
"significantly" contribute to an injury in order 
for a compensable industrial accident to occur. 
The only requirement is that there be a medical 
and legal causal relationship between petitioner's 
condition and work-related activities, significant 
or otherwise. Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 
P,2d 15,25 (Utah 1986). 
However, the correct "preponderance t>f 
medical evidence" standard of proof clearly 
prefaced the ALJ's medical causation 
conclusions. Considering both the record and the 
ALJ's order as a whole, we agree with the 
Commission that the ALJ's usage of the word 
"significant" was merely unintended surplusage; 
which constitutes only harmless error2 and does 
not alter the ALJ's determination of no medical 
causation. We are persuaded that the ALJ and, 
more importantly, the Commission,3 did not use 
a "significant -contribution" standard to 
determine the existence of medical causation. 
Rather, as discussed above, the ALJ found no 
credible medical evidence to relate petitioner's 
current disability to the industrial accident. 
Thus, we find no reversible error. 
Medical Panel Referral 
Finally, petitioner argues that because a causal 
connection between his injury and his 
employment depends on the production and 
interpretation of medical evidence, the ALJ 
abused her discretion in not referring the 
medical causation aspect of the case to a medical 
panel. Petitioner, however, bases this claim on 
the Commission's application of its own rules, 
and we review such application under a 
reasonableness and rationality test. Ashcrofi v. 
Industrial Comm'n, No. 920586, sbp op. at 4 
(Utah App. June 9, 1993). 
Appointment of a medical panel is addressed 
in Utah Code Ann. §35-l-77-(l)(a) (1988) as 
follows: 
Upon the filing of a claim for 
compensation for injury by accident, or for 
death, arising out of or in the course of 
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employment, and if the employer or its 
insurance carrier denies liability, the 
commission may refer the medical aspects of 
the case to a medical panel appointed by the 
commission.4 
(Emphasis added.) This statute grants the 
Commission the discretion to appoint a medical 
panel, but does not require it in all cases. 
Ashcrofty slip op. at 4; Intermountain Health 
Care v. Industrial Comm'n, 839 P.2d 841, 845 
(Utah App. 1992). 
However, the Commission has adopted a rule 
implementing the statute, which limits the 
Commission's discretion by identifying 
circumstances when a medical panel "will be 
utilized." Ashcroft,, slip op. at 4. This rule 
states: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the 
Administrative Law Judge where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues 
may be involved. Generally a significant 
medical issue must be shown by conflicting 
medical reports. Significant medical issues 
are involved when there are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of 
permanent physical impairment which vary 
more than 5% of the whole person. 
Utah Adm. Code, R568-1-9 (1993).5 
Petitioner argues that the Commission's rule 
required review of his case by a medical panel, 
because there were medical reports which 
conflicted as to the extent of his impairment by 
more than five percent-Dr. Gaufin reported a 
fifteen percent impairment, while Dr. Heiner 
indicated a thirty percent impairment. 
Petitioner's argument, however, overlooks the 
critical threshold issue which precedes the 
requirement of review by a medical panel. 
Before discrepancy in reports of impairment is 
relevant, an A U must find credible evidence of 
medical causation. Because the Commission 
found no credible evidence to support a finding 
of medical causation, any conflict over 
impairment ratings is irrelevant and the rule is 
inapplicable. We conclude, therefore, that the 
A U did not abuse her discretion by tailing to 
refer the medical causation issue to a medical 
panel. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, we affirm the Commission's 
denial of permanent total disability benefits to 
petitioner. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Regnal W. GarfT, Judge 
1. "Pine key question in determining causation is 
whether, given this body and this exertion, the 
exertion in fact contributed to the injury." Allen v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 24 (Utah 1986) 
(citations omitted). 
2. An error is harmless if it is "sufficiently 
inconsequential that . . . there is no reasonable 
likelihood that the error alfected the outcome of the 
proceedings.*" Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div.t 
814 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 1991) (quoting State v. 
Verde,T70 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989). 
3 . See Virgin v Board of Review, 803 P.2d 1284, 
1289 (Utah App 1990) (the Commission, in 
reviewing the evidence presented to the ALJ, is the 
ultimate fact finder). 
4. Prior to 1982 the statute was mandatory, and 
provided as follows: 
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for 
injury or by accident or for death arising out of 
or in the course of employment and where the 
employer or insurance carrier denies liability, the 
commission shall refer the medical aspects of the 
case to a medical panel appointed by the 
commission. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-77 (1953). 
(Emphasis added.) 
5. Adoption of this rule is consistent with the Utah 
Supreme Court's Morton decision, holding that the 
legislature may explicitly grant discretion to an 
administrative agency. Morton Int'l Inc. v. Auditing 
Drv., 814 P.2d 581, 589 (Utah 1991). It follows that 
the agency can then act by rule to limit its own. 
discretion, so long as such action is not inconsistent 
with the implementing legislation. Ashcroft, slip op. at 
4. 
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RUSSON, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Kevin Holland seeks review of a decision of 
the Career Service Review Board of the State of 
Utah denying a grievance filed by Holland 
against the Utah State Office of Education and 
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ate u 785 P-2d 1127 (UuhApp. 1989) 
determining the amount of a reasonable sion and claimant appealed, 
attorney fee. 
Utah H27 
B. RDA's Liability For Owner's Attorney 
Fees Incurred On Appeal 
Owners argue that because Utah Code 
Ann. § 11-19-23.9 (1986) authorizes an 
award of attorney fees to condemnees, 
RDA should be be ordered to pay Owners' 
attorney fees necessarily incurred on ap-
peal. Rule 34(a) of the Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals, however, states that "if 
a judgment or order is affirmed, costs [in-
cluding attorneys' fees] shall be taxed 
against the appellant unless otherwise or-
dered; if a judgment or order is reversed, 
costs shall be taxed against the respondent 
unless otherwise ordered." 
Owners appealed the trial court's deci-
sion in RDA's favor on two major issues: 
(1) Owners' entitlement to interest paid into 
the court clerk's office pursuant to the 
August 16, 1985 stipulation, and (2) reim-
bursement for expert witness fees under 
Utah Code Ann. § 11-19-23.9. We affirm 
the trial court's judgment on both of these 
issues. Therefore, Owners are not entitled 
to attorney fees on appeal. 
BILLINGS and GREENWOOD, JJ., 
concur. 
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Steve ZIMMERMAN, Petitioner, 
v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Granite Beef, Inc. and/or Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah and Em-
ployers' Reinsurance Fund, Respon-
dents. 
No. 890191-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 28, 1989. 
Rehearing Denied Dec. 20 "989. 
Workers' compensation chimant was 
denied benefits by the Industrial Commis-
The Court of 
Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that: (1) 
claimant's preexisting condition was not 
aggravated by industrial injury; (2) Com-
mission's conclusion that claimant had not 
suffered compensable industrial injury pre-
cluded consideration of whether he quali-
fied for tentative permanent total disabili-
ty; and (3) medical panel was qualified. 
Affirmed. 
1. Workers9 Compensation «=>1545 
Employee did not suffer any aggrava-
tion of preexisting condition on basis of 
industrial accident; aggravation which 
medical panel referred to was that due 
solely to temporary pain experienced by 
employee following accident and not aggra-
vation of or by preexisting conditions of 
spinal stenosis and Reiter's syndrome. 
2. Workers9 Compensation <S=847 
Permanent total disability benefits 
may be awarded when relatively small per-
centage of impairment caused by industrial 
accident is combined with other factors to 
render claimant unable to obtain employ-
ment 
3. Workers9 Compensation *=>847, 1377 
In order for employee to obtain tenta-
tive finding of permanent disability under 
"odd lot doctrine," employee must prove 
that he or she can no longer perform duties 
required in his or her occupation; employ-
ee, having been referred to Division of 
Vocational Rehabilitation by Industrial 
Commission, must, through cooperation 
with Division, establish that he or she can-
not be rehabilitated; and burden thereafter 
shifts to employer to prove existence of 
steady work employee can perform, taking 
into account several factors, including em-
ployee's education, mental capacity and 
age. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
4. Workers9 Compensation «=»1633 
Industrial Commission's finding that 
employee did not suffer compensable indus-
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trial injury precluded consideration of 
whether employee qualified for tentative 
permanent total disability; employee failed 
to demonstrate necessary causation be-
tween impairment and industrial accident 
in order to support his claim to permanent 
disability benefits. 
5. Workers' Compensation «=»1937 
Employee was not substantially preju-
diced by Industrial Commission's medical 
panel's composition; at time panel was ap-
pointed, initial diagnosis and treatment fo-
cused on employee's complaints of back 
and hip pain and thus, panel properly in-
cluded neurologist and orthopedic surgeon 
and further, panel reviewed x-ray studies 
with specialist on bone radiology and rheu-
matology after diagnosis of Reiter's syn-
drome was made. 
€. Workers9 Compensation <$=> 1939.6 
Industrial Commission's medical pan-
el's limited assessment of workers' com-
pensation claimant's credibility was not im-
proper; panel's assessment of credibility 
went only to judging whether claimant was 
capable of accurately relating to panel 
symptoms he suffered and was not basis of 
panel's report 
Bruce J. Wilson, Provo, for petitioner. 
Richard Sumsion, Salt Lake City, for 
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah. 
Erie V. Boorman Jr., Salt Lake City, for 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
Before BILLINGS, GARFF and 
GREENWOOD, JJ. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Stephen P. Zimmerman appeals an Indus-
trial Commission order which denied him 
permanent disability benefits. We affirm. 
In January 1987, Zimmerman was em-
ployed by Granite Beef, Inc. His duties 
consisted of cutting and boxing meat, re-
quiring him to lift heavy boxes and pallets. 
On January 26, 1987, Zimmerman, while 
lifting an empty pallet, heard* a pop in his 
low back and felt an immediate sharp pain. 
He reported the incident to his supervisor 
and left work to obtain medical attention. 
At the time of the accident, Zimmerman 
was twenty-two years of age. He had 
worked as a laborer since age seventeen 
and had never complained of back problems 
prior to the accident. X-rays and a CT scan 
revealed no acute fracture. His injury was 
diagnosed as a musculotendinous strain. 
Zimmerman applied for disability bene-
fits on February 5, 1987 and received tem-
porary total disability benefits from Janu-
ary 30,1987 to March 4,1987. On approxi-
mately March 1, 1987, Zimmerman re-
turned to work. While lifting a heavy 
piece of meat at work, he experienced a 
recurrence of back pain. He remained off 
work for another period of time and was 
again paid temporary total compensation 
from March 11, 1987 through April 29, 
1987. His benefits were terminated, how-
ever, when he failed to keep two doctor 
appointments. Compensation was reinstat-
ed on May 27, 1987 and he was paid 
through June 25, 1987, when his benefits 
were again suspended for failure to keep a 
physical therapy appointment 
Following further therapy, on approxi-
mately July 1, 1987, Zimmerman began 
working for a new employer, Wescot Fiber-
glass Company. After working approxi-
mately one month with Wescot, Zimmer-
man was injured while grinding down the 
edges of a large fiberglass container. The 
boards on which he was sitting gave way 
and he rolled off, landing on his back. He 
experienced shooting sensations and pain in 
his lower back and qunt work because of 
pain. He did not file a claim in connection 
with this accident Additional temporary 
total disability benefits, however, were paid 
by the Workers' Compensation Fund from 
September 9, 1987 through January 29, 
1988. 
On January 6, 1988, a hearing was con-
ducted before an administrative law judge 
(A.LJ.) on Zimmerman's claim for perma-
nent disability benefits. The A.LJ. ap-
pointed a medical panel to review Zimmer-
man's case. The medical panel submitted 
its report to the A.LJ. on April 29, 1988. 
The report found as follows: 
ZIMMERMAN v. INDUSTRIAL O W N OF UTAH Utah H 2 9 
Cite as 785 Md 1127 (UtahApp. 1969) 
1. There is BO medically demonstrable 
causal connection between the appli-
cant's ongoing problems and the industri-
al accident of January 26, 1987. 
2. All of the residual problems com-
plained of by the applicant were caused 
by a pre-existing condition.1 
3. We find no period of time after 
1/1/88 during which the applicant has 
been temporarily or totally disabled as a 
result of the industrial injury. 
4. We suggest a current permanent 
physical impairment of 10% because of 
the pain and x-ray findings at the sacroil-
iac joints, understanding that his Reiter's 
disease has a good chance of progressing 
in the future, and there seems to be no 
waj of telling whether it is currently 
stabilized 
5. Assuming that his condition is stabi-
lized, his total impairment is 10%. 
€. No portion of the permanent physical 
impairment is attributable to the appli-
cant's industrial injury. 
7. The percentage of permanent physi-
cal impairment attributable to any cause 
is 10%. 
8. We believe that the industrial injury 
aggravated the pre-existing condition, 
since we are unable to find any evidence 
©f pain before the injury. 
Following objections by Zimmerman, the 
A.LJ resubmitted the case to the medical 
panel A supplemental report of the medi-
cal panel, released on August 26, 1988, 
increased Zimmerman's physical impair-
ment by another ten percent but attributed 
the increase to a pre-existing spinal steno-
sis 
On October 7, 1988, the A.LJ. entered 
findings of fact, which adopted the medical 
1. The pre-existing condition identified by the 
panel was Reiter's syndrome, which is a disease 
of uncertain cause, characterized by arthritis, 
conjunctivitis, and urethritis Webster's Medi 
cal Desk Dictionary 611 (1986) 
2. Utah Code Ann % 63-46b-16(4) (1989) ftates 
The appellate court shall grant relief only if, 
on the basis of the agency's record, it deter 
mines that a person seeking judicial review 
has been substantial^ prejudiced by any of 
the following 
panel's findings, conclusions of law, and an 
order. The A.LJ. determined that the re-
sidual problems Zimmerman complained of 
were caused by his pre-existing conditions 
of Reiter's syndrome and spinal stenosis. 
Because she found that Zimmerman failed 
to demonstrate that his ongoing medical 
condition was related to his industrial acci-
dent, the A.LJ. denied permanent disability 
benefits. 
On March 19, 1989, the Industrial Com-
mission denied Zimmerman's motion for re-
view. The Commission adopted the A.L. 
J.'s findings of fact and determined that 
the A.LJ. correctly adopted the medical 
panel finding that Zimmerman's condition 
was unrelated to his industrial accident 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Respondents contend that our review of 
the Commission's findings is limited to 
'•whether the Commission's findings are 
a^rbitrary and capricious' or Vholly with-
out cause' or contrary to the 'one [inev-
itable] conclusion from the evidence' or 
without *any substantial evidence' to sup-
port them" Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev., 
736 P.2d 237,238 (Utah 1987) (quoting Kai-
ser Steel Corp. v. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888, 
890 (Utah 1981)) However, because this 
proceeding was commenced after the effec-
tive date of the Utah Administrative Proce-
dures Act (UAPA), Utah Code Ann 
{ 63-46b-l to -22 (1989), we review the 
Commission's decision under the standards 
set forth in that act Johnson v. Depart-
ment of Employment Sec, 121 Utah Adv. 
Rep 26, 27 (1989), Grace Drilling Co v. 
Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 66 (Utah 
CLApp.1989). Under the UAPA,1 the 
(*) the agency action, or the statute or rule 
on which the agency action is based, is uncon 
stiruuonal on its face or ms applied, 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the Juris-
diction conferred by an> statute, 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the 
issues requiring resolution, 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted 
or applied the law, 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful 
procedure or decision making process, or has 
'.Ailed to follow prescribed procedure. 
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Board's finding? "will be affirmed only if 
they are 'supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court* This 'substantial evi-
dence test' grants appellate courts greater 
latitude in reviewing the record " 
Grace Drilling, 776 P.2d at 67 (quoting 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1989)). 
AGGRAVATION OF 
PRE-EXISTING CONDITION 
Zimmerman first claims that because the 
industrial accident aggravated his previous 
asymptomatic conditions, disability benefits 
should have been granted as required by 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-^9 (Supp.1987) (re-
pealed 1988).* Section 35-1-69 mandates 
apportionate compensation by the Workers' 
Compensation Fund and the Second Injury 
Fund for disability resulting from combina-
tion of a pre-existing condition and an in-
dustrial injury, as follows: 
(1) If any employee who has previous-
ly incurred a permanent incapacity by 
accidental injury, disease, or congenital 
causes, sustains an industrial injury for 
which either compensation or medical 
care, or both, is provided by this chapter 
that results in permanent incapacity 
which is substantially greater than he 
would have incurred if he had not had 
the pre-existing incapacity, or which ^ ag^  
gravates or is aggravated by such pre-
existing incapacity, compensation, medi-
cal care, and other related items as out-
lined in Section 35-1-81, shall be award-
ed on the basis of the combined injuries, 
but the liability of the employer for such 
compensation, medical care, and other re-
lated times shall be for the industrial 
injury only. The remainder shall be paid 
out of the Second Injury Fund provided 
for in Subsection 35-1-68(1) 
(0 the persons taking the agency action 
were illegally constituted as a decision-mak-
ing body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a deter-
mination of fact, made or implied by the 
agency, that is not supported by substantial 
evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute; 
For purposes of this section, (a) any 
aggravation of a pre-existing injury, dis-
ease, or congenital cause shall be deemed 
"substantially greater", and compensa-
tion, medical care, find other related 
items shall be awarded on the basis of 
the combined injuries as provided in this 
Subsection (1) 
Zimmerman contends that the Industrial 
Commission's determination that "[t]he 
medical panel found there was no aggrava-
tion of a pre-existing condition" contradict-
ed the panel's finding that "the industrial 
injury aggravated the pre-existing condi-
tions, since we are unable to find any evi-
dence of pain before the injury." Zimmer-
man concludes that the Commission's dis-
regard of clear evidence showing aggrava-
tion was a misapplication of law, and that 
we should, therefore, reverse. 
Utah Code Ann. $} 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1989) 
provides that relief shall be granted if an 
"agency has erroneously interpreted or ap-
plied the law." Id. (emphasis added). Ac-
cording to this count's previous interpreta-
tion of this section, '"we will not disturb the 
Board's application of factual findings to 
the law unless its determination exceeds 
the bounds of reasonableness and rationali-
ty." Pro-Benefit Staffing Inc. v. Board 
of Review, 775 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah CtApp. 
1989). We do, however, accord less defer-
ehce^to the Commission's factual findings 
than under the pre-UAPA standard, up-
holding its factual findings if they are 
"supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before 
the court" Grace Drilling Co., 776 P.2d 
at 67 (quoting Utah Code Ann. 
{ 63-46b-16(4Xg) (1989)). 
[1] Zimmerman argues that the Com-
mission erred in concluding that he was not 
(ii) contrary to a rule of tthe agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, 
unless the agency justifies the inconsistency 
by giving and reasons that demonstrate a fair 
and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
3. Laws 1988, ch. 116 § 6 repealed section 35-1-
69 (1987), and enacted Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-69 (1988), which was effective July 1, 
1988. 
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appellate review when "the agency has not 
decided all of the issues requiring resolu-
tion/' resulting in substantial prejudice to 
the petitioner. 
[2] The Workers' Compensation Act es-
tablishes a procedure by which a finding of 
permanent total disability may be deter-
mined. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (Supp. 
1987) states in pertinent part: 
A finding by the commission of perma-
nent total disability shall in all cases be 
tentative . . . If the employee has tenta-
tively been found to be permanently and 
totally disabled, it shall be mandatory-
that the industrial commission of Utah 
refer the employee to the division of vo-
cational rehabilitation under the state 
board of education for rehabilitation 
training 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the 
"odd lot doctrine," which allows the Com-
mission to find permanent total disability 
when a relatively small percentage of im-
pairment caused by an industrial accident 
is combined with other factors to render 
the claimant unable to obtain employment. 
See Norton t>. Industrial Comm'n, 728 
P.2d 1025, 1027 (Utah 1986); Hardman t;. 
Salt Lake City Fleet Management, 725 
P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 1986). 
£3] Zimmerman cites Hardman for the 
proposition that the only requirement for a 
tentative finding of permanent disability is 
that the employee ttot be able to return to 
his or her former occupation. Hardman 
sets forth the following steps for qualifica-
tion under the "odd lot" doctrine: (1) the 
employee must prove that he or she can no 
longer perform the duties required in his or 
her occupation; (2) the employee, having 
been referred to the Division of Vocational 
Rehabilitation by the Industrial Commis-
sion, must, through cooperation with the 
Division, establish that he or she cannot be 
rehabilitated; and (3) the burden then 
shifts to the employer to prove the exist-
ence of steady work the employee can per-
form, taking into account several factors, 
including the employee's education, mental 
capacity, and age. Hardman, 725 P.2d at 
entitled to permanent benefits from the 
facts as found by the medical panel, the 
A.LJ., and the Commission. We disagree 
and find that the Commission's conclusion 
denying permanent benefits did not exceed 
the bounds of reasonableness and rationali-
ty and is supported by substantial evidence. 
With respect to the term "aggravation," 
the Utah Supreme Court has found that 
compensation is required under section 35-
1-69(1) "if the industrial injury results in a 
permanent impairment that is aggravated 
by or aggravates a pre-existing permanent 
impairment to any degree " Second 
Injury Fund v. Streator Chevrolet, 709 
P.2d 1176, 1181 (Utah 1985) (emphasis in 
original). The record viewed in its entirety, 
demonstrates that the aggravation the 
medical panel referred to was that due 
solely to the temporary pain experienced by 
Zimmerman following the accident and not 
aggravation of or by the pre-existing condi-
tions of spinal stenosis and Reiter's syn-
drome. No permanent impairment was 
found to have resulted from the industrial 
injury itself or in combination with the 
prior existing conditions. Because the in-
dustrial accident did not result in a perma-
nent impairment, the Board correctly de-
nied Zimmerman permanent benefits. We 
acknowledge that the medical panel's find-
ings in this matter, as adopted by the 
A.LJ. and the Commission, are not as clear 
as could be desired, but our analysis and 
review of the record convince us that the 
panel determined that Zimmerman's impair-
ment was solely because of pre-existing, 
though dormant, conditions. If there had 
been any aggravation, or if a combination 
of pre-industrial accident conditions and in-
dustrial accident injuries met the requisite 
statutory percentages of impairment, Zim-
merman would have been entitled to com-
pensation. Id However, the Commission 
found otherwise, and its findings are sup-
ported by substantial evidence. 
TENTATIVE TOTAL DISABILITY 
Zimmerman also argues that the Indus-
trial Commission erred in refusing to ad-
dress his request that they make a tenta-
tive finding of permanent total disability. 
Section 63-46b-16(4)(c) of UAPA allows for 
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1326-27. See also Peck v. Eimco Process 
Equip. Co., 748 P.2d 572, 575 (Utah 1987). 
Zimmerman argues that the medical ad-
vice he received to avoid heavy lifting or 
heavy work and the medical panel's recom-
mendation for re-education to "stave off 
unemployment" are undisputed evidence 
that Zimmerman is medically unable to re-
turn to his former occupation. Conse-
quently, argues Zimmerman, the Commis-
sion erred in not referring him to Rehabili-
tation for further evaluation. 
The Commission determined that because 
Zimmerman did not claim permanent total 
disability until after the hearing, there was 
no evidence on the record to justify sending 
Zimmerman to Rehabilitation for a com-
plete evaluation. Zimmerman claims, how-
ever, that even though his request came 
after the hearing, the Commission still had 
five months to consider the request and 
should have done so. 
[4] We find, however, that notwith-
standing the timeliness of Zimmerman's re-
quest, the Commission's conclusion that he 
had not suffered a compensable industrial 
injury precludes consideration of whether 
he qualifies for tentative permanent total 
disability. "[UJnless the claimant has suf-
fered a compensible industrial injury, the 
[odd lot] doctrine is inapplicable no matter 
how compelling the other factors." Ortiz 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 766 P.2d 1092,1094 
(Utah CtApp.1989). The medical panel's 
findings, adopted by the Commission, clear-
ly show that Zimmerman failed to establish 
the necessary causation between his im-
pairment and his industrial accident in or-
der to support his claim to permanent dis-
ability benefits. See Allen v. Industrial 
Comm'n of Utah, 729 P.2d 15, 24-25 (Utah 
1986); Ortiz, 766 P.2d at 1094; Large v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 758 P.2d 954, 956 
(Utah Ct.App.1988). Since the Commission 
did not find compensable permanent dis-
ability, a rehabilitation evaluation was not 
necessary. Ortiz, 766 P.2d at 1095. 
Therefore, the Commission did not err in 
failing to determine the issue or to make a 
finding of tentative permanent disability, 




Zimmerman next claims that the medical 
panel was not properly qualified as re-
quired by statute. Qualifications of a 
medical panel in workers' compensation 
cases are set forth in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-2-56(2) (1988). The statute states in 
pertinent part 
Where a claim for compensation based 
upon partial permanent disability due to 
an occupational disease or industrial inju-
ry is filed with the commission, the com-
mission shall appoint an impartial medi-
cal panel to consist of one or more physi-
cians specializing in the treatment of the 
disease or condition involved in the claim, 
and such medical panel shall make such 
study, take such X-rays and perform 
such tests as the panel may determine 
and certify to the commission the extent, 
if any, of the permanent disability of the 
claimant 
Zimmerman claims that the Industrial Com-
mission's failure to appoint a rheumatolo-
gist who specializes in Reiter's disease to 
the medical panel was a substantial error. 
We disagree. 
When the panel WJIS appointed, the initial 
diagnosis and treatment focused on Zim-
merman's complaints of back and hip pain. 
Consequently, the panel properly included 
Dr. Leonard Jarcho, a neurologist, and Dr. 
Geoffery Orme, an orthopedic surgeon. 
Zimmerman's pre-e:dsting Reiter's syn-
drome was unknown until he was seen by 
Dr. Charles Rich and referred to Dr. Chris-
topher Jaclcson, a specialist in rheumatolo-
gy. 
[5] We find that Zimmerman was not 
substantially prejudiced by the Industrial 
Commission's composition. The panel re-
viewed all medical records and diagnostic 
studies. Dr. Jarcho also took the extra 
precaution of reviewing the X-ray studies 
with a specialist on bone radiology and a 
specialist in rheumatology at the Universi-
ty Medical Center. Zimmerman's claim 
that Dr. Jackson's findings contradict the 
panel's findings is unsupported. Zimmer-
ZIMMERMAN v. INDUSTRIAL COM?* OF UTAH Utah H 3 3 
CUe a« 785 T2A 1127 (UtahApp 1989) 
isolated excerpts from Dr. ing whether he was capable of accurately man quotes 
Jackson's notes to support the notion that 
Dr. Jackson believed Zimmerman's Reiter's 
disease was minor and the symptoms were 
due to the protruding disc in the congen-
ially narrow spinal canal. Review of Dr. 
Jackson's entire report indicates his agree-
ment with the panel's findings. 
MEDICAL PANEL'S 
CREDIBILITY JUDGMENT 
[6] Lastly, Zimmerman claims that the 
Industrial Commission improperly adopted 
the medical panel's opinions relative to his 
credibility. In its report, the panel ques-
tioned Zimmerman's reliability and motiva-
tion. However, the panel's assessment of 
Zimmerman's credibility only went to judg-
relating to the panel the symptoms he suf-
fered and was not, as Zimmerman con-
tends, the basis of their report We find, 
therefore, no error in the Commission's 
adoption of the panel's findings, including 
the limited assessment of Zimmerman's 
credibility. 
We affirm. 
GARFF and BILLINGS, JJ., concur. 
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Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Orme. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter, 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
John W. Zupon filed this Petition for Review 
from an order of the Industrial Commission 
denying his claim for permanent total disability 
benefits. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
In 1975, petitioner was employed by Kaiser 
Steel as an electrician. On August 7 of that year, 
he felt a pain in his back while lifting an 
acetylene tank at work. In February of 1977, an 
administrative law judge found petitioner had a 
ten percent permanent physical impairment and 
was entitled to twenty-six weeks of temporary 
total compensation and thirty-one weeks of 
permanent partial compensation. The ALJ based 
his ruling on the opinion of a medical panel 
which found petitioner had total physical 
impairment of sixty percent. The panel, 
however, found only ten percent of the total 
physical impairment attributable to the industrial 
accident. It attributed the balance of petitioner's 
impairment to a preexisting condition known as 
ankylosingspondylitis, a degenerative disease of 
the spine. The panel concluded the ten percent 
impairment was attributable to the industrial 
accident because there was "a one-in-six chance 
that the ankylosingspondylitis was aggravated by 
the lumbar back strain on the basis of the 
progression of the x-ray changes." 
In June of 1976, petitioner applied for social 
security disability benefits. His initial 
application, application for a rehearing, and 
application on appeal were all denied. Following 
a court order obtained to acquire review of 
unspecified new evidence, petitioner had a new 
hearing in May of 1978. In June of 1978, the 
Social Security Administration's ALJ granted 
petitioner benefits. The ALJ ruled petitioner's 
total disability was not a result of his back 
problems but rather a result of arthritis in his 
hands that became more severe starting in 
January of 1977. A doctor who assessed 
petitioner in 1981 to determine whether his 
Social Security benefits should continue noted: 
"I think this patient's symptoms are way out of 
proportion to the objective findings which are 
presented." 
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed an 
application for permanent total disability based 
on his 1975 accident. A hearing was held and 
the ALJ concluded petitioner had failed to 
establish the necessary medical causation 
between his 1975 industrial accident and his 
permanent total disability. The ALJ based her 
conclusion on two rationales: First, the medical 
evidence demonstrated it was petitioner's 
arthritic condition, which was unrelated to the 
industrial injury, that caused petitioner's 
inability to work; Second, -even if 
ankylosingspondylitis contributed to petitioner's 
inability to work, the industrial accident did not 
cause the disease and "only questionably 
aggravated it." 
On August 3,1992, the Industrial Commission 
issued an order affirming the ALJ's order and 
denying petitioner's motion for review. 
Petitioner brings a petition for review to this 
court from the Commission's order.1 
On appeal, petitioner argues the Commission 
erred by failing to apply the "odd lot** doctrine 
to ids situation and award him permanent total 
disability benefits.2 Petitioner further claims the 
Commission's determination of no medical 
causation was contrary to its prior determination 
of ten percent causation and therefore in error.3 
The Commission responds that the odd lot 
doctrine is inapplicable because medical 
causation must be established prior to the 
doctrine's application and the Commission 
properly found petitioner's industrial injury did 
not cause his permanent total disability. 
ODD LOT DOCTRINE 
The odd lot doctrine "allows the Commission 
to find permanent total disability when a 
relatively small percentage of impairment caused 
by an industrial accident is combined with other 
factors to render the claimant unable to obtain 
employment." Zimmerman v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 785 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah App. 
1989). See also Marshall v. Industrial Comm'«, 
681 P.2d 208, 212-13 (Utah 1984) (discussing 
odd lot doctrine). To qualify as a recipient of 
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benefits under the odd lot doctrine, an employee 
must first "prove that he or she can no longer 
perform th^ duties lequiitd in hie ot^her 
occupatioi^^m/n^mta/i, 785 P.2d at 1131. 
Next, the employee, Through cuupeiatiuu with 
the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, must 
"establish that he or she cannot be 
rehabilitated " W. After the employee has shown 
that rehabilitation is not possible, the employer 
has the opportunity "to prove the existence of 
steady work the employee can perform." Id. The 
work the employer establishes is available must 
take into consideration all relevant factors 
"including the employee's education, mental 
capacity, and age" as well as physical 
limitations. Id.4 
Before a claimant can acquire benefits under 
the odd lot doctrine, however, the claimant must 
establish a compensable industrial injury. 
Zimmerman, 785 P.2d at 1132. "4[U]nless the 
cfaimant has suffered a compensable industrial 
injury, the [odd lot] doctrine is inapplicable no 
matter how compelling the other factors/" Id. 
(quoting Ortiz v. Industrial Comm'n, 766 P.2d 
1092,1094 (Utah App. 1989)) (modifications in 
original). The claimant must prove the 
compensability of an injury by a preponderance 
of the evidence. Ashcrqft v. Industrial Comm Vi, 
855 P.2d 267, 269 (Utah App. 1993). Proving 
medical causation between the industrial accident 
and the disability for which the claimant seeks 
compensation is a necessary component for 
recovery. Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 
15, 27 (Utah 1986). 
MEDICAL CAUSATION 
Medical causation is an issue of fact and we 
review the determination of the Industrial 
Commission under the substantial evidence 
standard. See King v. Industrial Comm'n, 850 
P.2d 1281, 1285 (Utah App. 1993); Utah Code 
Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(g) (1989). "Medical 
causation demands that petitioner 'prove [his] 
disability is medically the result of an exertion 
or injury thjiL aumucd during a *>u*k<elated 
activity.%TWillnr4^nv IndustrialCommw216 
Utah Adv. Kep. 12, 13 (Utah App. 1993) 
(quoting Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 
15, 27 (Utah 1986)) (footnote omitted). 
Petitioner claims the Commission committed 
error in ignoring its prior decision that ten 
percent of petitioner's permanent partial 
impairment was attributable to the industrial 
accident. This argument misapprehends the 
impact of the Commission's earlier decision. 
For the odd-lot doctrine to apply, the 
Commission must first determine there is 
medical causation between the petitioner*! 1975 
industrial accident and his now claimed 
permanent total disability. That is a different 
question from, and not controlled in anyway by, 
the determination that his industrial accident 
caused a permanent partial disability. 
Furthermore, the determination that there was 
medical causation in the 1977 hearing did not 
prevent the Commission from reachine a 
different conclusion based on new medical 
evidence at the 1992 hearing. See Utah Code 
Ann. §35-1-78(1) (Supp. 1993). While the 1977 
decision was some evidence supporting medical 
causation for the new permanent total claim 
brought sixteen years after the industrial 
accident, the ALJ and the Commission properly 
reassessed all the medical evidence in the 
record. 
Based primarily on the Social Security 
Administration's determination petitioner's total 
disability was a result of the arthritis in the 
petitioner's hands, the Commission found there 
was no medical causation between the 1975 
industrial injury and his permanent total 
disability claim.5 Thus, the Commission's 
determination petitioner did not establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the 1975 
industrial accident was a medical cause of his 
now claimed total permanent disability is 
supported by substantia], undisputed evidence in 
the record. We therefore affirm. 
CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission's determination 
that petitioner failed to establish his 1977 
industrial injury was a medical cause of his now 
claimed permanent total disability is supported 
by substantial evidence. We therefore affirm the 
denial of permanent total disability benefits. 
Judith M. Billings, Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
1. In his reply brief, petitioner challenges, under Utah 
Code Ann. §63-46b-12(6)(c)(1989), the sufficiency of 
the Industrial Commission's findings of fact in its 
order denying review. We note the facts in this case 
are undisputed and in such a case the failure to 
disclose a specific subsidiary finding is not fatal to the 
agency's decision. See Adams K Board of Review, 
821 P.2d 1,5 (Utah App. 1991). Although we do not 
remand here because of the nature of the record, we 
strongly encourage the Industiial Commission to 
clearly articulate its factual findings in all cases to 
erhance our ability "to conduct a meaningful review." 
Id. at 4. 
2. Petitioner also argues the Commission erred when 
it rejected his claim, made for the first time in his 
Motion for Review, that he deserved compensation for 
an additional fifty percent permanent partial disability. 
The application for a heai ing does not specify such a 
claim. The ALJ, in a response letter, indicates that 
such a claim was not presented at the hearing. 
Although the Commission rejected the claim based on 
the eight year statute of limitations which had expired 
more than seven years before petitioner raised this 
claim in his motion for teview, we do not consider 
Mr. Zupon's claim because his failure to raise the 
claim at the original hearing precludes any review on 
appeal See Ashcroft v. industrial Comm'n, S55 P.2d 
267, 268-69 (Utah App 1993). 
3. Petitioner also claims we should remand the case 
for factual findings because the Commission applied 
the substantial evidence taiX rather than a 
preponderance of the evidence standard. See Ashcrqft 
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v. Industrial Comm'u, 855 P.2d 267, 269 (Utah App. J 
1993). In Ashcrqft, the Industrial Commission held I 
petitioner had failed to meet his burden of proof under I 
the substantial evidence standard. Furthermore, the I 
only evaluation of the evidence the Commission did I 
was under the substantia] evidence standard. We noted J 
substantial evidence review is not the role of the I 
Commission, a trier of fact. Id. I 
The case at hand is significantly different. Here, die I 
Commission ruled the ALT* findings were supported I 
by substantia] evidence, the order found the I 
•respondents had established no medical causation by I 
^substantial evidence." This is the exact opposite of I 
Ashcrqft. A substantial evidence standard represents a I 
higher burden of proof and thus the comment I 
represents at most a harmless error. I 
Furthermore, in the order denying review, the I 
Commission systematically responded directly to the I 
challenges the petitioner asserted to the ALTs I 
findings. In response to the petitioner*s challenge that 
the A U improperly found no medical causation, the I 
Commission recited the evidence supporting medical I 
causation and concluded "the medical records do not 
establish a medical causal connection between 
applicant's August 7, 1975 industrial injury and his 
permanent total disability.* As opposed to Ashcrqft, 
where substantia] evidence was the only comment on 
the evidence by the Commission, in this case the 
substantial evidence standard is simply recited in 
response to an unclear nonspecific challenge. The 
substantive, factual discussion of the case applies the 
necessary preponderance of the evidence standard. 
4. Although petitioner argues that application of the ! 
odd lot analysis indicates he is entitled to benefits, it ! 
is clear from the record there was, at the very least, 
never any rehabilitation evaluation ordered. See 
Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Management, 725 
P.2d 1323, 1328 (Utah 1986) (remanding for 
rehabilitation determination). See oho Norton v. 
IndustrialComm'n, 728 P.2d 1025,1028 (Utah 1986) 
(per curiam) (remanding to assess disability and 
provide employer opportunity to prove existence of 
work). 
5. The ALJ and the Commission discussed an 
alternative basis for the rejection of petitioner's claim. 
Based on the medical panel's assessment that there 
was only a one-in-six chance petitioner's back injury 
aggravated his spine disease, the A U questioned the 
validity of the earlier ALJ's finding of medical 
causation. The ALI noted a one~in-six, or 16 and 66 
one~hundredths percent, chance is significantly less 
than the 50 percent required under the preponderance 
of the evidence standard. Furthermore, the ALJ 
explicitly and completely reviewed the substantial, 
undisputed medical evidence in the case. The 
Commission also affirmed the ALJ's finding of no 
medical causation on this basis and recited undisputed 
facts in the record to support its conclusion. The 
commission noted* (1) The medical records show no 
treatment for back pain after 1976; (2) The doctors 
who treated petitioner immediately after the accident 
noted he complained of pain and limited use of much 
of his body, 'suggesting that the applicant was 
experiencing symptoms of progressive arthritis of the 
spine, shoulders, elbows, and hands;" (3) A doctor in 
1976 concluded petitioner could return to work; and 
(4) A doctor evaluating petitioner for Social Security 
Benefits in 1981 concluded petitioner's symptoms 
were out of proportion with the doctor's objective 
analysis. 
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DURHAM, Justice: 
ThorupBrothers Construction, Inc., asks us to 
review an order of the Auditing Division of the 
Utah State Tax Commission assessing 
$26,328.30 in additional sales tax plus interest. 
We reverse. 
In 1987, the Catholic Diocese o f Salt Lake 
City contracted with Thorup Brothers 
Construction, Inc. (Thorup), to construct an 
addition to Judge Memorial Catholic High 
School, a tax-exempt entity under Utah Code 
Ann. {59-12-104(8) (Supp. 1993), which is 
owned and operated by the Diocese. (The 
Diocese and Judge Memorial will be referred to 
collectively as Judge Memorial.) Thorup agreed 
to build an auditorium, a music room, and 
locker rooms. In return, Judge Memorial agreed 
to pay Thorup for its labor and purchased 
materia] costs plus sales tax. Judge Memorial 
specifically reserved the right to donate 
construction materials to the project1 and Thorup 
agreed to credit Judge Memorial for those 
materials. Consistent with this agreement, Judge 
Memorial issued purchase orders totalling 
I $374,102 based on Thorup's detailed materials 
lists. 
To support the project, Judge Memorial also 
contracted with Scott, Louie & Browning 
Architects (Scott). Both Scott and Thorup 
entered into subcontracts. Scott also hired The 
Rboads Company, Inc., to conduct the ongoing 
inspection of the project's masonry work. In 
addition, Judge Memorial hired £ . W. Allen and 
James S. Bailey as structural engineers for the 
project. Finally, James Maher, a member of 
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